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with the sword at their throat they have become
members of what is facetiously called the
'Brotherhood’ of Nations!
William Hunter, an "Old Resident" of the foreign
factories in Canton, 1825-1842
The 'Fan Kwae’ at Canton: Before Treaty Days
(London, 1882; reprint, Shanghai, China: Oriental
Affairs, 1938), 95.
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ABSTRACT
"Palmerston, Parliament and Peking" is a revisionist
work designed to challenge the prevailing economic
interpretations of the first Opium War, 1839-1842.
Orthodox historiography considers early nineteenth-century
Britain as a modern, industrial society and argues that its
Government needed to respond violently to the Chinese
authorities' suppression of the opium trade in order to
protect and expand a lucrative endeavor.

Indian opium

sales generated revenue for the British-run government in
Bengal and paid for Chinese tea, a highly prized commodity
in Great Britain.

British industrialists demanded war to

end the Chinese Government's restrictions on trade, known
as the Canton system, thus opening China's market to goods
produced by Britain's expanding industrial economy.
During the mid-1970s a new interpretation of British
society began to emerge which challenges the centrality of
modernization to the experience of life in early
nineteenth-century Britain.

Viewing Britain in the 1830s

as a predominantly traditional society, these historians
argue that the landed aristocracy remained the dominant
order economically, socially and politically.

Although

Northern industrialists launched their challenge to this
viii
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aristocratie order in this period, the limited scope of
industrial growth inhibited their ability to win approval
for middle-class initiatives at the highest levels of
government.
By revising the interpretation of the British
Cabinet's decision to wage war on China, this dissertation
supports these new interpretations of early nineteenthcentury British society.

Lord Melbourne's Whig Ministry

(1835-1841) did not respond immediately to calls for a
violent response to events in China.

Several Ministers

doubted the wisdom of confronting such a populous empire as
China, and economic considerations shared center stage with
the Government's domestic political interests.

A political

crisis in the Fall of 1839 created the opportunity for
middle-class Radicals, whose constituent eagerly awaited
the "opening" of China, to sv/ay a cautious aristocratic
government.

IX
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INTRODUCTION

In 183 9 and 184 0 the Government of Great Britain, the
Melbourne Ministry (1835-1841), contemplated war with
China.

At home the Ministry faced growing political

resistance.

The Opposition stridently called the nation's

attention to the Chartist riots, a deficit budget, colonial
rebellions in Canada and Jamaica, Irish unrest,
disestablishment of the Anglican Church and threats to
British trade in Mexico, Buenos Aires and China.^ This
political crisis sets the scene for the Melbourne
Ministry's decision to wage war in response to the Chinese
government's seizure of £2,000,000 worth of British owned
opium.

^Appendix A; Viscount Powerscourt, "House of Commons
Debate, January 30, 1840," Times, 31 January 1840, p. 3 ;
See also Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists ; Popular Politics
in the Industrial Revolution (New York : Pantheon Books,
1984); Ged Martin, The Durham Report and British Policy: A
Critical Essay (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
1972); Philip J. McLewin, Power and Economic Change: The
Response to Emancipation in Jamaica and British Guiana
1840-1865 (New York: Garland, 1987); John O. Ranelagh, A
Short History of Ireland (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1983); G.I.T. Machin, Politics and the Churches in
Great Britain (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1977); Iwan Wyn
Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and Cooperation in
Spanish America, 1835-1848" (Ph.D. diss., University of
London, 1975); For China see footnote 2.
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2
Although the opium crisis has certainly not been
ignored, its relationship to the British domestic situation
has not been fully explored.

Current historiography on the

subject focuses primarily on economic issues in the Far
E a s t P r e v a i l i n g interpretations argue that the British
Government needed to respond violently to the Chinese
authorities' suppression of the opium trade in order to
protect and to expand a lucrative endeavor.

Indian opium

sales generated revenue for the British-run government in
Bengal and paid for Chinese tea, a highly prized commodity
in Great Britain.

Furthermore, British industrialists

demanded war to end the Chinese Government's restrictions
on trade, known as the Canton System, and to create an
opportunity to sell mass-produced goods.

The resulting war

changed the economic relationship between Britain and China
by opening the latter's vast market.

^Gerald S. Graham, The China. Station: War and
Diplomacy, 1830-1869 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Tan
Chung, China and the Brave New World: A Study of the
Origins of the Opium War (1840-42) (Durham, N.C.: Carolina
Academic Press, 1978); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 18401842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part
of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced
the Gates Ajar (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1975); Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and The
Opium War (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1964);
Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China,
1800-1842 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951);
Maurice Collis. Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the Opium
Imbroglio at Canton in the 1830's & the Anglo-Chinese War
that Followed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947); David
Gwen, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven :
Yale University Press, 1934; reprint, Archon Books, 1968) .
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Douglas North, winner of the 1993 Nobel prize for
economics, argues that changes in economic institutions
must be studied in the particular political context of the
time rather than in isolation.

Political institutions

define and maintain economic relations based on property
rights and contracts.

Since economic, social and political

institutions by their very nature are slow to adapt
themselves, substantial economic changes will more likely
occur when accompanied by either an internal or external
threat to a political institution.^

North criticizes

purely economic historical analyses that use simple
"cost/benefit calculus."

This methodology assumes that

individuals weigh the cost of a particular economic system
against the potential benefits of changing it.

If the cost

of change outweighs the benefits--economic growth--then
individuals will act to preserve the system.

If, on the

other hand, the benefits outweigh the cost, then
individuals will act to change the system.^
Historians of the Opium War have generally used
cost/benefit calculus to explain the opening of China.
They have argued that "the British" believed that the
Chinese government's restrictions on foreign trade limited
the potential for an exponential growth in sales of British

^Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic
History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 27-9.
^North, Structure and Change, 4-5.
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4
manufactured goods.

The benefits of change outweighed the

cost of preserving the system.

Because of the inhibiting

trade environment, the "British" sought an excuse to change
violently their economic relationship with China.
Two fundamental deficiencies limit the ability of
these orthodox interpretations to explain the events which
occurred in China and London at the end of the 1830s.
First, most of the historians

who have dealt with the

issue present a monolithic image of the "British."

These

scholars make few attempts to differentiate between the
wishes of the merchants in China and the policies of Her
Majesty's Government in London.

They also assume that the

British Government strove to meet the needs of the
mercantile and manufacturing communities.

The result of

this methodological approach is an assumption that the
historian can use the term "British" to mean merchants,
manufacturers. Foreign Service Officers, the Foreign Office
and the Government without differentiating among them.
Such an oversight is not unique to the Opium War.
Historian Ged Martin finds similar deficiencies in
histories of British policy toward Canada during the same
period (1835-1841).

Martin notes that "The historians'

shorthand may mislead in such terms as 'British’ or ' the
British Government.’

In the 1830s there was certainly

The conclusion contains criticism of specific
historians and their work.
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little sign of ' the Official mind’ and we must guard
against the more workaday device of ' the Colonial Office
view ’ .
Second, assuming a convergence of desires among "the
British" allows historians of the Opium War to ignore the
complexity of British society and politics in the first
half of the nineteenth century.

They can consider members

of the British Government in an economic rather than a
political role.

As Douglas North points out, however, most

politicians concern themselves more with the preservation
of their own power, rather than with seeking ways to expand
the econom.y.

Economic change occurs when a threat to a

political institution combines with the desire for economic
gain.

Just as North does not reduce economic policies to

the search for growth, he refuses to explain political
action as a simple grab for power and control.

A society's

governing ideology, by providing guidelines for acceptable
behavior, shapes the actions of both the rulers and the
ruled.^

In order to place a particular historical event

in context, one must examine the hegemonic values within a
community.

^Ged Martin, "Confederation Rejected: The British
Debate on Canada, 1837-1840," Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 11 (October 1982): 35.
^North, Structure and Change, 21-9.
^North, Structure and Change, 45-58.
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6
Until recently the orthodox interpretations in British
history argued that in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries the English witnessed the final decay
of traditional society and the emergence of a modern
nation.

As industry and commerce replaced agriculture as

the most significant aspect of the economy, the rural,
aristocratic community of the ancien regime gave way to the
urban, middle class society of the Victorian period.
Following the political and economic policies and values of
the middle class, British imperial power reached its
apogee.

During the mid-1970s a new interpretation of

nineteenth century British social structure began to emerge
which challenged this standard interpretation.

Denying the

centrality of modernization to the experience of life in
the first half of the nineteenth century, these historians
view Britain in the 1830s as a predominantly traditional
society.

The landed aristocracy remained the dominant

order economically, socially and politically.

Although

Northern industrialists began their challenge to Britain's
aristocratic order in the this period, the limited scope of
industrial growth inhibited their ability to win approval
for middle-class initiatives at the highest levels of
government.
One of the major points of contention between these
two sets of interpretations is the nature of the nineteenth

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

century economy.®

The standard interpretation emphasizes

the industrial revolution.

Between 1760 and 1840 the

English economy changed from hand production, using human
or animal power to make unique goods in a family setting,
to mass production, using machine-generated power to make
standardized goods in factories.

The change in production

caused the economy to "take-off" as it moved beyond
providing subsistence needs for a local community to
providing consumer goods for the society at large and for
export abroad.

Displaced rural laborers left the familiar

surroundings of the traditional family economy to work in
the unsafe factory system, which concentrated all aspects
of production around the steam engine.

According to these

interpretations, overseas trade performed an essential
service in providing markets for Britain's expanding
industrial economy.^

For two comprehensive historigraphical essays on the
early nineteenth-century economy see: David Cannadine, "The
Past and Present in the English Industrial Revolution,"
Past and Present no. 103 (May 1984): 131-72; Joel Mokyr,
"Editor's Introduction: The New Economic History and the
Industrial Revolution," idem, ed., The British Industrial
Revolution: An Economic Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1993), 1-131.
^Walt Whitman Rostow, British Economy of the
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948; reprint,
1949 ; idem, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
Manifesto (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1960);
idem. How It All Began: Origins of the Modern Economy (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Phyllis Deane and W.A. Cole,
British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 : Trends and Structure
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); Phyllis
Deane, The First Industrial Revolution (Cambridge :
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Critics of this interpretation argue that while
industrialization began in the early nineteenth century,
the change affected a relatively small percentage of the
total economy.

Only 10 to 12 per cent of the English labor

force worked in modern factories ; the remainder engaged in
agriculture or in traditional trades.

Textile production,

the most widely used example of industrialization, centered
around Lancashire,

It employed one-half of the industrial

work force, but represented 7 per cent of British national
income.'"^

When iron and steel are added to textile

production, total industrial output still only represented
less than one-fourth of total manufacturing output in 1840.
The results of these studies show a rate of growth
considerably slower and more constant in the total economy
than the rate advanced by advocates of an industrial take
off theory.

Consequently, as historians downplay the

importance of industrialization to the total economy, they
similarly diminish the significance previously attributed
to foreign markets for manufactured goods.

Cambridge University Press, 1965); David Landes, The
Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1969); Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and Overseas
Trade (Atlantic Highlands, N J : Humanities Press, 1979).
^°Michael Fores, "The Myth of a British Industrial
Revolution," History 65 (1981): 181-98.
” c. Knick Harley, "British Industrialization Before
1841: Evidence of Slower Growth During the Industrial
Revolution," Journal of Economic History 42 (June 1982) :
267-89; N.F.R. Crafts, "British Economic Growth, 1700-1831:
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The dominance of the industrial take-off theory has
shaped the standard interpretation of early nineteenth
century social structure.

Social historians tend to find

the origins of modern English social relationships in this
period.

National class divisions, based on the new urban

industrial experience, replaced paternalistic social
relationships derived from life in small rural communities.
With the decline of traditional relationships the landed
aristocracy abdicated responsibility to the rising
capitalist middle class, which struggled to maintain its
hegemonic position in society against the new industrial
working class.

Each class had unique values that

necessarily produced conflict among the various social
groups and their belief systems.
Like their counterparts in economic history, some
social historians have questioned the validity of viewing
early nineteenth-century social relationships in modern
terms.

Revisionists downplay the division of English

A Review of the Evidence, Economic History Review 26 (May
1983): 177-99; idem, British Economic Growth During the
Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
^^For the two most important presentations of this
general interpretation, see : Harold Perkin, The Origins of
Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 1969) ; Edward Palmer Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963; New
York : Vintage Books, 1966) .
^^Any of the most recent interpretations rest on what
has been described as a "linguistic turn" in methodology.
For the pros and cons of this approach see : David Mayfield
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society along economic lines--land, capital and labor--and
examine society in terms of governors and governed, idle
and industrious orders, or privileged few and the people.
Those with political power dominated those without, and a
life of leisure commanded more prestige than did working
for a living.

In this type of society the traditional

aristocracy still played the dominant role.

Domination

involved more than simply exploitation; it dictated a
responsibility to the lower orders.

Contemporaries thus

did not view as natural the conflict among the various
orders of society.

Animosities grew out of the perceived

abuse of political power and the failure to reconcile the
various interests of the community, rather than the misuse
.

of economic power.

14

and Susan Throne, "Social History and Its Discontents:
Gareth Stedman Jones and the Politics of Language," Social
History 11 (May 1992): 165-88; John Lawrence and Miles
Taylor, "The Poverty of Protest : Gareth Stedman Jones and
the Politics of Language--A Reply," Social History 18
(January 1993): 1-15; Patrick Joyce, "The Imaginary
Discontents of Social History: A Note of Response to
Mayfield and Throne, and Lawrence and Taylor," Social
History 18 (January 1993): 81-5; James Vernon, "Who's
Afraid of the 'Linguistic Turn’? The Politics of Social
History and Its Discontents," Social History 19 (January
1994): 81-97.
^^Francis M.L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the
Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963);
idem. The Rise of Respectable Society; A Social History of
Victorian Britain, 1830-1900 (Cambridge University Press,
1988); Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in
English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1983) ; Patrick Joyce, Visions
of the People: Industrial England and the Question of
Class, 1840-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
standard interpretations of domestic politics during
the late 1830s contrast sharply with the revisions taking
place in economic and social histories.

Political

histories commonly argue that in the second half of the
1830s the foundations of the modern British two-party
system developed.

They define a "party" as a structured

organization with a clear ideology.

The Liberal Party,

according to this analysis, advocated progressive reform of
the constitution and attracted its support from large urban
and non-English (Irish, Scottish and Welsh) constituencies.
The Conservative Party, drawing its support from small
boroughs and English counties, opposed constitutional
reform but admitted the necessity of practical reforms.
Once party members entered the House of Commons, they
seldom voted across party lines ; party organization and
ideology instilled this discipline.
Such modern definitions of party organization and
ideology have not stood unchallenged.

Challengers to the

^^Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English
Politics, 1832-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955); idem,
"The Organization of the Conservative Party, 1832-1846,
Part I; The Parliamentary Organization," Parliamentary
History 1 (1982): 137-59; idem, "The Organization of the
Conservative Party, 1832-1846, Part II: The Electoral
Organization," Parliamentary History 2 (1983) : 131-52 ;
D.E.D. Beales, "Parliamentary Parties and the 'Independent'
Member, 1810-1860," Ideas and Institutions of Victorian
Britain: Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark, Robert
Robson, ed., (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), 1-19 ; David
Close, "The Formation of a Two-Party Alignment in the House
of Commons," English Historical Review 84 (April 1969).
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prevailing interpretation prefer a narrower, and more
traditional, definition of party politics.

Instead of two

all-encompassing parties, revisionists focus on smaller
groups of politicians held together by aristocrats through
bonds of family and friendship.

These historians also

reject the artificial lines created by the yes-or-no nature
of parliamentary divisions lists.

By examining the

ideological differences within the "Liberal" and
"Conservative" parties, one finds that a combination of
interests could produce the perception of a "two party
system."

Various blocs on both sides of parliament joined

forces to gain divergent goals by the same means.
The conventional interpretations of British imperial
history reflect the standard versions of economic, social
and political histories.

Proponents of a "free trade

imperialism" theory argue that British politicians favored

R. Hugh Cameron, "Parties and Policies in Early
Victorian Britain: A Suggestion for Revision," Canadian
Journal of History 3 (December 1979): 257-77; Boyd
Hilton,"Peel : A Reappraisal," Historical Journal 22 (1979) :
585-514; Peter Handler, Aristocratic Government in the Age
of Reform: Whigs and Liberals, 1830-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990); Ian Newbould, "Whiggery and the Dilemma of
Reform: Liberals, Radicals and the Melbourne
Administration, 1835-9," Bulletin of the Institute of
Historical Research 53 (1980): 229-41; idem, "Sir Robert
Peel and the Conservative Party, 1832-1841 : A Study in
Failure?," English Historical Review 48 (July 1983) : 52957; idem, "The Emergence of a Two-Party system in England
from 1830 to 1841 : Roll Call and Reconsideration,"
Parliaments, Estates and Representation 5 (June 1985) : 2531; idem, Whiggery and Reform, 183 0-41; The Politics of
Government (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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an aggressive overseas policy in order to expand foreign
markets for the new industrial economy.

Unlike their

aristocratic predecessors, who sought a formal imperial
structure, early- and mid-Victorian leaders followed a
laissez-faire policy which favored inform.al economic
control to accomplish their imperialistic goals.

Events

around the world drew British forces into areas whose
political leaders refused to cooperate v/ith the agents of
the informal empire.

This theory emphasizes the role of

British officials and citizens abroad and their
relationship to indigenous collaborators.

It suggests that

if overseas officials called for help, or got into trouble
with native administrations, then the British Government
sat ready to use force.

Most critics of "free trade

imperialism" do not challenge their antagonists'
assumptions about the nature of early nineteenth century
English society.

They continue to set English overseas

exploits within the context of an industrial middle-class
society.

An ideology based on laissez-faire economics.

^^John Gallagher and Roland Robinson, "Imperialism of
Free Trade," Economic History Review 6 (1953): 1-15; Roland
Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," The
Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, Edited with an
Introduction by Wm. Roger Louis (New York: New View Points,
1976), 128-151; David K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire
1830-1914 (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1973); Bernard
Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical
Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and
Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press, 1970).
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however, precluded the possibility of government
intervention in order to advance foreign trade.

Foreign

wars represented an exception, not the rule.
Currently, Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, recognizing
the new work of economic and social historians, have begun
to set imperial activity within the context of an
aristocratic society.

Rejecting the notion that the needs

of Northern industrialists motivated economic expansion,
Cain and Hopkins developed the idea of "Gentlemanly
Capitalism."

During the course of the eighteenth century,

bankers and commercial capitalists, those who could best
afford the lifestyle of gentlemen, entered into Britain's
ruling elite by supporting the growth of a "Fiscal-Military
State"--the apparatus needed to finance continental wars,
to pay for government patronage and to collect excise
taxes.

These gentlemen, located in or near the City of

London, exercised considerable influence in Whitehall and

^^Desmond C.M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade:
Some Reservations," Economic History Review 21 (1958): 295305; idem, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign
Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); idem,
"Further Objections to an ' Imperialism of Free Trade’,
1830-50." Economic History Review 25 (February 1973): 7791; Oliver MacDonagh, "The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade,"
Economic History Review 14 (April 1962): 489-501; Britten
Dean, "The British Informal Empire: The Case of China," The
Journal of Comm.onwealth & Comparative Politics 14 (March
1975): 54-81.
^*The most developed presentation of this conception
is John Brewer's The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the
English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988).
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led the drive toward imperialist expansion.

Parliamentary

leaders--landed aristocrats--took this advice, because
"successful expansion, reinforced by colonial acquisitions,
generated profits and revenues, helped to service the
national debt, and contributed to employment and political
stability.
While a reinterpretation of the British Cabinet's
decision to wage the first Opium War (1839-1842) supports
these new explanations of early nineteenth-century British
society, an important anomaly needs to be explained.

The

evidence available shows that Northern merchants and
industrialists provided the impetus behind the use of
force, not the City, the Foreign Office, or the Cabinet.
The question then becomes for the historian of the Opium
War : why did a parliament and Cabinet, dominated by landed
aristocrats, address so actively the economic needs of a
political and social minority?

The political crisis the

Melbourne Ministry faced during this period provides the
key to an answer.
In 1839, just six short years after the summoning of
the first Reform Parliament, Lord Melbourne still struggled

^°Peter J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism:
Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (New York: Longman,
1993), 103; See also their "The Political Economy of
British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914," Economic History
Review 23 (Novem.ber 1980) :463-90, as well as, "Gentlemanly
Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old
Colonial System, 1688-1850," Economic History Review 29
(December 1986): 501-25.
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with the Great Reform Act's legacy.

His Ministry had lost

the confidence of the House of Commons and faced the
possibility of losing office.

On domestic issues the

Opposition accused the Ministry of undermining the
constitution of Great Britain, while Radicals claimed the
Ministry supported the status quo.

It fought back by

pointing to the active participation of members of the
Opposition and Radicals in passing controversial pieces of
legislation.

On foreign policy issues Her Majesty's

Government did not have this luxury.
While normally foreign policy remained "free from
effective interference by parliament,

freedom meant

taking responsibility for real, or perceived, failed
policies.

In 1836 Melbourne wrote to Lord Palmerston,

Foreign Minister, "From all I hear of the real temper of
the House of Commons, We must be very careful what we do in
foreign a f f a i r s . P a l m e r s t o n was not careful enough.
In 1839 the Opposition asserted that the Ministry's
inaction in regard to overseas interests threatened the
commercial position of British merchants.

Her Majesty's

Government thus needed strong, swift action to pacify the

^^Bernard Porter, "British Foreign Policy in the
Nineteenth Century," The Historical Journal 23 (1980), 194,
^^Viscount Melbourne to Viscount Palmerston, South
Street, 10 February 1836. Palmerston Papers. Property of
the Broadlands Trust. Deposited in Southampton University
Library (Hereafter cited as PP). GC/ME/69.
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commercial and manufacturing constituencies.

The opium

crisis, which had developed in China in March 183 9,
provided the best opportunity to act swiftly without
risking a general European war.

The political threat from

the Opposition and the Radicals was a crucial factor in the
Ministry's decision to send an expeditionary force to
China.
Domestic politics then played an integral role in the
decision to wage war.

To focus primarily on economic

issues in the Far East provides too simplistic an
interpretation of events.

Understanding the Melbourne

Ministry's decision to send an expeditionary force to China
in 1839 requires a discussion of the institutional changes
that occurred both in Great Britain and in China during the
early 1830s.

In 1832 Great Britain experienced the

sweeping changes of the Great Reform Bill; in 1834 the
China trade lost both of its regulatory institutions--the
British East India Company and the Canton System.

These

institutional changes contributed to the uncertainty of
both parliamentary politics and Anglo-Chinese relations.
Although half way around the world from each other, the
deterioration of conditions in Britain and China resulted
in two simultaneous crises that politicians in the British
Parliament linked together.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
Because the role the nineteenth-century British
"state" falls so easily in and out of favor with
scholars,

I feel compelled to explain my concentration

on parliamentary politics.

In the early nineteenth century

parliament provided the recognized forum for discussing
issues of national interest.

Newspapers of every political

inclination covered events in the capital with considerable
attention.

As one newspaper explained to its readers,

the conflicting interests and views which engage
and direct the energies of the several classes
forming the community--in the largest acceptance
of the term--of this vast empire are
concentrated, and placed as it were in the area
of parliament for discug,sion in detail, and for
adjustment in patches."
Parliament thus furnishes a legitimate setting for
historical inquiry.

A detailed examination of the issues

that capture the attention of Parliament contributes to a
better understanding of the reaction of that body and the
British press to the news that the Chinese government had
confiscated £2,000,000 worth of British owned opium.
Beginning in August of 1839 and lasting until the
summer of 184 0, the Opposition saw the opium crisis as
another example of Ministerial incompetence.

In this tense

23.

For the changing fortunes of the "state" in
historical scholarship see Martin J. Wiener, "The Unloved
State: Twentieth-Century Politics in the Writing of
Nineteenth-Century History," Journal of British Studies 33
(July 1994): 283-308.
^'^"Meeting of Parliament," The Charter (London), 19
January 1840, p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
political atmosphere the Ministry met at Windsor Castle on
1 October 183 9 to decide the fate of the China question.
The following spring, while the political assault from the
Opposition continued and rumors of war leaked out to the
press, journalists and pamphleteers argued whether the
Chinese actions justified a violent response; they failed
to reach a consensus.

The argument then shifted to the

House of Commons where politicians debated whether or not
Melbourne's Ministry had acted appropriately in the years
leading up to the conflict.

One can describe the policy

which emerged from both the private Cabinet debate and the
public debate as "British" only in the broadest terms.
Individual members of the Cabinet doubted the wisdom of
sending forces to China, the press remained divided over
the issue and almost one-half of the M.P.s voted against
the Ministry's China policy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE GREAT REFORM ACT
AND
DEREGULATION OF THE CHINA TRADE

At the beginning of the nineteenth century an
aristocratic elite dominated Great Britain.

This elite saw

land as the rudimentary source of wealth and the unwashed
masses of society as a serious threat to the security of
the realm.

The "unreformed system" theoretically

restricted the parliamentary franchise to men of
independent status within the community; property, poor
rates or income, each defined on a regional basis,
determined independence.

As these economic values changed

at varying rates and as property changed owners over the
centuries, the actual wealth and status of individual
electors varied from region to region.

No generalizations

can adequately describe the incredible number of variations
within the unreformed system.^ These myriad methods for

^Frank O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: The
Unreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian England, 17341832 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 27-105; Michael
Brock, The Great Reform Act (London: Hutchinson University
Library, 1973), 18-24.
20
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selecting Members of Parliament remained overwhelmingly
under the influence of the local landed aristocracy.^

Any

fundamental change in the constitutional system seemed
unlikely because the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
wars had solidified the aristocratic perception of reality.
Political circumstances, however, did not fully
correspond to the changing economic and social realities.
The industrial revolution had begun to shift the wealth of
Great Britain from the agricultural sector of the economy
to the industrial, and from the rural areas to the urban.
This redistribution of wealth, and the population migration
which followed a similar pattern, started a fundamental
shift in the social structure.

Great Britain saw the rise

of an industrial capitalist class and the growth of the
urban working classes.

Denied the right to share in the

political power, these groups began their challenge to the
aristocratic government because they believed that the
political monopoly encouraged monopolies of wealth.

The

Historians disagree about the precise meaning of
"deference," or aristocratic influence : O 'Gorman, Voters,
Patrons, and Parties, 225-44; Richard Davis, "The Whigs and
the Idea of Electoral Deference : Some Further Thoughts on
the Great Reform Act," Durham University Journal 67
(December 1974): 79-91; idem, "Deference and Aristocracy in
the Time of the Great Reform Act," American Historical
Review 81 (June 1976) : 532-39; J.G.A. Pocock, "The Classic
Theory of Deference," American Historical Review 81 (June
1976): 516-23; David Spring, "Walter Bagehot and
Deference," American Historical Review 81 (June 1976) : 52431; Alan Heesom, "'Legitimate’ versus 'Illegitimate’
Influences : Aristocratic Electioneering in Mid-Victorian
Britain," Parliamentary History 1 (1988): 282-305.
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demographic changes had left many rural areas unpopulated
and created several new municipalities.

While the old

boroughs retained their representatives, however, the new
urban centers such as Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds
failed to gain a voice in Commons.^
resulted in an unusual situation.

This imbalance
Historians estimate that

between 200 and 338 M.P.s owed their return to a single
proprietor.

Contemporary critics of the system, however,

used the higher number to argue for reform.^

The

undemocratic nature of this system meant that most
Englishmen had no direct representation in the House of
Commons.^
As information technology changed at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, newspapers, transported by faster
coaches on better roads, highlighted the inequities of the
unreformed system.*

A limited number of merchants and

^Brock, Great Reform Act, 18.
^0'Gorman {Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 20-1) favors
the lower estimate, while Brock {Great Reform Act, 34)
places the number around 275.
*James Vernon disagrees with the above view
altogether. He argues that "democracy" means more than
formal participation in a political process; other forms of
popular protest gave the masses a voice in the "unreformed
system." The Reform process itself therefore was
undemocratic because it eliminated more traditional forms
of political participation. Politics and the People: A
Study in English Political Culture, c.1815-1867 (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press), 7.
*Brock, Great Reform Act, 17.
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manufacturers could manipulate the electoral process, but
the money and time involved restricted participants to
those with substantial wealth and p r e s t i g e T h e average
commposition of the unreformed House of Commons broke down
as follows : 24% M.P.s had aristocratic connections; 25%
gentry; 33% professional, law, army or navy; and 15-2 0%
commercial, manufacturing or industrial.

The largest

numbers of M.P.s thus représentâtived the landed interest,
while the system allowed enough flexibility to include
other established interests within English society.®

To

many of the disfranchised the political situation was
intolerable, and they demanded reform.

Many others dreaded

political reform because they feared it would open a
pandora's box, inviting anarchy.’

The American and French

Revolutions reinforced the pathological fear that change
would wipe out all of the existing system.
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) best articulated the English
aristocratic outlook in Reflections on the Revolution in
France.

Written in the form of a letter to a Frenchman,

Reflections contains Burke's argument that the French
Revolution lacked legitimacy and stability because the
revolutionaries sought to destroy French society and to

^Brock, Great Reform Act, 24-5; Thompson, English
Landed Society, 7, 40-41, 63.
®0'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 119-2 0.
’Brock, Great Reform Act, 39-42.
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recreate a new one based on untested philosophical
speculations.

Burke supported his position by comparing

the French Revolution to the English Glorious Revolution of
1688.

He contended that the Glorious Revolution sought to

correct and conserve, not to destroy and recreate, English
society.
The key to Burke's argument was his insistence that
men must base their decisions on practice, not theory: "The
circumstances are what render every civil and political
scheme beneficial or noxious to m a n k i n d , n o t
metaphysical quality.

some

For example, the French

revolutionaries claimed that liberty was a positive good,
yet Burke asked if a madman should be set free?

He

concluded that societies should not make fundamental
decisions about political rights founded on untested
theories that lead to social unrest and violence.
According to Burke, social stability depended upon respect
for "inherited" principles.

Much like a son inherits his

father's physical characteristics and property rights, a
society acquires the political system of its forefathers.
Just as the son is not the father, yet retains his father's
qualities, a society must only change slowly over time in
order to avoid violence--as the English did in 1688.

Rapid

changes in political or social relationships invited social

^°Edmund Burke. Reflections on the French Revolution.
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 8.
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unrest; gradual, or organic change, insured the
preservation of order.”
While Burke's Reflections offered a strong argument
for the maintenance of the status quo, his earlier
political career furnished support for reform.

Burke had

stood for Catholic emancipation and fought against the
American Revolutionary war and the East India Company's
imperialism in India.

Even in Reflections his

arguments, based on practical necessity rather than theory,
called for gradually changing institutions that
precipitated disorder.

Blind obedience to the past or to

authority represented a threat just as serious as
metaphysical theories : "A state without the means of some
change is without the means of its conservation."'*^
Most parliamentary figures in Britain agreed with
Burke's assessment of the French Revolution and sought to
maintain the British system relatively unchanged.

Labeling

British post-war politics as a struggle between
"conservatives" seeking to preserve the status quo and
"liberals" hoping to invent a new system glosses over,
however, important differences and similarities among

” Burke, Reflections, 35-9.
''^James J. Sack, "The Memory of Burke and the Memory
of Pitt: English Conservatism Confronts its Past, 18061829," Historical Journal 30 (1987): 623-40.
^^Burke, Reflections, 24.
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political leaders and creates simplistic stereotypes.'^
By referring to Burke's view of change, one can illuminate
the political landscape in early nineteenth century England
and define individuals within unique, yet overlapping,
tendencies--Ultra-Tory, Liberal Tory, Whig and Radical.
Ultra-Tories manifested the most extreme adherence to
the ideas explicated in Burke's Reflections.'^^

Ultra- or

High Tories regarded any "Reform" in response to popular
pressure as an invitation to violent revolution.

They

viewed the role of government within the framework of a
"managerial philosophy, which thought that the best way to
minimize social unhappiness was to control society.
The central government should exercise its control through
a variety of monopolies--political, religious and economic.
Politically, the subjects of the realm should defer to the
judgment of the landed aristocracy.

Land gave the

For the contrary view of early nineteenth-century
political circumstances--"Thus the new differences between
whig and tory, as distinct from the dead differences of the
early eighteenth century, emerge as a broad distinction
between a liberal and conservative attitude." Austin
Mitchell, The Whigs in Opposition, 1815-1830 (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1967), 13.
^^In "The Memory of Burke and the Memory of Pitt,"
Sack argues that English "conservatives" made little or no
use of Burke himself before the 1830s because of his
statements regarding Catholic Emancipation, the American
Revolution and the East India Company. Sack does not,
however, establish that conservatives ignored the arguments
within Reflections, only the author.
^*Boyd Hilton,"Peel : A Reappraisal," Historical
Journal 22 (1979): 607.
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aristocracy a stake in community stability as well as the
wealth needed to cultivate a political education.

In terms

of religion, Ultra-Tories clung steadfastly to the
"catholic" claims of the Anglican Church, believing the
Established Church essential to the survival of the
state.

Economically, they supported the monopolies of

the Crown-chartered companies--the Bank of England, the
East India and Levant Companies.

This support helped to

tie the older middle classes of the City, Shipping, East
Indian and West Indian interests--those who could best
afford seats in Commons--to the English ancien regime.
Liberal Tories reflected a more moderate view of
change than the High Tories.

According to this political

position, practical, gradual reform was a necessary evil.
Liberal tories believed that, "if one could only strip away
monopolies and pensions and other manifestations of
control, society would regulate itself and that it would do
so in such a way as, not to eliminate, but at least make
sense of pain and vice."

They concluded that "social

order would be restored only if individuals looked to their

^^Jonathan D.C. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 :
Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during
the Ancien Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985), 349-58.
^^W.D. Rubenstein, Capitalism, Culture, and Decline in
Britain 1750-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1994), 140-2.
^’Hilton, "Peel, " 607.
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own duties and relied on God's Providence to harmonize
t h e m . B r o a d l y speaking, contemporaries grouped the
Ultra- and Liberal Tories under the rubric "conservative"
or Tory.

Both groups' commitment to an "Anglican spiritual

basis for national life" provided the common cause for
unity
The Whigs had a more positive view of reform.

They

believed that the central government should respond with
positive measures to pressure for political, religious and
economic change from out of doors because "agitation" was a
sign of the people's loss of confidence in the
constitutional system.

This belief stemmed from an older

eighteenth-century ideology of aristocratic responsibility
held by Charles James Fox (1749-1806), the leading opponent
to England's war against revolutionary France and to the
"tyrannical" tendencies of George III and his ministers.
Lord Holland, Henry Richard Fox (1773-1840), carried his
uncle's ideas into the nineteenth century, transforming
them in the process.

He argued that since the British

political systems rested on the concept of popular
sovereignty. Parliament, acting as the trustees of the
people's will, must respond to their needs.

His opinion

^°Mandler, Aristocratic Government, 97.
James Sack, From Jacobite to Conservative: Reaction
and Orthodoxy in Britain, c .1760-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 253.
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went much further than the traditional view of Parliament
as the balance against despotism and democracy; it also
stood in sharp contrast to Tory authoritarianism as well as
to the practical individualism of Liberal Tories.
Radicals, on the other hand, called for the immediate
elimination of all political, religious and economic
monopolies.

They believed that the current artificial

political system created all such monopolies, the source of
inequality and distress, and their removal would then
provide social s t a b i l i t y . C o n t r a r y to the assertions of
either Burke or the Whigs, the study of history
demonstrated a gradual erosion of free Englishmen's natural
rights that could only be restored by enfranchising the
"non-represented" i n t e r e s t s . T o accomplish this goal.
Parliament needed to expand the definition of property

^^Mandler, Aristocratic Government, 19-21; Newbould
places more emphasis on the idea of the Whigs as a balance
between the extremes of democracy and despotism. Whiggery,
7; See also Ellis Archer Wasson, "The Great Whigs and
Parliamentary Reform, 1809-1830," Journal of British
Studies 24 (October 1985) : 434-464.
Jones, "Rethinking Chartism," 135; John Belchem,
"Radical Language and Ideology in the Nineteenth-Century
England: The Challenge of the Platform," Albion 20 (Summer
1988): 253 ; lorwerth J. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in
Early Nineteenth-Century London: John Gast and His Times
(Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 80.
^^T.M . Parssinen, "Association, Convention and AntiParliament in British Radical Politics, 1771-1848," English
Historical Review no.88 (July 1973): 504-33.
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beyond landed wealth to include industry, commerce and
labor.
Because no one of these fluid tendencies--Ultra-Tory,
Liberal Tory, Whig or Radical--could put together a
majority of M.P.s in Commons, the Crown's ministers had to
govern by coalition.

After 1815 Liberal Tories held most

of the key positions in the Government, while Ultra-Tories
provided the needed support.

The post-war ministries

followed a program of retrenchment to eliminate the war
debt, which grew from £238,000,000 in 1793 to £902,000,000
in 1815, and reduced the taxes required service i t T h e
Whigs, who furnished the majority of the Opposition,
offered little resistence to such popular measures.
Furthermore Lord Grey (Charles Grey) , the only
Parliamentary leader who could command the loyalty of the
various factions within Whigs, refused to seek office.
In 1828 the Duke of Wellington (Arthur Wellesley),
hero of the Battle of Waterloo, headed a ministry composed
of Ultra- and Liberal Tories.

The ministry first sought to

repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, which excluded

^^Norman Gash, "After Waterloo : British Society and
the Legacy of the Napoleonic Wars," Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society 28 (1978): 152; See also Boyd
Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce: The Economic Policies of
the Tory Governments 1815-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977).
^^Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition, 26ff; Newbould,
Whiggery, 44-5.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
Catholics from holding public office, and then, in 1829 it
put forth the Catholic Emancipation Bill (1829).
Wellington hoped to end the unrest in Catholic Ireland
caused by the 1800 Act of Union, but both of his endeavors
met stiff resistance from the ministerial benches because
of the threat to the Established Church.

Wellington

finally succeeded in maneuvering these bills through
Parliament with the help of the Opposition, but in the
process the cooperation between Ultra-Tories and Liberal
Tories ceased to e x i s t . A f t e r this episode the Duke
abandoned any attempts at reform because he feared it would
further weaken the Government's position, inviting public
unrest.
In July and August 183 0, as continental Europeans
faced violent revolutions, England was in the middle of an
election.

Enthusiasm for reform gripped Great Britain.

The unreformed system became a "scapegoat" for "people too
ignorant to know how their trouble originated," and "many
people saw Reform as a panacea.

The continental

^^George M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill;
Being the Life of Charles, Second Earl Grey (New York:
Richard R. Smith, 1929), 208-10; Brock shows that George
Canning (Prime Minster 1827) had previously weakened the
Tories by forming a coalition Government but then points
out the Ultra-Tories' hatred of Wellington and Sir Robert
Peel for "ratting" on the Protestant institutions of
Britain. Great Reform Act, 55.
^®Brock, Great Reform Act, 64, 61; Newbould, Whiggery,
42 .
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revolutions had little direct effect on the British
elections, but the unrest did influence the mindset of many
Members of Parliament when they took their seats.
Following the election, Wellington's Government returned in
a weakened position.

The Whigs, led by Lord Grey, suddenly

provided a considerable opposition after fifty years of
marginal significance.

They still hoped that the Duke

would introduce at least a "sham Reform Bill."^^

Grey and

the Whigs preferred government-sponsored reform over the
violence a revolution would b r i n g . W e l l i n g t o n quickly
dashed their hopes for change, and the Whigs began to
demand reform.
In the ensuing parliamentary debates Wellington's
Ministry fell because several Ultra-Tories went into
Opposition, believing Wellington had earlier betrayed the
Protestant constitution.

Lord Grey formed a Government

composed of peers and territorial magnates, and had the
support of Whigs, Radicals and Ultra-Tories.

He began the

push for reform, hoping to eliminate the threat to social
order and property.Ironically,

the Ultras felt the

unreformed system allowed Wellington to ignore the true

^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 102-3.
^°Trevelyan, Lord Grey, 235-6; Newbould, Whiggery, 40,
51.
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 69; Newbould, Whiggery, 80.
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 45-54.
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will of the English people, and reform meant restoring
Protestant i n f l u e n c e B e c a u s e of the coalitional nature
of its majority in Commons, Grey's Ministry hammered out a
compromise without totally destroying the existing
political system.

The compromise did, however, introduce

"sweeping changes" to the constitution to insure that
further reform would not be needed for another thirty or
forty years.
The Great Reform Act of 1832 formed the basis of this
compromise.

The act had two essential tenets, both of

which were designed to limit the visibility of the
"pocket"

or "rotten" boroughs.

The bill gave the

industrial and commercial capitalists the right to vote by
extending the franchise to £10 households which equaled
about 200,000 voters, or a 45% increase of the
e l e c t o r a t e T h e Reform Bill also changed the medieval
form of territorial representation, which had excluded the
new urban centers, to a form of proportional
representation, which included them.

These measures

^^D.C. Moore, "The Other Face of Reform," Victorian
Studies 5 (September 1961): 7-34; Newbould, Whiggery, 4852 .
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 145-8.
*The term "pocket borough" refers to a borough which
had few, or no, constituents except the landlord. The term
is used often because the proprietor had the Member of
Parliament "in his pocket."
^^0'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 178-80.
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eliminated a total of 143 seats, the majority of which were
held by conservatives, and redistributed the seats to the
new urban-industrial centers as well as
counties.

English and Welsh

These changes gave the middle classes' concerns-

-trade and dissent--a wider and more obvious place in the
political d e b a t e T h e Whigs believed that tying the new
middle classes to rank and property would help to remove
the threat to social stabilty posed by the lower orders.
The Great Reform Bill still denied the working classes
the right to vote ; they remained outside the formal
political system.

Anti-reformers felt that popular

discontent with the constitution arose from material needs
rather than from an intellectual commitment to reform.
This argument complemented the Whig faithfulness to
preserving the aristocratic government.

To extend the

franchise to the lower orders would invite future rifts in
society.

The decision to exclude the working classes

only delayed further agitation on their part ; in 183 9 the
Chartist movement violently called for reform.
The Great Reform Bill also had immediate political
ramifications.

The bill diluted the power base of the

conservatives and further destroyed cooperation among

^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 13 8-9, 335-5.
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 59.
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 43-4.
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Ultra- and Liberal Tories.

As a result of the first reform

election in 1832, the Tories only held 144 seats, while the
Reformers claimed 476.

The remaining 38 seats went to

Irish Repealers who pushed for revocation of the Act of
U n i o n . W h i l e in Opposition, the conservatives had no
unified voice, but they were not helpless.
spokesman stood out--Sir Robert Peel.

One prominent

Peel, leader of the

Liberal Tories, gathered support in the House of Commons,
advocating a policy of cooperation with the Whigs.

Peel

believed that cooperation would allow the conservatives
enough time to regroup and pose a more serious political
threat to the Whigs.

He tried to offer a middle ground

which promoted practical reform.

He hoped to bring change

under the control of the friends of the traditional
constitution and prevent more radical reforms from taking
place.

In the Tamworth Manifesto Peel tried to paint

himself as the leader of a moderate party committed to
preserving the status quo, rather than the leader of a
reactionary party.

To accomplish his goal, he had to bring

the Ultra-Tories to heel.

Peel lacked, however,

credibility with the Ultra-Tories, who wanted "to defend
and preserve a paternalistic, hierarchical society" against

The New Parliament," The Guardian (Manchester), 1
January 1833, p.2; Newbould breaks Grey's support into
three categories : 91 Ministerial M.P.s, 267 Ministerial
fringe, and 137 waverers. Whiggery, 21.
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any changes in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t H i s participation in
reform legislation had brought his faithfulness to the
English constitution into question.

Peel's weakness showed

itself most apparently in the House of Lords, where he had
virtually no influence among the Ultra-Tory Peers.

He had

to depend upon the cooperation of the Duke of Wellington in
order to entice the Lords to acquiesce in the call for
moderation.*^

Peel gained strength because his message

appealed to the small boroughs and English counties.*^
Peel did not attract a consistent enough following in
Commons and lacked the political strength to challenge
successfully the Whigs and the advocates of reform.
Accordingly, from 183 0 to 1841, except for a short five
month period (December 1834 to April 1835), the Whigs
managed the House of Commons with the help of Peel as well
as the Radicals.

The Radicals demanded an economic policy

that favored commerce and industry and a religious policy
that tolerated non-Anglican churches.

As parliamentary

leaders the Whigs followed a liberal platform.

They moved

beyond political reform to religious and economic reform.
These modifications challenged the religious monopolies of
the Anglican Church and the chartered trading companies.

*°Newbould, "Sir Robert Peel," 533.
*^Newbould, "Sir Robert Peel," 536.
*^Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, 134, 141-2
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such as the East India Company.

In return for reform the

Whigs won support from the constituents of the new
industrial centers, as well as the more traditional
commercial and manufacturing cities and their
representatives--the Radicals.
One of the joint concerns of the Whigs and the
Radicals was the East India Company's monopoly on trade
with China.

Whigs saw abolition of the monopoly as a way

of removing a long standing symbol of corruption, while
Radicals saw abolition as a means of economic
liberalization.

In 1600 Queen Elizabeth had granted the

company a charter; one of its primary goals was to acquire
the much desired luxury goods of "Cathay," --porcelains,
silk, and satins.

The Company failed to access directly

Chinese goods until 1699, but between 1735 and 1795 trade
began to thrive.
The East India Company located its Far East
headquarters in India.
economic center.

India was more than just an

The Company with its own army and navy

gained political control over most of India.

This control

gave the Company a considerable power base from which to
enforce its monopoly and gave the

Company's Court of

Directors a means of dispensing patronage.

All British

^^Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, 162-6
Cathay is the Renaissance term for China and remained
in use into the eighteenth century.
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trade in the Far East had to be either in East India
Company ships, or in private ships licensed by the Company.
Accordingly, at the beginning of the 1800s the East India
Company, because of its trade monopoly in the Far East,
controlled British trade with China.

The India Act of 1784

represented the political consequence of merchant
imperialism in India.

As the Company's use of force drew

heavy criticism from the British Parliament, William Pitt
(Prime Minister, 1783-1801, 1803-1806) brought the East
India Company under the control of the British Government
in London.

He hoped to end continued expansion into the

subcontinent by creating the Board of Control to oversee
Indian affairs.

The President of the Board served as a

Cabinet member and set policy that the Company's Court of
Directors in London and the Crown-appointed Governor
General in India carried out.
The British Government's primary commercial concern
was a steady supply of high quality tea from C h i n a . T h e
sale of tea, a highly prized commodity in Britain,
generated a considerable amount of revenue for the

Cyril H. Philips, The East India Company 1794-1834
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940; 1961), 304. The publication date of Philip's study illustrates the
dearth of recent scholarly research on the political
aspects of the East India Company.
^^Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, The Management of
Monopoly: A Study of the East India Company's Conduct of
Its Tea Trade, 1784-1833 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1984), 23.
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Treasury.

The tea tariff, which amounted to no less than

£3 million, covered one-half the expenses of maintaining
the best naval fleet in the w o r l d . I n the early 1830s
China provided the only available source of tea.

The East

India Company had a monopoly on all tea imported into
Britain.

It also attempted to grow tea in Assam, a region

in Northeast India.

While the effort looked promising for

the future, it remained a "young experiment" as late as
1837
The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted nothing
substantial from Britain except its bullion.

British

merchants bought tea from China, but the fragmented and
self-sufficient nature of the Chinese economy made it
difficult for the British merchants to sell their goods to
the Chinese p e o p l e . C h i n a ' s hand-finished products were
of a far superior quality to any of the mass produced goods
which the British had to offer.

A highly unfavorable

^^Fay, Opium War, 17-18.
^^Lord Auckland to John Cam Hobhouse, Calcutta, 9
April 1837, Broughton Papers. Letter Books. Oriental and
India Office Collection, British Library, London (Hereafter
cited as 010). Mss.Eur.F213/6/150.
^^Madeleine Zelin, "The Economic Structure of the
Chinese Economy during the Qing Period: Some Thoughts on
the 150th Anniversary of the Opium War," Kenneth
Lieberthal, et al. ed. Perspectives on Modern China: Four
Anniversaries (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 37-8.
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balance of trade emerged which the British constantly
sought to remedy.
The Chinese Emperor in Peking limited the East India
Company's commercial ventures by using the Canton System,
which had two fundamental f e a t u r e s . T h e first limited
all trade to the port of Canton, located in the far
southeastern corner of the Chinese Empire.**

Chinese

authorities thought that this location was far enough away
from most Chinese that "barbarian" contamination could be
kept to a minimum.

Any foreigner wishing to travel to

Canton had to receive a passport prior to his arrival; the
Chinese government refused to allow barbarian females into
Canton.

By restricting all foreign trade to a single port

the Chinese also believed that they could more effectively
control the foreigners by keeping them under the watchful
eyes of the emperor's servants.

'^^Earl H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years Of Early AngloChinese Relations, 1750-1800 (Pullman, WA: State College of
Washington, 1936), 142-69; Both the more traditional
mercantilist theories and the new laissez-faire theories
saw a trade imbalance as a positive evil. An unfavorable
balance of trade caused an outflow of bullion and weakened
the nation's ability to compete with other European states.
^°Greenberg, British Trade, 46; Hosea Ballou Morse's
The Gilds of China with an Account of the Gild Merchant of
Canton (New York: Longmans, Green, 1909) offers a
comprehensive, but dated, history of the Canton system.
See above p.vi, MAP 1, "China in the Early
Nineteenth Century,"; from Fay, Opium War, 28.
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The Chinese government itself had little direct
contact with foreign merchants.

In the Chinese social

structure merchants were at the b o t t o m . T h u s ,
merchants should have contact with merchants.

only
The second

feature of the Canton system addressed this need.

At

Canton all foreign trade had to be carried on with twelve
or thirteen merchants--the Co-hong, or Hong merchants.

The

Co-hong were Chinese wholesale merchants licensed by the
emperor to trade with the foreigners.

In return for the

privilege of trading, the Co-hong collected imperial duties
and signed a bond guaranteeing that no contraband was
carried into China.

They also had to make sure that the

barbarians respected Chinese laws and customs.
Under these conditions the Anglo-Chinese relationship
was very tense, but s e c u r e . E v e r y o n e involved had
learned to work within the system, and the tea trade became
highly profitable.

The East India Company recognized the

apprehension of the Chinese and did its best to follow
Chinese custom and tradition.

The Co-hong realized the

East India Company's need for Chinese goods and did its
best to smooth out differences between the barbarians and
imperial officials.

^^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 108.
^^Fay, Opium Vlar, 35.
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On 13 June 1833 Charles Grant, President of the Board
of Control, introduced the Whigs' resolution abolishing
the Company's monopoly with the hope of easing tensions
caused by the Canton system.

He blamed the Chinese trade

restrictions on the Company's dual role as trader and
sovereign.

The Chinese "had heard of the Company's

victories in many parts of India, and to a people so
sensitive as they were as to the approach of any foreign
power to their territory, such matters were great cause of
j e a l o u s y . A l l o w i n g private merchants to trade with
China would entice the Chinese government to open gradually
its huge market and remove the embarrassing possibility of
war.
Grant also expressed a practical reason for abolition
of the monopoly.

Since 1815 the licensed private traders'

share of the goods shipped to and from China out-paced the
Company's trade.

Between 1813 and 1830 the total value of

the exports and imports carried to and from China in
Company owned ships fell from £13,500,000 to £11,600,000,
while in the same period the total value of goods carried
in licensed private ships rose from £9,000,000 to
£31,000,000.^^

To continue a de jure monopoly while it

^Charles Grant, "East-India Company's Charter," House
of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 18 (13 June 1833), col.
709 .
^^Grant, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 18 (13 June 1833),
col. 710.
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did not exist in fact would be contrary to common sense.
The resolution thus rested, not on the metaphysical
principle of laissez faire, but on bringing institutions
more in line with reality.
Abolition of the Company's monopoly excited little
debate in Commons, or in the p r e s s . A f t e r the fierce
struggles over the Reform Bill, affairs in India and China
seemed insignificant.

Furthermore, the East Indian

interests in Parliament had sided with the opponents of
reform and lost a number of their rotten boroughs in the
p r o c e s s . T h e Whigs also compensated the Company's stock
holders with an annuity of 10.5 percent of the revenues of
India and left the Court of Directors in control of its
India patronage network.

The Whigs' behavior during

abolition of the trade monopoly demonstrates the Grey
Ministry's ability to carry forth reforms that satisfied
the needs of a variety of interests.

The long-term

significance of abolition rests less on the Whigs'
purposes, however, than on its unintended consequences for
Anglo-Chinese relations.

^^The Manchester Guardian merely noted that Grant
introduced the bill. 15 June 1833, p.2.
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 60.
^^Philips, East India Company, 285-97.
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CHAPTER 2
"CHINA BELONGS TO PALMERSTON"

In the 183 0s two new factors began to change the
context in which British merchants traded in China.^

The

first was Parliament's action in 1833 revoking the East
India Company's monopoly in China, thus removing one half
of the regulatory system that had guided the Anglo-Chinese
relationship.

The second factor was the rise of the opium

trade, the topic of Chapter 4.

The consequences resulting

from the removal of the Company's monopoly on the China
trade forms the basis for the present chapter.

This

deregulation, part of the Grey Ministry's attempt to
further economic reform, had its price because of the power
vacuum it created.

As Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston

set his policy to carry out the ministry's goal to open
peacefully and gradually China's market while keeping
British Governmental interference to a minimum.
When Parliament abolished the company's monopoly in
1834, it created a three-man trade commission headed by a
Chief Superintendent of Trade, shifting responsibility for

^Greenberg, British Trade, 215.
44
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the affairs in China from the Board of Control to the
Foreign Office.

As John Cam Hobhouse, President of the

Board of Control (1835-1841), explained to Lord Auckland
(George Eden), Governor General of India (1835-1842),
"China belongs to Palmerston.

Palmerston, an Irish

peer, entered the Foreign Office when Grey formed his
Ministry in 1830 and remained Foreign Secretary until 1841,
except for a few short months in 1834/183 5 when the
conservatives formed a ministry.

The third Viscount

Palmerston's rise to the highest level of British
Government contrasts sharply with the experience of his
father who preferred renovating one of the family estates-Broadlands--located near Southampton in Romsey.

The elder

Palmerston had lived the life of leisure, collecting art,
and even taking his family on the Grand Tour during the
French Revolution.

He had, however, insured that young

"Harry" received the best classical education in Britain at
the time.

At age four he had a governess who taught him

French, and at age six the second Viscount hired an Italian
tutor, who, besides teaching his native language, probably
taught Harry both Latin and Greek.

These early experiences

prepared him for public school at Harrow, and then the
University of Edinburgh.^

^Hobhouse to Auckland, India House, 30 August 1837,
010, Mss.Eur.F213/6/l24.
3^

Bourne, Palmerston, 1-11.
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While in Edinburgh the young aristocrat lived with and
studied under Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy
(1753-1828).

Stewart's official title suggests, from the

modern academic perspective, a rather limited scholarly
field, but Professor Stewart had a large sphere of inquiry.
His moral philosophy laid the foundation for the
development of a course in political economy.^

Since

Palmerston's most recent biographer believes that Stewart's
course on political economy "must have been among the most
significant experiences of his l i f e , a closer look at
Stewart's philosophy might help to explain Palmerston's
future policies as Foreign Secretary.
In his moral philosophy Stewart sought a middle path
between Scottish skepticism and French rationalism.'^

He

belonged to a school of thought called "common sense"
realism which held that the human mind had an a priori
capacity, independent of both sense experience and logic,
to know right from wrong.

This position departed from the

path carved out by Stewart's Scottish predecessors David

^Knud Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political
Economy: The Contribution of Dugald Stewart," in
Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. V. Hope
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 212.
^Bourne, Palmerston, 25; Bourne mistakenly states,
however, that Stewart merely provided a "simplified version
of Adam Smith." Palmerston, 27.
^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political
Economy," 212-14, 219.
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Hume and Adam Smith.

These men believed that morality

depended upon a person viewing his own action from the
position of an imaginary "impartial s pe ct at or -t he
relative experiences of human reactions.^

Stewart

concluded that the human mind's power to know that a
correct moral answer exists, while it may not be grasped
immediately, allowed for a confidence in society's eventual
development into a natural system based on a divine
i m p r •i nX.t . a

Stewart's attempt to secure a middle ground in moral
philosophy carried over into his political economy.^

He

clearly delineated a difference between "what is abstractly
right and practically expedient," cautioning his students
not to apply theory in the face of strong opposition

^Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald
Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 10, Biographical
Memoirs of Adam Smith, LL.D., William Robertson, D.D.,
Thomas Reid, D.D. [Hereafter cited as Adam Smith]
(Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1858), 26-9; Mark Granquist,
"The Role of 'Common Sense’ in the Hermeneutics of Moses
Stuart," Harvard Theological Review 83 (1990) : 308-9;
Russell Niehlei, "Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith
Problem," Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986); 617.
^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political
Economy," 226, 229.
^Donald Winch, "The System of the North: Dugald
Stewart and His Pupils," in That Noble Science of Politics:
A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History, ed.
Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 38.
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because doing do so threatened social stability.

As a

philosopher living during Europe's revolutionary turmoil,
he took significant legal risks entering into debates that
included the French philosophes, advocates of theoretical
speculation.

One of the ways Stewart overcame these

hazards was by distinguishing between economic freedom and
political equality.

The former contributed to the cause of

liberty, while the latter deteriorated into Jacobinism.”
He repeated several times during his lectures that
"the happiness of mankind depends iwmediately,
not on the form of government, but on the
particular system of law and policy which that
form introduces, and that the advantage which one
form of government possesses over another, arises
chiefly from the facility it affords to the
introduction of such legislative improvements as
the general^ginterest of the community
recommend."
He also cautioned his students that any change in policy
must be gradual so as not to disturb the public order.
Stewart defined political economy as a science
concerned with the general welfare of the community and

^°Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald
Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 9, Lectures on
Political Economy, vol.2, (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable,
1856), 85-6, 121, 223.
”Emma Rothschild, "Adam Smith and Conservative
Economics," Economic History Review 45 (1992): 80-81.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol.2, 376;
See also Stewart, Adam Smith, 55-6.
’^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 210,
257, 419.
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charged it with supplying actual legislators, rather than
the multitude, with policy options.

The end of all

political economy--happiness--requires "laws which give
security of the right of property, and check the inordinate
inequality in its distribution."’^

By "inordinate

inequality" he meant unnatural inequality caused by
unenlightened laws which favor a particular interests at
the expense of the rest of society.

Stewart, following

Smith and the physiocrats, stated that agriculture held the
primary position in the natural order of the economy,
followed by manufacturing, and lastly, foreign trade.
Mercantilism, a "false system of Political Economy
propagated by merchants and manufacturers," reversed this
order, allowing the towns to benefit inordinately from the
labor of the countryside, the basis of all national
wealth.

As a political economist, Stewart recommended

removing the mercantilist restrictions and subsidies that
protected trade and manufacturing in order to restore the

’^Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald
Stewart, ed. William Hamiliton, vol. 8, Lectures on
Political Economy, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable,
1856), 16.
’^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 157.
’^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 1415, 157, 256, 294; idem, Lectures on Political Economy,
vol. 2, 195-6; idem, Adam Smith, 60-2.
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natural balance within the community.

Stewart further

supported his belief in free trade by underscoring the
primacy of internal commerce : "the best customers of
Britain (according to an old observation) being the people
of Britain."’'^ Modern nations, unlike ancient states,
depend upon "internal cultivation" rather than conquest for
strength.

Imports and exports in corn, for example, amount

to a small portion of the commerce in any commodity and
make only a minor contribution to the economy as a
whole.Furthermore,

exotic commodities such as tea and

coffee divert the resources of the poor away from the
nutritious food needed to survive ; Britain's formal system
of political economy thus contributed to the misery of the
multitude.
Professor Stewart's emphasis on agriculture did not
lead him to favor restrictions on trade and manufacturing
in order to promote the cultivation of land.

On the

contrary, he believed such restrictions would disrupt the
whole economy by retarding the "natural" growth of the
subsidiary sectors of the economy.

To encourage

^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 17980.

^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 242.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 43;
idem. Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 83.
^°Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 1445.
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agriculture only required the dissemination of useful
knowledge concerning the science of agriculture and
required "those who fill the higher stations in society, to
instruct and animate their inferiors by influence of
example.

This position elucidates an important

difference between Stewart and Smith; Stewart moved the
focus from the individual to the "goodness of the over-all
s y s t e m . W h i l e Smith attributed the advances of the
"modern" age to the rise of individuals pursuing their own
self-interests in commerce,Stewart emphasized the
advent of printing and the freedom to exchange ideas.
Because printing gave people the means by which they could
improve their own condition, he argued that social progress
required a system of government-sponsored education beyond
the mechanical arts to help individuals cultivate their
moral capacity.
Besides disturbing the natural order within the
community, mercantilism also contributed to the bellicose
nature of the international order.

Quoting extensively

^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 181.
^^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political
Economy," 228.
^^Winch, "The System of the North," 27-8.
'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 398.
^Stewart, Lectures on Politial Economy, vol. 2, 32 8333, 341.
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from Smith, Stewart explained that merchants and
manufacturers encouraged nations to look with jealousy on
the progress of the neighbors, producing "discord and
animosity," rather than the natural result of trade,
and friendship."

"union

Removing the unnatural influence of the

"mean rapacity" of these men from governmental policy,
would restore p e a c e . M e r c h a n t s and manufacturers only
focused on their own sectarian interest while neglecting
the good of the community.

Because the prosperity and

stability of the community depended upon agriculture, only
the ownership of land provided an individual with the means
to see the common interests of all.
While the majority of Stewart's course on political
economy focused on government economic policy, he did
introduce his students to the theory of government.
Careful to point out that "political wisdom is much more
the result of experience than of s p e c u l a t i o n , h e
deviated from the customary treatment of the subject by
concentrating on the simple forms of government--democracy,
aristocracy and monarchy--rather than the functions-legislative, judicial, and executive.

He recognized the

need to separate these functions to reduce the chances for

^^Stewart,

Adam Smith, 62.

^^Stewart,

Lectures on Political Economy,

vol. 1, 15-

^^Stewart,

Lectures on Political Economy,

vol. 2, 424.

6.
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an abuse of power, but he believed that this goal could
best be accomplished by a "mixed government," one combining
the three simple f o r m s . S t o p p i n g short of enunciating a
general theory, he pointed to the "perfections of our
system" to support his case.

The British constitution

checked the ability of either the monarch, the aristocracy
or the people to ignore the interests of the community at
l a r g e . S t e w a r t believed that the end of government
simply required "wise and equitable laws, and a vigourous
and effectual execution of them."

To impose artificial

conditions on a constitution, such as extending the
franchise to the lower orders, would counteract the
"obvious intentions of nature" by giving unenlightened
people a voice in political decisions.
Stewart's course taught that enlightened economic
policy contributed to a well-ordered society and that true
statesmen should subordinate sectarian economic
considerations to the needs of the state.

He also stressed

that good government was not only a practical necessity but
also a moral responsibility of those in power to look after

'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 3 512.

^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 44 950 .
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 362.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 3, 378.
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the general welfare of the community.

The course provided

the young Palmerston with a "liberal" economic education
and a "conservative" political education.

Free trade, or

laissez-faire, would bolster traditional social
institutions by restoring the primacy of land in the
economy and the landowner in the political system.

These

lessons drawn from Adam Smith differed from those offered
by the Radical David Ricardo.

Ricardo believed free trade

would benefit the new industrial sector of the economy and
provide the basis for British domination of world trade.
Thus, while Palmerston's later beliefs in free trade
coincided with those held by middle-class Radicals, his
convictions stemmed from a vastly different source and
furnished a basis for his early affiliation with the
Liberal T o r i e s . S t e w a r t ' s course also prepared
Palmerston for a successful career lasting well into the
Victorian period.

One explanation for this success was

Palmerston's ability to join social conservatism with
economic innovation,

"an underlying theme" of the

nineteenth century.
When Palmerston left Edinburgh in 1803, he chose to
continue his education at St. John's College, Cambridge,

^Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 71.
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 29.
^^Thompson, Rise of Respectable Society, 30.
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even though his father's death two years earlier had made
the youth a peer of Ireland.

He then entered the House of

Commons in 1807 after his former guardian, the Earl of
Malmesbury (James Harris), found an open seat for the young
man representing the borough of Nevjport on the Isle of
Wight.

Palmerston bought the seat for £4,000 on the

condition that "he never set foot in the place.
Sitting in Commons allowed Palmerston to take a job as
Junior Lord of the Admiralty, and two years later, as
Secretary at War, once again thanks to Malmesbury.

The War

Office came without a seat in the Cabinet and had a
peculiar function.

Instead of directing military

operations, hiring personnel, setting financial policy or
planning the overall organization of the army, Palmerston
acted as an intermediary relaying to the Commons the army's
needs and supervising the workings of the army for the
Commons.

In neither capacity did he have any authority to

enforce decisions.

He had the burden of responsibility

without the power to follow through and faced the wrath of
the army and Parliament for failures.
Although Liberal Tory ministries rose and fell,
Palmerston remained in the War Office for nineteen years.
His years in office generated neither high praise nor grave

^*Bourne, Palmerston, 79.
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 80-97.
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rebuke from his contemporaries.

His duties remained rather

tedious, even though he performed them with skill and
energyIt

came as a surprise when Lord Grey chose

Palmerston to enter the Whig Cabinet as Foreign Secretary
in 1830.

Prime Ministers in the nineteenth century usually

sought to fill the office with the most capable men.
Palmerston was, however, the exception.

When he first

joined the Whigs, he was a "second-rate politician," and
only after several years in office did he gain the respect
JT T. •
of
his peers. 39

Grey had trouble finding a Foreign Secretary and even
considered keeping the position for himself.

After two

other prominent politicians refused the office for personal
reasons. Grey turned to Palmerston.

As a Liberal Tory,

Palmerston, and his companion Lord Melbourne (Home
Secretary, 1830-34), provided the Whigs with the wide
Parliamentary base needed to govern after fifty years of
Tory do mination.Palmerston's friendship with Melbourne
serves further to explain the Irish peer's elevation to the
Cabinet.

While A.J.P. Taylor's statement that Melbourne

^^Bourne, Palmerston, Chs. 3, 4 & 6.
^^Charles R. Middleton, The Admistration of British
Foreign Policy 1782-1846 (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1977), 98.
‘^°Bourne, Palmerston, 328-9.
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"carried his illegitimate brother-in-law with him"^^ is
certainly an exaggeration, Palmerston's "secret" affair
with Lady Cowper, Melbourne's married sister, helped to
change his fortunes.

Lady Cowper moved in the highest

social circles in England and secured for Palmerston
invitations to dinners at Holland House, a center for Whig
politics and society.
In 1828 Palmerston resigned his office after a
misunderstanding with the Duke of Wellington, and then
further separated himself by attacking the Duke's foreign
policy.

These attacks gained him respect at Holland House

and set out his foreign policy p r i o r i t i e s P a l m e r s t o n
criticized his former colleagues for reversing British
policy by abandoning Donna Maria, Queen of Portugal, to her
uncle Don Miguel's attempt to usurp the throne.

Such an

undignified move threatened to bring about an unjust war
and put Britain in league with the "oppressor . . .
trampling upon the oppressed.

Britain had pledged

itself, and received from Don Miguel a sim.iliar pledge, to

^^A.J.P. Taylor, "Lord Palmerston," History Today, 41
(January 1991), 16.
'^Bourne, Palmerston, 3 08-9.
^^John W. Rooney, "Palmerston and the Revolutions of
1830-1833," The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 17501850: Proceedings 14 (1984): 406-13.
^^Lord Palmerston, "Affairs of Portugal," Hansard, 2d
ser., vol. 21 (10 March 1829), col. 99.
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support Donna Maria as the constitutional sovereign of
Portugal.

By breaking his oath Miguel insulted the British

crown, and "if the insulted honour of our sovereign, is a
legitimate ground for national quarrel, we are intitled
[sic] to demand and extort, reparation from Don Miguel.
While Palmerston did have a commitment to "liberalism"
as one of his foreign policy g o a l s , t h e term needs to be
qualified and put into context.

As his quarrel with the

Wellington administration shows, Palmerston favored
constitutional regimes.

Dugald Stewart taught him that

constitutions were not the laws themselves, but the general
spirit which animated a whole system of government
Liberalism depended upon the security of property, a strong
executive and a free exchange of ideas.

By failing to

support the rightful executive of Portugal and honor
Britain's pledge, Wellington contributed to the undermining
of the spirit of the agreement between Donna Maria and Don
Miguel.

These attacks on Wellington demonstrated, however,

that constitutional principles followed behind national
honor as a foreign policy p r i o r i t y H o n o r refers to an

''^Palmerston, "Portugal," Hansard, 2d ser., vol. 21 (1
June 1829), cols. 1651-2.
'^Bourne, Palmerston, Ch. 8.
'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 376,
422 .
'^^Rooney, "Palmerston and the Revolutions of 183 01833," 409.
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inner feeling of self-worth that the community recognizes
by lauding valor and honesty.

Conversely, shame refers to

an inner feeling of humiliation that the community fosters
by admonishing cowardice and d e c e p t i o n I n the
aristocratic world of international relations a nation
without honor warranted the scorn and contempt of its
neighbors, thus weakening its position.

Wellington's

policy had brought shame to Britain, contributing to
deterioration of national honor.
After the revolutions of 1830 Palmerston faced a
plethora of foreign policy problems.

He decided that

British interests required him to support constitutional
movements on the continent and to defend the Ottoman Empire
from European interference.
constant attention.

These endeavors demanded

His policies drew sharp criticism, not

only from foreign governments, but also from within the
governments he served.
was a mere side show.

Compared to European affairs China
The Foreign Secretary delegated

^’Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and
Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 14; Jonathan Po'wis, Aristocracy (Oxford, UK:
Basil Blackwell, 1984), 8-14.
^°See Charles Webster's The Foreign Policy of
Palmerston, 1830-1841 : Britain, the Liberal Movement and
the Eastern Question (2 Vols. London : G . Bell & Sons,
1951.) for the standard interpretation of Palmerston's
early career as guided by liberalism; See also Rooney,
"Palmerston and the Revolutions of 1830-1833" for the
beginnings of a reinterpretation focusing instead on
national interests.
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responsibility for overseeing the detailed operations of
the newly created trade commission to a senior clerk in the
Foreign Office,

while retaining for himself the

authority to make all final decisions.
To adjust to the changes brought on by the abolition
of the East India Company's monopoly, Parliament legislated
several institutional modifications.

While the East India

Company had controlled the China trade, supercargoes, the
company's representatives, exercised considerable authority
over British merchants trading in China.

In the eighteenth

century supercargoes traveled aboard each ship and carried
out all cargo and commercial transactions.

By the

nineteenth century the function of the supercargoes had
changed.

Supercargoes no longer attached themselves to

specific ships; they remained in Canton throughout the
trading season and supervised the transactions of a greater
number of vessels.

Once the season ended, the supercargoes

left Canton for Macao, a peninsula under Portuguese
control, extending out of the mainland into the Gulf of
Canton about seventy-five miles from the city of Canton.
Of twelve Company supercargoes in Canton, three or four of
the senior agents formed the Presidency and Select

^^Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy,
75, 191, 323.
*See above p.vii, MAP 2, "Gulf of Canton," p.ii; from
Fay, Opium War, 16.
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Committee.

The Select had the authority to expel non

licensed merchants from Canton.
The original plans for the new trade commission called
for the Chief Superintendent to have the same powers as the
Company's supercargoes, but, fearing the concentration of
power in the hands of one man. Parliament limited his
power.

The Chief Superintendent lacked the authority to

demand obedience from British subjects in China, and the
merchants were aware of this incapacity.

British merchants

felt that they were not accountable to anyone for their
trade actions in the Far East.

The superintendent was

there to serve the needs of the merchants, not to control
them.
The Chinese, both the Hong Merchants and the imperial
authorities, were also uneasy about the abolition of the
East India Company's monopoly.

For over one hundred years

trade had flourished under the existing system; they saw no
need for change.

The first Chief Superintendent, Lord

William Napier, reinforced their concerns when he arrived
in China on 15 July 1834.
Chinese custom or protocol.

Lord Napier had no respect for
He had his orders, and by God,

^^Greenberg, British Trade, 18.
^^Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of
the Chinese Empire (New York; Longmans, Green, 1910), vol.
1, The Period of Conflict; 1334-1860, 169; Lord Palmerston
to Lord William Napier, 25 January 1834, Correspondence
Relating to China (Great Britain: Parliament, 1840), 5.
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nothing was going to stop him.

Hoping to extend British

trading privileges beyond a single port, Palmerston
instructed the Chief Superintendent to proceed to Canton
and take up residence there.

Upon his arrival he was to

communicate directly with the Governor-General (or Viceroy)
of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces.
orders literally.

Napier took these

He proceeded to Canton without receiving

a passport from Chinese officials and only then sent a
**
letter to Governor-General Lu K'un.
Napier's unannounced arrival in Canton greatly
disturbed the provincial government and the Co-hong.

In

several letters to the Hong merchants dating from 21 July
to 31 July (designed to be passed on to the foreign
community), Lu expressed his dissatisfaction with Napier's
presence.

He stated that it was a well-known fact that all

foreigners must receive a passport before proceeding to
C a n t o n . T h e Governor-General could not understand

General accounts of Napier's mission to China can be
found in most works concerning the Opium War. One cannot
truly understand his arrogance, however, until reading the
despatches found in the Correspondence Relating to China
(7-41).
There are two major styles of transliteration from
the Chinese characters to Roman letters : Wade-Giles and
pinyin.
1 am following James Polachek's usage in The Inner
Opium War--Wade-Giles.
^^Inclosures 2, 3, 4, and 5, Governor of Canton to
Hong Merchants, in Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834,
(The Foreign Office received this letter on 31 January
183 5.) Correspondence, 17-21.
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Napier's total disregard for protocol and his lack of
respect for Chinese custom.
Napier's letter further annoyed Governor Lu because
Chinese law forbade barbarians to send "personal letters"
to Chinese officials.

Foreign correspondence had to be in

the form of a "petition" from inferior to superior; the use
of the Chinese character "Pin" on the correspondence
signified a petition.

Chinese custom also prohibited the

transmission of petitions directly to the official.

A

petition must be delivered by the Co-hong.
Additionally, Lu refused to recognize Napier's
official position as an agent of the British Government.
The Chinese had never allowed an official of a foreign
government to reside within its territory.

They were not

about to change thousands of years of tradition for one
obnoxious man.

The Chinese Viceroy ordered Napier to leave

Canton until he received permission to return and until he
was willing to follow Chinese practices.
Napier refused to accept the Chinese demands because
he failed to understand the Chinese government's position.
He felt that it should, and would, give in to his demands
for recognition as an official representative of the
British Crown and for direct communication with Chinese
officials.

He based this assumption on a misconception

^^Napier to Palmerston, 9 August 1834, Correspondence,
7-11.
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about the importance of trade to the Chinese government.
In a letter to Lord Palmerston, Napier wrote the following:
The house of every Chinaman in these extensive
suburbs, is a shop of one sort or another. Every
man is constantly at work; nobody seen loitering
about and idle; and, in fact, every man is a
merchant; yet does one of these same Edicts
[ordering Napier to obey Chinese customs and
traditions] speak of the 'petty affairs of
c o m m e r c e - a s if commerce were a matter of no
concern to the empire !
Napier concluded that the Chinese government needed British
trade and it was just putting up an elaborate front to
extract unreasonable demands from the foreigners.

To

rectify the situation, Napier recommended reminding the
Emperor of his Tartar heritage by pointing out that "he is
only an intruder; and that it will be his good policy to
secure himself upon the throne by gratifying the wishes of
his p e o p l e . I f

the British put the Tartar rulers in

their place by means of military force, then the Chinese
people would welcome British goods.
Napier was wrong.

The Governor-General threatened to

stop all trade because of "the fault of one man. Lord
Napier."

Following this threat from Lu, the Hong

merchants, who were anxious to get things back to normal.

^'^Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834,
Correspondence, 12.
^^Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834,
Correspondence, 13.
^^Napier to Lord Grey, 21 August 1834, Correspondence,
26- 2 8 .
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Stopped trade on 16 August until Napier complied with the
Viceroy's wishes.

This action was succeeded by rumors that

Chinese officials were circulating derogatory stories about
the English delegation.

Napier responded by posting his

own account of the "Present state of relations between
China and Great Britain," translated into Chinese for all
in Canton to read.

In the document, an arrogant statement

of the British position, Napier called Governor-General Lu
a liar.

The Chinese authorities replied with a quick and

pointed response, stating that "According to the Laws of
the nation, the Royal Warrant should be respectfully
requested to behead you; and openly expose [your head] to
the multitude, as a terror to preserve dispositions."^^
Following this incident Governor-General Lu, on 2
September 1834, reaffirmed the Hong's decision to stop
trade.

He also intensified the standoff by closing Napier

and the foreign community off from the outside world.
Demanding Napier's departure. Lu denied the foreign
community access to communication, servants and
provisions,

and surrounded its factories with troops on

Memorandum, Foreign Office, February, 1840 [based on
the "Records of Proceedings" kept by the superintendents at
Canton], Correspondence, 34.
According to K. N. Chaudhuri this action was the
typical response to European threats by indigenous Asian
states. The Trading World of Asia and the English East
India Company (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
125 .
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land and sea.*°

Napier instantly responded by calling in

two British Navy frigates and landing a contingent of
marines in Canton.

In a letter to the Hong merchants

Napier justified his actions by claiming that the Chinese
"have opened the preliminaries of war."

He stated that

"His Imperial Majesty will not permit such folly,
wickedness, and cruelty as they have been guilty of, since
my arrival here, to go unpunished; therefore tremble
Governor Loo, intensely tremble .
Once again, Napier was wrong.
of his strength, and he fell ill.

The crisis drained him
After the Viceroy

threatened to use force, Napier decided to withdraw from
Canton on 21 September, just two short months after his
arrival.

Napier knew the damage his actions had wrought

would not be tolerated by the Foreign Office.

Palmerston's

original instructions had ordered Napier not to lose any of
the trading privileges already obtained and to "abstain
from all unnecessary use of menacing l a n g u a g e . T h e
Chinese added insult to injury by delaying Napier's journey
as he left Canton.

A trip that usually took less than a

The Agents of the East India Company in China to the
Honourable the Court of Directors in London, 29 September
1834, Correspondence, 42.
^^Napier to the Hong Merchants and Chinese
authorities, 8 September 1834, Correspondence, 36.
^^Palmerston to Napier, 25 January 1834,
Correspondence, 3-4.
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day required one week.

This delay prevented Napier from

receiving proper medical care.

He died on 11 October 1834.

As a result of the Napier mission the Chinese
authorities became more suspicious than ever of the British
in Canton.

British merchants in Canton called for forceful

action, but Sir John Francis Davis, Second Superintendent
of Trade under Napier, disagreed.

He assumed the position

of Chief Superintendent of Trade and was determined to
follow a policy of quiescence.

Davis, a former President

of the Select Committee and resident of China for twentyone years, removed himself and the commission to Macao.
These changes succeeded in putting British trade back on
the road to success.

The British merchants immediately

resumed trade on the same footing as though Napier had
never arrived.
The merchants objected to Davis's new policy, because
they feared that another unfortunate incident might be
repeated under different circumstances.

Accordingly, the

British merchants at Canton sent a petition "TO THE KING'S
MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL," encouraging the Council
to take measures to "maintain the honour of our country,
and preserve the advantages . . . [of] safe and
uninterrupted commerce with China."

Calling "the insults

wantonly heaped upon" Lord Napier to the attention of the
King's council, the merchants stated that the the Chief
Superintendent Office's impotence compounded the problem.
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They wanted the King to send a Plenipotentiary with full
authority to deal with any situation that might arise.

The

merchants also called for an extension of trading rights to
Amoy, Ningpo, and Chusan.

The merchants took a dim view of

the proceedings of the past few m.onths. According to them,
Napier tried his best, but he lacked the authority to
demand change.

The British merchants in Canton wanted a

guarantee that similiar insults would not recur.

They

thought that the best way to prevent a recurrence would be
to redress forcefully the insult and extend trading
rights.^
In England, James Matheson, partner in the largest
British firm in China, Jardine, Matheson & Company, gained
the support of the commercial and manufacturing lobbies of
Manchester, Glasgow and Liverpool for a new "forward
policy" in regard to C h i n a . H e argued that the
government needed to protect the "new individual system of
enterprise"*^ because British merchants were "daily
subjected to injuries and insults."**

The Napier mission

British Merchants at Canton to the King's Most
Excellent Majesty in Council, 9 December 1834,
Correspondence, 68-70.
*^Greenberg, British Trade, 193-4.
**James Matheson, The Present Position and Prospects
of the British Trade with China; Together with an Outline
of Some of the Leading Occurrences in its Past History
(London: Smith, Elder, 1836), 7.
**Matheson, Present Position, 5.
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provided Matheson with the perfect example of Chinese
governments "imbecility, avarice, conceit, and obstinacy"
and of the need for British governmental action to counter
the humiliating results of Napier's failure.

Protection

thus meant more than defending the status quo; it meant
extending British commercial privileges to ports beyond
Canton, if necessary, with force.

Matheson even received

the patronage of Lord Napier's widow.

In a letter to Lord

Palmerston she urged him to meet with Matheson and to
consider his recommendations for extracting retribution for
the insults heaped upon her husband and for opening China's
m a r k e t T h e r e is no evidence that this proposed meeting
ever took place, or that Palmerston even took Matheson's
suggestions seriously.

British merchants in Canton,

however, fully supported Matheson's proposals.
Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, former East India Company
Supercargo, agreed with Matheson's evaluation of British
relations with China.

In a public letter to Lord

Palmerston, Lindsay argued forcefully for "armed
interference."

He believed that a small naval force of

"one line-of-battle ship, two frigates, six corvettes, and
three or four armed steamers, having on board a land force
of about six hundred men, chiefly artillery, in order to

Lady Napier to Palmerston, 14 April 1835, Foreign
Office, General Correspondence: China. Public Record
Office, Kew (Hereafter cited as F017), F017/12/346-7.
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protect any land operation which might be necessary" could
secure a more stable trading relationship.*®

The goal of

this force would be to disrupt the Chinese coastal trade in
grain on which some parts of China were "entirely
dependant" for the "necessaries of life."

Lindsay believed

that such an operation would cause great anxiety in Peking
and force the Emperor to open several Northern ports, to
define import and export duties, and to abolish the Co
hong.*’

The time needed for the armed intervention would

be no more than seven months, and in all probability,
perhaps half that time; it could take place between March
and September while the China trade was at its seasonal
stand-still.

The use of force would cause no interruption

in the British trade with China.
Karl Gutzlaff, German protestant missionary, foremost
expert on China and joint-translator for the trade
commission, agreed with Lindsay's assessment of the
situation.

In an essay secretly commissioned by the

Foreign Office, Gutzlaff stated that "the moment the
[Chinese] Government is persuaded that Great Britain will
take no notice of the late, most lamentable occurrences, it

Hugh
Honourable
China, 2d.
Wellington

Hamilton Lindsay, Letter to the Right
Viscount Palmerston on British Relations with
(London: Saunders and Otley, 1836. vol. 1140,
Pamphlets), 12-13.

*’Lindasy, Letter to . .

. Palmerston, 10-11.

^°Lindsay, Letter to . .

. Palmerston, 18.
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will grow bolder, glory in the impunity with which it can
carry it's [sic] measures into effect and become more
troublesome than it was before.

To stem this

deplorable turn of events, he suggested seizing one of the
Chusan islands and using it as a base to blockade China's
coastal trade.

This threat to the economic vitality of six

or eight maritime cities would force the Chinese officials
to negotiate a more agreeable trade relationship.^^

As a

contributing writer to the Chinese Repository, a monthly
established by protestant missionaries in China, Gutzlaff
may have had an ulterior motive for making these
suggestions.

The Chinese Repository hoped to convince the

British and American general public that the opening of the
China trade would have the added benefit of creating an
opportunity to convert the Chinese population to
Christianity.

By presenting China as a weak and wicked

empire, the editors believed that they made the decision to
wage war more likely.^
Such belligerent attitudes did not go unopposed.
George Thomas Staunton, also a former East India Company

^^Karl Gutzlaff, "Present State of our Relations with
China," Separate Inclosure, Robinson to Palmerston, 26
March 1835, F017/9/131.
"^Gutzlaff, "Present State," FO17/9/148-50.
^Murray A. Rubinstein, "The Wars They Wanted:
American Missionaries' Use of The Chinese Repository Before
the Opium War," The American Neptune 48 (Fall 1988) : 27182 .
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Supercargo and now M.P. for Hampshire borough (1832-1835),
disagreed with Lindsay and Matheson.

Staunton acknowledged

that Lindsay's proposals had the support of the great
majority of British merchants in Canton, yet the M.P.
regarded those suggestions as unjustified in seeking
redress for the Chinese treatment of Napier.

The British

were, "in a national point of view, totally and entirely in
the wrong in all our proceedings upon this occasion.
The expedition, far from succeeding, would increase the
fear and hostility of the Chinese toward the British and
would hurt the existing trade.
Despite Staunton's common sense argument, the whole
Napier incident provided a wonderful opportunity for the
British Government to go to war.

Not only had the Chinese

stopped trade, but the Emperor's Viceroy had threatened to
behead an officer of the crown.

The Chinese had insulted

British life, liberty, and property.

The demands of the

majority of British merchants at Canton and in Britain
provided a splendid excuse for military action.
The reaction to the episode among British officials
was, however, quite mild.

The Duke of Wellington, who

temporarily replaced Lord Palmerston in 183 5 when the Grey
Ministry fell, responded immediately with a succinct note

^^George Thomas Staunton, Remarks on the British
Relations with China, and Plans for Improving Them (London:
Edmond Lloyd, 1836. vol. 1141 Wellington Pamphlets), 12.
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reminding Lord Napier of British policy : commercial
privileges were to be obtained by peaceable means, not
f o r c e . P a l m e r s t o n did not deem it necessary to change
this policy when he returned to the Foreign Office later in
1835.

Considering Dugald Stewart's warnings about avoiding

the counsel of merchants and manufacturers, this decision
should come as no surprise.

To open violently China's

market would have disrupted the natural economic order just
as surely as granting the East India Company a monopoly
did.

For the next three years Palmerston continued to let

the British trade with China follow its natural course,
neither protecting nor restricting it.

^^Duke of Wellington to Napier, 2 February 1835,
Correspondence, 5.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL DISSENTION

The abolition of the East India Company's monopoly
produced uncertainty in Anglo-Chinese relations.

The

British Trade Commission in China needed clear guidance
from London, but Palmerston's laissez-faire policy left His
Majesty's servants in China without definite instructions.
The Chief Superintendents had to decide on their own the
most prudent course of action, and the commission fell into
internal turmoil.

Junior members of the commission had

their own ideas about what ought to be done.

Clashes over

policies within the commission dominated the management of
Chinese trade for the whole of 1835 and 1836.

When

Palmerston put an end to the dispute, he did so without
restating his own policy.

In 1837 and 1838 the Foreign

Secretary finally stated, in unequivocal language, that the
British Government had no intention of taking an active
role in opening the Chinese market.
On 19 January 1835 John Davis officially resigned his
position as Chief Superintendent because of "personal
reasons."

Privately, however, he made his reasons known.

"If I find that I have nothing to do but sit still until
74
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the Government at home have made up their minds, I shall
probably accompany Mrs. Davis home."^ Davis was
frustrated because he had begged his superior in London for
instructions, but none were forthcoming.

Davis believed

that the government should take a firm and consistent
stance in regard to China in order to offset the
embarrassments caused by Napier's miserable failure to
force the Chinese

to bow to his wishes.

In the second and

third chapters of the first volume of his The Chinese: A
General Description of the Empire of China and Its
Inhabitants, Davis provided a short history of "British
Intercourse" with China.
first British ship in

Beginning with the arrival of the

1637, he chronicled the "frequent

interruptions" of the China trade.

He argued that every

time the British had submitted to the Chinese government's
demands, the latter responded by pressing for more
concessions.

If, on the other hand, the British merchants

had refused to back down, Chinese authorities always
retreated to their previous position.^
Davis's argument should not be confused with the
"crude and ill-digested" program set forth by the British

^Davis to John Barrow, Macao, 8 November 1834, First
Enclosure, Barrow to John Backhouse, 13 March 1835,
F017/12/175.
^Sir John Francis Davis, The Chinese: A General
Description of the Empire of China and Its Inhabitants,
vol. 1 (London: Charles Knight, 1836), Ch. 2 & 3.
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Merchants in Canton after the Napier episode.^ Davis
believed that the British should take no violent steps that
might disrupt the status quo.

Firmness required a clear

diplomatic strategy that would gradually put the British
trade with China on a more secure footing.

When he

resigned, Davis instructed Sir George Best Robinson, who
moved up from Second Superintendent to Chief
Superintendent, to continue the quiescent policy that Davis
had established until the Foreign Office instructed the new
Chief Superintendent otherwise.^

Captain Charles Elliot,

R.N., appointed Third Superintendent on the Departure of
Davis, disagreed and argued for a more forward approach.
Elliot believed that the commission should open
communications with the Chinese Vioeroy through the Hong
Merchants using the Chinese character "Pin," signifying a
petition.^
Robinson, a former East India Company Supercargo, had
lived in China for fifteen years, while Elliot had only
arrived with Lord Napier in 1834.

Robinson refused to take

Elliot's advice but then relented at his first opportunity
as leader of the British trade delegation to have contact

^Davis to Palmerston, Macao, 19 January 1835,
Correspondence, 80.
^Extract from the "Records of Proceedings," 19 January
1835, Correspondence, 80.
^Elliot, "Minute," Enclosure, Robinson to Wellington,
Macao, 26 April 1835, FO17/18/30.
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v/ith the Chinese authorities.

On 21 January the Argyle, a

British merchant vessel, dropped anchor off the coast of
China to repair the damage done to the ship by a fierce
tempest.

While attempting to make the repairs, the

captain, Mr. Alexander MacDonald, sent a small boat with a
twelve-man party ashore for the purpose of finding a pilot
to guide the ship to Canton.

The group never returned.

The twelve sailors had been kidnapped by a band of lawless
Chinese who demanded a $500 ransom.
Not having the m.oney on board, MacDonald decided to
proceed to Macao and there informed Robinson of the
incident.

Robinson thought the episode could be handled

without any official contact between himself and the
Chinese authorities.

Elliot pressed Robinson for action.

The Third Superintendent wanted Robinson to open
communications with the Chinese and ask for their
assistance.

Robinson gave in to Elliot "less from an idea

that there existed a chance of its [the communication]
being received, than from a wish to convince that gentleman
he had formed an erroneous opinion in anticipating, that on

The Spanish dollar from Mexico was the currency of
choice for Chinese foreign commerce.
"The tael (T. or
Tls.), the basic unit of Chinese currency at Canton, was a
hypothetical coin of pure silver weighing 1.2 08 oz. The
only circulating Chinese coin was the copper cash [1000
cash = T.l]. The basic coin in foreign commerce was the
Spanish dollar [$1 = T. 0.72], with an intrinsic value of
4s. 2d. (4/2), and an exchange value ranging from 5s. 2d.
upwards." Pritchard, Crucial Years, 103.
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any pretext or under any circumstances, would the Canton
authorities be induced to communicate with an officer of
this commission."*
On 1 February 1835 Elliot proceeded to Canton with a
formal request that the Viceroy investigate the matter.
Robinson avoided putting the request in the form of a
letter by adapting the same mode of communication used "by
public officers in their reports to each other" in an
attempt to avoid Lord Napier's mistakes.

Like Napier's,

this attempt at communication failed, and the Chinese, once
again, insulted one of His Britannic Majesty's officers.
Accompanied by Karl Gutzlaff and Captain MacDonald,
Captain Elliot arrived at Canton in full uniform.

The

expedition did not go to the foreign factories as Lord
Napier had done, but to a small gate a few miles away,
where in 1831 another naval captain had successfully
transmitted a letter to the Viceroy.

After entering the

gate, the group proceeded a "few houses" into Canton, where
without provocation, a group of Chinese soldiers, led by a
"second lieutenant," attacked Elliot and threw him to the
ground.

Gutzlaff tried to protest this action and to

explain the purpose of their visit.
continued to push the party forcibly

The soldiers, however,
back through the city

Robinson to Palmerston, Private and Confidential,
Macao, 13 April 1835, Foreign Office, Embassy and Consular
Archives: China. Public Record Office, Kew (Hereafter cited
as F0228), F 0 2 2 8 / 2 / 1 2 3 .
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gates.

Once this had occurred, a mandarin of higher rank

arrived and Captain Elliot tried to present Robinson's
request for assistance.

The mandarin "sneered

contemptuously" at the document and laughed at Elliot when
he requested that the Chinese lieutenant be punished.^
The mandarin then withdrew.

Captain Elliot remained

and continued to plead for an official to come and receive
the report.

After over half an hour had passed, Mowqua, a

senior member of the Co-hong, arrived with several
Mandarins.

Elliot beseeched the mandarins to accept the

document, but they continually replied that only petitions
were acceptable.

Their rigidity forced Elliot to leave

Canton, having failed miserably at his self-imposed task.
One month later, however, the Chinese authorities obtained
the release of the twelve sailors and the unfortunate
incident came to an end.^
Once again an excuse for war had presented itself.
Chinese renegades held twelve British subjects for ransom.
The Chinese authorities responded by assaulting an officer
of the crown.

The fact that the British Government did not

respond to this incident is striking and significant.

No

reference to the incident can be found in any document sent

Charles Gutzlaff's report, in an extract from the
"Records of Proceedings," 1 February 1835 (received 7 July
1835), Correspondence, 84-85.
^Gutzlaff's report. Correspondence, 85.
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out by the Foreign Office.

Lord Palmerston completely

overlooked it.
As a result of Elliot's experience, Robinson embarked
on the same policy Davis had chosen to follow--quiescence.
Robinson informed Lord Palmerston that no further contact
with the Chinese would be attempted unless it was necessary
and that the commission awaited "definite instructions.
Those instructions never arrived; Robinson was left without
instructions from the Foreign Office for almost two years.
The last despatch concerned Lord Napier's troubles and told
the superintendents to avoid any further disturbances.
This forced Robinson to set his own policy, while
continuing to appeal for advice.

Even after considering

the six months it took for despatches to travel from China
to London, and then back again, the absence of instructions
implies that Palmerston had only a minimal interest in
British commercial and diplomatic affairs in China.
Without instructions from England Robinson's quiescent
policy continued to draw sharp criticism from Elliot.

The

next internal conflict over policy arose in August 1835
over the behavior of a British merchant named James Innes.
Innes believed that the Chinese authorities had acted
illegally when they seized one of his cargoes.

It was

under the care of a Chinese pilot who had proceeded up the

^Robinson to Palmerston, 16 October 1835,
Correspondence, 101.
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river to Canton without a passport.

Innes demanded redress

for this outrage and threatened to attack Chinese trade in
order to get compensation.

Robinson persuaded Innes

that violence was not the best course of action.

The Chief

Superintendent told Innes that the commission would bring
the matter to the attention of the Chinese at the first
opportunity.

Innes agreed, but Elliot vigorously opposed

this line of action.

He believed that the commission

should "forcibly" expel Innes from China for his threats
and deny him the right to trade.

The Chief

Superintendent decided against such strong action and
referred the matter to England for further instructions.
Another quarrel broke out between Robinson and Elliot
in late 183 5 when the steam-boat Jardine arrived from
London.

The owner hoped to use the steamer as a ferry

between Macao and Canton and Lintin.

After observing the

Jardine in the Gulf of Canton, the Chinese authorities
ordered it out of Chinese waters.

Ignoring these

orders, the captain of the vessel continued to prepare for
a trip up the river to Canton.

Elliot demanded that the

commission should exert its authority by ordering the ship

^°Palmerston to Robinson, Foreign Office, 6 June 1836,
Correspondence, 111-2.
’^Elliot, "Memorandum,"
"Memorar
Enclosure, Robinson to
Palmerston, Macao, 20 November 1835, F017/18/86.
^^Alan Reid, "The Smoke Ship," Mariner's Mirror 72
(1986) : 69.
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to leave.

Robinson believed that he had no authority to

stop the Jardine, while Elliot felt that the commission had
both the authority and the obligation to order the Jardine
not to proceed with its plans.

He reasoned that the

presence of the steamer would cause the Chinese government
to stop all trade and would increase the animosity of the
commercial community toward the commission.
Once again Robinson chose to ignore Elliot's advice.
On 1 January the steamer proceeded up the river, but the
Chinese military halted its progress by firing its cannons.
Six days later an Imperial Edict announced that any further
attempt to use the "smoke ship" would be met with equal
fury and that it should leave Chinese waters immediately.
Seeing little chance for a successful business in Canton,
the captainleft for Singapore.

The incident had no

effect on the rest of British trade with China, but it
added to the dissention within the trade commission.
The internal turmoil caused by the Jardine incident
was exacerbated by a larger conflict between Robinson and
his subordinates.

On 1 December 1835 Robinson moved his

base of operations from Macao to a forty ton cutter named
the Louisa,

anchored off Lintin, a small island in the Gulf

of Canton.

He moved because the Portuguese felt he

^^Elliot, "Minute," Macao, 27 December 1835,
Correspondence, 122.
^^Reid, "Smoke Ship," 70.
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threatened their jurisdiction and because he wanted to be
at the heart of British mercantile interests.

Lintin

was the anchorage for mercantile vessels both waiting to
proceed to Canton and depositing opium on receiving ships,
floating opium warehouses.

Robinson also took this move to

avoid putting himself and British trade at the mercy of the
Chinese authorities.

He prophetically warned that residing

at Canton would be troublesome in times of confrontation.
If a conflict arose, and the Superintendent failed to
submit to Chinese demands, the British could have "their
servants taken away; their provisions stopped; and houses
u n r o o f e d . R o b i n s o n concluded that in such a situation
the British community, led by the Superintendent, would
have no alternative but total submission to the Chinese
demands.
Robinson follov/ed this policy for a year, and trade
continued on its peaceful course.

His new residence also

won the approval of the British Chamber of Commerce at
Canton, because the commission's residence at Macao had
been a great inconvenience to them.

As Robinson

explained to Lord Palmerston, large ships could not

^^Costin, Great Britain and China, 30-31.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, 1 December 1836,
Correspondence, 106.
^^Sprott Boyd, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce at
Canton, 8 December 1835, Correspondence, 109.
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approach Macao's harbor due to physical constraints, and
thus lay open to sudden winds while waiting for port
clearance into Canton.

A residence at Lintin, on the

other hand, provided the British ships with a safe and
speedy place to take care of official business.
Captain Elliot, now Second Superintendent and
supported by Third Superintendent Alexander R. Johnston,
energetically disapproved of Robinson's move.

In

memorandums enclosed in Robinson's despatches Elliot
criticized Robinson's policies.

The Second Superintendent

felt that Robinson's actions violated the instructions
given to the trade commission and broke English law.
The instructions called for the commission to reside at
Canton.

He believed that until new instructions arrived in

China the commission should attempt to receive permission
from the Chinese authorities to proceed from Macao directly
to Canton.

Elliot also maintained that Robinson put the

legitimate trade at risk by residing among the receiving
vessels.

He assumed that the Chinese officials would see

the residence as de facto approval by the British
Government of the illicit trade and that an incident
involving the opium traffickers and the Chinese would bring

^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin,
February 1836, F0228/3/79.
''^Elliot to Robinson, Macao, 23 November 1835,
Enclosure No. 1, Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 16 January
1 8 3 6 , F0228/3/24.
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the wrath of the Canton authorities down upon the
commission.

Both Elliot and Johnston refused,

therefore, to move with Robinson to Lintin and refused to
sign any official documents.
Robinson defended his decision, referring to the fact
that the China trade continued unmolested.

Contrary to the

assertions of Elliot and Johnston, the Chinese authorities
ignored his residence at Lintin, even though one or two war
junks maintained watch over the a n c h o r a g e . R o b i n s o n
told Palmerston that the commission had nothing to do with
the opium trade and argued that if a residence at Lintin
was illegal, then residing at Macao "must be equally
i l l e g a l . H i s t o r i a n Chang Hsin-pao states that these
defensive despatches "must have bored Palmerston
c o n s i d e r a b l y , b u t it was Elliot whom the Foreign office

^°Elliot, "Minute," 30 November 1835, Enclosure No. 1,
Robinson to Palmerston, Lintin, 29 February 1836,
F0228/3/124.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, Lintin, 5 January 1836,
F0228/3/1.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin,
25 February 1836, FO228/3/101-2.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin,
29 February 1836, F0228/3/119.
^^Chang, Conunissioner Lin, 68.
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chastised for sending home "such voluminous records of
matters of small amount.
The internal dissension became so serious that Elliot
accused Robinson of suspending him from office, a deed the
Captain considered a violation of the "King's
Instructions."^*

Elliot felt that he had the right to see

all despatches sent to and from the Foreign Office.
Robinson's residence deprived him of this right.

Robinson

responded by telling Elliot that he had formed an
inaccurate opinion.

The Chief Superintendent explained

that he would let Elliot see the despatches if he agreed to
perform his duties for the commission.
The conflict among the members of the commission
continued throughout the trading season.

During this nine-

month period Robinson continued to report the tranquil
state of affairs which existed between the merchants and
the Canton authorities and waited with "regret and anxiety"
for instructions from England.

He wanted to know what to

do but refused to listen to the opinions of Elliot and
Johnston.

Chief Superintendent Robinson believed that his

colleagues' views differed "in idea only from those which
^*William Fox-Strangways to Elliot, Foreign Office, 14
September 1836, F0228/4/49.
^*Elliot to Robinson, Macao, 9 January 1836, Enclosure
No. 3, Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 16 January 1836,
FO228/3/30.
^^Robinson to Elliot, 9 January 183 6, Enclosure No.
3A, Robinson to Palmerston, 16 January 1836, FO228/3/20-46.
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dictated the early proceedings of this Commission [under
Lord Napier] and if adopted, I predict their results would
be equally disastrous."^®

Even though Robinson received

no instructions, he felt secure with his position.

He

finally decided to break his connections with the East
India Company in November 1835.^*

Thus, when rumors of

the abolition of the Office of Chief Superintendent and the
promotion of Captain Elliot to head the trade commission
surfaced in Canton one year later, Robinson felt frustrated
that his authority had been undermined.^®

These feelings

could not possibly have matched the feelings of abandonment
when he learned that the rumors were true.
The reasons for Palmerston's actions are not clear
because of the contradictory nature of the evidence.

At

first glance one might assume that Palmerston disapproved
of Robinson's policies, but the Foreign Secretary had
originally approved of the Lintin station.

He stated that

HIS Majesty's Government approve of the proposal
contained in your despatch, of December 1, 1835
[detailing the move]; and they are of the opinion
that it would be desirable to extend the limits
of the power of the Superintendents of British

^®Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 12 October 1836,
FO228/3/206.
^^Robinson
to Palmerston, Private and Confidential,
^^Robins
Macao, 23 November 183 5, F0228/2/148-9.
^°Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin,
28 November 1836, F0228/3/212.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
Trade in China . . .
Macao.

to include Lintin and

Just ten days later Palmerston was less decisive about
the Lintin residence.

He had sent Robinson's despatches to

both the India Board and the Board of Trade and had asked
those two agencies to submit their opinions on the
establishment of permanent residence at L i n t i n . O n 7
June 1836 the India Board reported that it could not form
an opinion until Robinson provided further information.^^
That same day Palmerston wrote a letter that mimicked the
letter from the India Board.
As to the advantages which you [Robinson]
anticipate would result to British commerce from
the formation of a permanent establishment at
Lintin, of the nature of that which you suggest
in your despatch of December 1st, 183 5, I have to
say that, after duly considering what you have
said yourself in favour of such an establishment,
and the reasons against it, His Majesty's
Government do not feel that they have yet been
put sufficiently in possession of the means of
forming any final opinion upon this suggestion;
and I, therefore, cannot authorize the permanent
residence of the Commission at Lintin, until I
have received further information upon the
subject.

^^Palmerston to Robinson, 28 May, 1836,
Correspondence, 111.
^^Backhouse to R. Vernon Smith, Foreign Office, 2 May
1836, F017/16/116-7; Backhouse to Denis Le Merchant,
Foreign Office, 2 May 1826, F017/16/118-9.
^^Smith to Backhouse, India Board, 7 June 1836,
F017/16/134.
^‘^Palmerston to Robinson, Foreign Office, 7 June 1836,
Correspondence, 113-4.
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That information would never be provided.

In the same

letter in which Palmerston withdrew his outright approval,
he dismissed Robinson from his post as Chief Superintendent
of Trade in China.
doing so.

He gave no foreign policy reason for

He merely stated that His Majesty's Government

had abolished the office of Chief Superintendent in order
to reduce the size and expenses of the commission.
Robinson should turn over all official documents to Charles
Elliot.
Social differences might have played a role in this
personnel change.

After his return to England in 1835, Sir

John Davis urged John Backhouse, Permanent Undersecretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, to bring to the attention of
Lord Palmerston the immediate necessity of removing
Robinson in favor of Elliot.

Davis believed that "such a

man as Elliot should not remain below such a man as
R o b i n s o n . C h a r l e s Elliot was the cousin of Lord Minto
(Gilbert Elllot-Murray-Kynymound), First Lord of the
Admiralty.

Lord Minto had been a friend of Palmerston

since childhood.

Their fathers had been close associates

and the youths spent a considerable amount of time
t o g e t h e r R o b i n s o n was a mere merchant.

Whether Davis'

pleading had the desired effect is hard to determine.

^^Davis to Backhouse, Portland Place, London, 26 June
1835, F017/12/341-2.
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 1-16.
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Backhouse responded by writing that Lord Palmerston did not
have the time to consider the r e q u e s t , a n d the Foreign
Secretary did not replace Robinson for another year.

When

the promotion of Elliot over Robinson did take place,
however, it had less to do with any modern "rational"
notions of merit than with traditional conceptions of
status based on aristocratic family ties.^®
The lack of an explanation for the change is
symptomatic of a larger uncertainty surrounding the change
because Palmerston did not specify Elliot's new role.

When

the despatch informing Elliot of the decision reached China
on 14 December 1836, he took over as ranking officer of the
British trade commission at Canton without receiving any
definite instructions from the Government.

The Foreign

Secretary told Elliot to consider himself "Chief of the
Commission," but this title lacked any clear meaning.

In a

book on the British Consular Services abroad Desmound C.M.
Platt does not even consider Elliot's office as worthy of
consideration.^^

Elliot's new office was an

administrative aberration.

^^Backhouse to Davis, Draft, Foreign Office, 3 0 June
1835, F017/12/343.
^®W.D. Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption’ in
Britain 1780-1860," Past and Present 101 {November 1983) :
65 .
^^Desmond C.M. Platt. The Cinderella Service: British
Consuls since 1825 (Hamden, C T : Archon Books, 1971) 182.
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In regard to the conflict of opinion that existed
between Robinson and Elliot, Palmerston was equally vague.
He wrote to Elliot on 15 June, stating that he did not wish
to go into any details.
But I think it due to you to assure you that His
Majesty's Government entirely exonerate you from
any imputation of having been ' factiously
disposed’ in your proceedings with regard to Sir
George Robinson; or of having been influenced in
your conduct by any other motive than the good of
the Service. The decision of His Majesty's
Government which I communicate to you will afford
you the most satisfactory answer to your letter
upon this subject.
To Elliot this despatch must have seemed like a full
endorsement of his proposal for a more active trade
commission.
The vagueness of his instructions to Elliot came back
to haunt Lord Palmerston during the course of the next four
years.

Palmerston's blank check allowed Elliot to

experiment with a new China policy which lacked the
explicit approval of the Government in London.

Palmerston

had to spend the next several years clarifying his policy.
In the course of the correspondence from London to China
Palmerston sided with the opinion that Robinson had
expressed during his tenure as Chief Superintendent more
often than he declared approval for Elliot's propositions.
Upon receiving the June 15 despatch from Lord
Palmerston, Elliot immediately decided to change course and
^°Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 15 June 1836,
F0228/3/18-19.
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to put into effect ideas that he had contemplated in the
years preceding his appointment.

He wanted to reopen

communication with the Viceroy and to reside at Canton,
maintaining that these changes would bring advantages to
the merchant community.

After establishing himself in

Canton, Elliot had proposed aiding the Chinese authorities
in their attempts to control trade, which would cause them
to "court direct communication.
Elliot regarded his appointment as head of the British
trade delegation as the perfect opportunity to put his plan
into action.

Elliot also thought the newly appointed

Governor-General, Teng T'ing-chen, might be amenable to the
new course and open a dialogue.

Accordingly, on 14

December, the very same day he received his appointment,
Elliot asked the Hong merchants to deliver a petition to
the Viceroy.

The petition announced Elliot's appointment

and his desire to reside at C a n t o n . T e n g responded by
ordering an investigation into Elliot's intentions and into
the nature of his mission.
question the Captain.

He sent the Hong merchants to

Elliot informed them that his "duty

at Canton will be to conduct the public business of my

‘^^Elliot to Foreign Office, 14 March 1836,
Correspondence, 13 7.
^^Inclosure 1, Elliot to Governor of Canton, 14
December 1836, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 December 1836,
Correspondence, 142.
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nation, and by all possible means to preserve the peace
which so happily subsists between the two countries.
Elliot's proposal appealed to Governor-General Teng.
In a memorial to the Emperor, he recommended allowing
Elliot to proceed to Canton.

Elliot considered this a

major break-through in Anglo-Chinese relations, but the
Viceroy deemed it only a minor readjustment.^^

He stated

that since the termination of the East India Company's
monopoly, the British merchants in Canton had been without
guidance.

The Viceroy judged it prudent to grant Captain

Elliot permission to reside in Canton in order
to controul [sic] the merchants and seamen
. . . and . . . in case of any disturbances, he
alone is answerable. . . . [T]hough he is not
precisely the same as the Chief Supracargo [sic]
hitherto appointed, yet the difference is but in
name, for in reality he is the same. And after
all he is a^foreigner to hold the reins of
foreigners.
Hence, Elliot received permission from the Emperor to
reside in Canton under the same restrictions as the
Supercargoes.

The Chinese expected Elliot to control the

merchants during the trading season, and then, to retreat

'^^Inclosure 8, Elliot to Hong Merchants, 28 December,
1836, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 December 1836,
Correspondence, 146.
^^Inclosure 1, Edict from the Governor of Canton, in
Elliot to Palmerston, 18 March 1837, Correspondence, 193.
^^Inclosure 2, Extract of a Memorial from the Governor
of Canton to the Emperor of China, in Elliot to Palmerston,
27 January 1837, Correspondence, 152.
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to Macao.

Neither Governor-General Teng nor the Emperor

considered Elliot a diplomatic officer.
Elliot expected his news to be received in England
with jubilation, but his resumption of communications with
the Viceroy through the Hong Merchants had been premature.
One month after promoting Elliot to his post, Palmerston
finally got around to responding to Elliot's proposals.
The Foreign Secretary informed Elliot that it had been
acceptable for merchants of the East India Company to send
petitions through the Hong Merchants, but now it was
improper for an agent of the crown to submit to such
restrictions.^^

By the time Elliot received these

instructions, his plan was already well under way.

He

decided to ignore Palmerston's instructions and to stay the
course.

He told Palmerston that it "would be exceeding

injudicious, and perhaps prejudicial to the tranquil course
of trade" to turn back.
Palmerston was livid when he read Elliot's despatch.
The Foreign Secretary instructed Elliot to take steps
immediately to rectify the situation--to discontinue the
use of the Chinese character "pin" and of the Hong
Merchants.

Palmerston could not believe Elliot's

persistence in his course even after being given specific
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22 July 1836,
FO228/4/49-50.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 12 January 1837,
F0228/5/6.
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instructions to the contrary.

The Foreign Secretary

chastised Elliot for his insubordination and concluded by
reminding him
that it is the duty of an Officer of the Crown on
a foreign Station to take no important steps
without Instructions; and to obey promptly and
punctually the Instructions which he may receive;
and the greater the distance which separates such
officer from England, the more incumbent upon him
it is, to attend to these Rules ; because so much
longer will be the interval of time which must
elapse before the Government at home can repair
any inconvenience which may be produced by his
unauthorized acts, or by his neglect to execute
his Instructions.
Palmerston set foreign policy.
make decisions on his own.

He did not expect Elliot to

Even with the year it took for

letters to travel to and from China Palmerston wanted his
instructions to be followed with as little deviation as
possible.
In regard to trade policy Palmerston made it clear
that Elliot was to exert no pressure on the Canton
authorities for changing the present system.

He had John

Backhouse forward to Elliot a petition from the Glasgow
East India Association which called for a more active role
for the British Government in improving trade relations
with China and the Foreign Office's response.

The memorial

stated that British Government should protect trade by
seeking authorization from the Chinese for Admiralty
Jurisdiction in China, communications with the Court at
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 12 June 1837,
FO228/6/30.
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Peking, living quarters for merchants and their families in
Canton, new British owned warehouses, the protection of
Chinese Laws, access to northern ports, freedom to trade
with all Chinese and an island off the c o a s t . B a c k h o u s e
responded to these suggestions in no uncertain terms.

He

stated that the Government would not put the trade in
danger in order to press for these changes.^''

With this

set of letters Palmerston demonstrated to Elliot that the
British Government did not favor an active role for itself
in opening up the Chinese market.
During the course of 1836 Palmerston also clarified
his position in regard to two other disputes between Elliot
and Robinson.

Responding to Elliot's desire to stop the

advance of the steam-ship Jardine, Palmerston stated that
Elliot possessed limited authority when interfering with
the undertakings of British merchants in China.

Palmerston

told Elliot that he had no authority to stop the Jardine.
In the future Elliot should be "very careful not to assume
a greater degree of authority over British subjects in

^^Glasgow East India Association to Palmerston,
Enclosure No. 1, Backhouse to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22
July 1836, F0228/3/42-4.
^°Backhouse to Glasgow East India Association, Foreign
Office, 16 July 1836, Enclosure No. 2, Backhouse to Elliot,
Foreign Office, 22 July 1836, F0228/3/45.
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China than that which you [Captain Elliot] in reality
possess.
In regard to the case of James Innes the Foreign
Secretary informed Elliot that the British Government would
consider violent acts against the Chinese as acts of
"piracy."

Innes would be left to the mercy of the Chinese

if he carried out his threats.

In a second letter dated

the same day, however, Palmerston went on to say that it
was a "misconception" for Elliot to believe that he had the
power to expel any one from China.

The East India Company

Supercargoes had possessed the authority to expel
unlicensed merchants from China.

Since a license was no

longer needed to trade in China, the power had also ceased
to exist.
The Foreign Secretary knew that such limitations on
Elliot's powers affected the status of the trade
commission.

He wrote :

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the
inconvenience arising both from the undefined
state of Jurisdiction of the Superintendents in
China, and from their want of power to enforce
their decisions to which they may come, on

^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22 July 1836,
F0228/3/4B.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, F0228/4/58.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, FO228/4/69-70.
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matters submitted to them^^by members of the
commercial body in China.
He added that the Government was deliberating on the nature
of the trade commission in China.

Clarification of the

role of the Superintendents would be forthcoming.
concluded,

He

"In the meantime, I recommend to you to confine

your interference, when called for, as much as possible to
friendly suggestions and advice to the parties
concerned.

If Elliot had any questions about the

limits of his authority, Palmerston's instructions should
have answered them.

In two instances the Foreign Secretary

rebuked his subordinate for wanting to take a more active
role in controlling the China trade.

Captain Elliot

possessed no real power or authority to act.
Another concern of Lord Palmerston was the expenses of
the commission.

A "mystical faith in 'Cheap Government’"

dominated political debates in the first half of the
nineteenth century.

Since the Liberal Tory Government's

retrenchment measures left the Whigs with only £5,000,000
to cut from the budget, they experienced difficulties
finding areas in which to reduce fiscal o u t l a y s . T h e
trade commission in China was one area that they could

^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, F0228/4/67.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, F0228/4/67-8
^^Gash, "After Waterloo," 156-7.
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reduce without hurting their policy objectives.

In

November 1836 reduction of the commission's expenses
followed the reduction of commission staff itself in June.
The Foreign Secretary abolished several minor offices, and
slashed the salaries for each of the remaining offices by
£500 per annum.

Finally he cut the clerical and contingent

expenses from £5000 to £2500.

Palmerston then instructed

Elliot that "the above amount shall, under no
circumstances, in future be e x c e e d e d . I n another
letter dated the same day Palmerston reprimanded Elliot for
the commission's decision to pay £1014.15 for the creation
of a seamen's hospital.

Palmerston recognized the need for

the hospital but thought the amount appropriated was too
high.

He also disapproved any allocation of funds without

prior approval from London.

He considered such allocations

a violation of English law.
China absorbed Palmerston's attention on 8 November
183 5, for on that same day he dealt with another instance
of inappropriate distribution of public capital.

In a

dispute between Messrs. Turner & Co. and Mr. Arthur
Launders Keating over Spanish $300, the British trade
commission in China had paid the sum to Mr. Keating in
order to avoid a more general disruption of trade in
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, FQ228/4/73.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, F0228/4/76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100
Canton.

Although Palmerston did not intend to hold the

members of the commission personally responsible, he did
not want Elliot to make this type of mistake again.
Once more Palmerston's instructions came too late.
Elliot had already undertaken on his own authority to spend
public funds.

The main reason for the disbursement was

Elliot's move to Canton.

In Canton Elliot had to rent

additional residential and office space for the commission
during the season.

These expenses amounted to $5765.*°

Elliot also spent money on H.M. Cutter Louisa, which he
found badly in need of repairs.
was unseaworthy.

He thought that the vessel

He "furnished [it] with new decks and

topside, recoppered and thoroughly re-equipped in spars,
sails, boats and rigging" at a cost of $6500.*^

He

suggested raising the contingent expenses of the commission
by £1000 per annum in order to pay for the upkeep and
manning of the vessel.

He argued that the vessel provided

the best means of traveling from Macao to Canton because
the Chinese authorities allowed it to move unmolested.

*^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November
1836, F0228/4/65.
*°"A Statement of the disbursements made by Captain
Elliot since his assumption of the Office of Chief
Superintendent . . .," Enclosure No. 1, Elliot to
Palmerston, 17 September 1837, F0228/5/324.
*^"A Statement of the disbursements . . .,"
F0228/5/329.
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when Palmerston received the news of Elliot's
expenditures, the Foreign Secretary decided to allow them.
He raised the contingent expenses by £750, less than the
£1000 Elliot had requested.

Here Palmerston's flexibility

stopped.
While I communicate to you a very liberal
provision which Her Majesty's Government have
made for this Service, I must again impress on
you the necessity of exercising the most rigid
control over the Contingent Expenditure of the
Commission; and of making from time to time any
reductions therein which may be compatible with
the due execution of the public Service.
Neither Palmerston's policy of reducing the commission
nor Elliot's policy indulging the Chinese authorities
pleased the British merchants in Canton.

John Slade,

editor of the Canton Register, wrote to Palmerston, "every
measure for the protection and promotion of the British
trade to China, originating with the government of which
your lordship is a member, has failed utterly, and
disgracefully.
The Trade Commission's internal conflict provided
Palmerston with an opportunity to delineate a clear China
policy, but he had acted before clarifying his intentions.
This mistake led to tensions between Palmerston and Elliot.
The Foreign Secretary was finally forced to define British

^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 2 June 1838,
F0228/8/8.
^^Slade
to Palmerston, Canton, 9 October 1838,
^^Slac
F017/28/212.
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policy.

He did not wish Crown representatives in China to

direct a new forward commercial policy.

In the face of

opposition from the merchants in China the Foreign
Secretary wanted to reduce the British Government's
involvement in China rather than expand it. As Chief of
the Commission, Elliot was a minor official with little
voice in policy decisions and with limited authority over
British subjects.
his disposal.

He also had few financial resources at

The steps Elliot would take during the opium

crisis of March 1839 greatly exceeded his role as
Palmerston had defined it.
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CHAPTER 4
FAILURE TO TAKE HEED

Elliot's inability to follow simple instructions was
extremely unfortunate for the Foreign Minister because of
crises that developed in Britain and China.

Although

stemming from unrelated causes, they created tense
atmospheres in both imperial capitals, leading to a
deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations.

The crisis in

London, the topic of Chapter 5, resulted from a backlash
against the reform measures of the Whigs.

In Peking the

crisis arose out of the Chinese Emperor's desire to
revitalize his dynasty.

The Emperor's decision to suppress

the illegal opium trade provided a link between the two
crises, when the British Foreign Office failed to respect
the Superintendent's warnings about the increasing risk the
opium trade posed to legitimate British commerce.
During the late 1820s and early 1830s a danger to the
Anglo-Chinese relationship arose.

This threat came about

because the British merchants finally found a product which
the Chinese were willing to buy en masse--opium.

The sale

of opium successfully altered the balance of trade in the
British favor, but this shift too had its price.

During

103
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the early 1800s raw cotton exports from India to China had
closed the trade gap.
uncertain venture.

Indian cotton remained, however, an

Its price depended upon the size of

China's own domestic crop.

The problems in the Chinese

cotton market became serious in the 182 0s when trade in the
commodity came to a standstill, leaving the trade imbalance
as an irritation.^ Opium provided relief.
The East India Company grew and processed the drug in
India for consumption in China.

The laborers on Company

plantations sowed the seeds for the poppy in autumn, and
the flower bloomed in the spring.

The poppy flower varied

in color from white to deep violet, and the plant stood no
higher than five feet tall.

Once the spherical seed pod

developed on the end of the stem some time between July and
August, the flower fell off.

Laborers then walked the

fields in the evening, making shallow incisions using
hooked knives around the sphere.

During the course of the

night, a white milky liquid exuded from the interior of the
pod and built up on the outside of it.

The next day

workers reentered the fields in order to collect the raw
opium, now a dark brown mass because of the heat of the
sun.

The field hands repeated this process of cutting the

capsules and collecting the opium for several days until

^Greenberg, British Trade, 9-10, 80-94.
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the plant no longer produced the liquid.^
substance was simple.

Processing the

Opium was boiled in open vats for

several days in order to remove as much of the moisture as
possible.

Workers then took the processed opium and rolled

it into balls.

They covered these balls with poppy leaves

and placed them into chests that held two layers of twenty
balls each.^
The Company did not directly engage in the sale of
opium in China because in 1792 a Chinese imperial edict
forbade its importation.

The Company felt the trade was

too much of a risk, so during December or January it held a
public auction in Calcutta.

There, the Company sold the

opium in lots of five chests to private speculators, who
then hired merchants to deliver the product to China.^
These merchants, called country traders, had to obtain a
license from the Company in order to participate in the
legal trade in China.

They brought in the opium along with

their legitimate merchandise.^
After the Honorable Company's monopoly ended in 1833,
the country traders continued to trade in China but without

^"Cultivation of the Poppy," Documents Relating to
Opium, &c. (Canton: Chinese Repository, 1837), 45.
F017/28/155.
^"The Traffic in Opium carried on with China,"
Documents Relating to Opium, 69. F017/28/167.
'^"Traffic in Opium," 69. F017/28/167.
^Greenberg, British Trade, 14-15.
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a license.

The traders also could legally engage in the

tea trade, without any competition from the East India
Company.

In order to finance this new endeavor British

merchants increasingly turned to Anglo-American merchant
bankers in New York and London.*

Since American merchants

engaged in the China trade continued to run a trade
deficit, it was more efficient for them to draw a bill of
exchange from one of the Anglo-American Houses to pay for
Chinese merchandise than to continue to ship silver.

The

Chinese merchants in turn used the bills to purchase
British goods--opium.

These financial arrangements caused

credit to replace bullion as the mechanism for exchange and
linked the Canton markets to those in London and New
York.^
Once in Chinese waters the merchants transferred the
opium to receiving ships.

The British merchants brought

these vessels to China but the ships never left Chinese
waters; they were floating warehouses whose only purpose
was to house illegal goods.

Local authorities knew of

their presence, but did not have the naval capability to
drive them away.” As a result, Chinese opium dealers

*Weng Bang Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine
Matheson & Co., a China Agency of the Early Nineteenth
Century (London: Curzon Press, 1978), 228-9.
^Peter Temin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York:
Norton, 1969), 81-82.
*Fay, Opium War, 46.
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purchased opium directly from the receiving ships, paying
in silver.
The Chinese were responsible for transporting the
opium on shore, which usually meant bribing a local
official.

Boats of various sizes came alongside the

receiving ships, loaded up with opium and then took the
illegal substance ashore.

This arrangement allowed the

country traders to claim both that they did not smuggle
opium into China and that the Chinese officials sanctioned
the trade.’
The private merchants felt no threat from Imperial
authorities.

They even held them in contempt by publishing

a newspaper, called the Canton Register, that contained the
current prices of opium, and specified the names of those
participating in the illicit trade.

Those participants

were the same individuals and merchant houses that
conducted the legal trade after the abolition of the East
India Company's monopoly.
While historians have an abundance of evidence
concerning the opium trade itself, the material needed to
paint an accurate picture of the drug's consumption in
early nineteenth-century China is scarce.

Unlike most

European and Middle Eastern consumers who either chewed

’select Committee on the Trade with China. Report,
1840. 72.
10

Report, 1840, 49-50, 73, 94.
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opium or mixed it with a liquid, the Chinese smoked it.
They would place a small portion of opium on the end of a
thin skewer and heat it above a lamp.

Once the opium

reached the point of turning into a vapor, the addict
placed the skewer within a shallow bowl at the end of a
pipe and inhaled.

This method of taking the drug greatly

increased the narcotic effect.
Neither the British nor the Chinese lacked knowledge
about the long-term consequences of using opium.

Both

realized the escape it provided and the destruction of the
body that inevitably followed.
('The opium eater’) soon after having taken the
opium perceives an unusual exhilaration and
activity of the spirits; his imagination revels
in luxurious images, and he enjoys a feeling of
more than common strength and courage; but this
pleasing intoxication soon leaves him, and in its
stead follow laziness, disgust at all kinds of
occupation, and a certain imbecility of the
senses, closely bordering upon insanity. To
avoid the duration of this insufferable state,
opium must again be taken, thus continually
changing between the highest excitement and the
lowest state of despondency, the consequence of
which is an early derangement ^f the functions of
the body, and premature death.
Chinese descriptions of the narcotic's effects are no more
heartening.

Jonathan Spence, "Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China,"
Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant eds., Conflict and
Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975), 145-50; Fay, Opium War, 8-9.
Testimony as to the effects of using opium,"
Documents Relating to Opium, 70. F017/28/167.
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When any one is long habituated to inhaling it,
[opium], it becomes necessary to resort to it at
regular intervals, and the habit of using it,
being inveterate, is destructive of time,
injurious to property, and yet dear to one even
as life. Of those who use it to great excess,
the breath becomes feeble, the body wasted, the
face sallow, the teeth black: the individuals
themselves clearly see the ^ 1 1 effects of it,
yet cannot refrain from it.
Confucian officials, courtiers, merchants and soldiers
were the first to use the drug.

Not until the 1870s did

the habitual use of opium spread to the peasants, the vast
majority of the Chinese population.

Although the

devitalizing effects of the drug remained relatively
isolated in the upper echelons of Chinese society, they
were highly visible to the Court in Peking.
As early as 2 January 1835, John Davis warned Lord
Palmerston that a sudden increase in opium smuggling was
taking place and that this increase might bring on the
wrath of the Imperial government at Peking.

This

expansion occurred as a result of increased competition.
At the turn of the century territories under the East India
Company's control provided the only source of opium.

The

Company made a sizable profit selling relatively small

"Memorial from Heu-Naetse to the Emperor, proposing
to legalize the importation of Opium," Inclosure No. 1,
Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 2 February 1837,
Correspondence, 156.
^^Spence, "Opium Smoking," 150-3.
^^Davis to Palmerston, 2 January 1835, Correspondence,
76 .
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quantities of opium by keeping prices high.

In the 1820s

this situation began to change when Indian princes, who
were outside of the East India Company's jurisdiction,
started growing opium and selling it at a much cheaper
price.

In order to retain its market share, the Company

slashed prices and increased production.

The urban markets

in China seemed easily to accept this increase.
By the end of the 183 0s the country traders, the East
India Company and the British Government had become
dependent on an illegal trade without effective
controls.

The profits from opium paid for the tea.

At

first country traders exchanged the bullion they received
from the Chinese for bills of remittance from the East
India Company.

The Company then used the bullion to buy

tea, which it shipped to England.

With the abolition of

the company's monopoly, the country traders used the
profits from selling Company opium to buy tea for
themselves, or their clients.

Once the tea reached

England, the revenue generated from the tea tariff paidone
half of the expenses of maintaining the best naval fleet

in

the world.

^*Fay, Opium War, 58-59.
^^Greenberg, British Trade, 215; Morse, International
Relations, 168.
’®Fay, Opium War, 18.
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The increase in the illicit trade occurred
simultaneously with policy and personnel changes in the
Chinese imperial government at Peking.

In 1835 the Tao-

kuang emperor (r.1821-1850) appointed P'an Shih-en to
replace the recently deceased T s 'ao Chen-yung as Grand
Councilor.

This administrative change marked the

ascendancy of a minority faction within the imperial
bureaucracy.

For the previous hundred years, the

examination system, by which mandarins advanced in
government, favored scholars of the k'ao-cheng school.
This branch of Confucian scholarship advocated philological
textual studies of ancient manuscripts.

By the nineteenth

century these scholars were immersed in technical debates,
neglecting the social and moral concerns present in
Confucian literature.

P'an used his position as Grand

For an in depth study of the school see Benjamin A.
Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual Aspects
of Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Council on
East Asian Studies, Harvard Univeristy Press, 1984).
^°Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Intellectual
Transition in China, 1890-1907 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971), 13; Chang's first chapter provides
an excellent introduction to the competing philosophical
traditions within Confucianism.
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Councilor to support members of the literati* who
preferred the T'ung ch'eng school
The T'ung ch'eng School, opposing k'ao-cheng
scholasticism, emphasized the use of the Confucian classics
for the moral cultivation of China's elite.

If the

examination system favored adherence to these principles,
according to the T'ung ch'eng School, then advancing
statesman would possess a "moral charisma" which would
morally transform the Chinese p e o p l e . W i t h i n the
literati the Spring Purification Circle, whose members
adhered to the T'ung ch'eng school, organized a network of
families and friends to gain the patronage of important
officials such as P'an.

Sympathetic to this faction's

cause, P'an appointed its members to key positions within
the empire in order to tilt the balance within the
bureaucracy toward the moral cultivation school.
Frightened by recent rebellions in Southeastern China
and the military's inability to put down the rebellions,
the Tao-kung emperor sanctioned his new Grand Councilor's

The term literati refers to the one-half percent of
the male population who passed one of the three levels of
the imperial examination system. Polachek, Inner Opium War,
20

.
^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 83.

^^Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 16-7; Polachek, Inner Opium
War, 89
23

Polachek, Inner Opium War, 63-83.
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c h a n g e s . The emperor attributed the military's failure
to opium use and a great debate ensued about how best to
control the importation of an article that both sides
acknowledged as a destructive toxin.

Two methods of

dealing with the opium trade emerged out of the debate-legalization and prohibition.

The advocates of

legalization considered opium an ordinary commodity.

They

posited that the best way to control and regulate its
importation was to use the Canton system.

This change

would limit the market, which had been continuously
expanding, and would stop the flow of silver out of the
empire.

Proponents of prohibition argued that opium

destroyed the hearts and minds of innocent Chinese.

The

Son of Heaven should never sanction such a decadent trade.
The only way to control the spread of the dreadful habit
was to eliminate the supply brought to China by greedy
barbarians.

The prohibition of opium would also have the

added benefit of eliminating the exportation of silver.
The legalization initiative found support within the
bureaucratic establishment.

Provincial governors and

governor-generals, realizing the weakness of the Ch'ing
state in the face of rising organized crime, believed that

^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 114-15.
^^Captain Elliot provided Lord Palmerston with a
series of Chinese memorials (received 17 July 1837)
detailing the nature of the debate over opium.
Correspondence, 153-181; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 103-19.
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relaxation of restrictions on the drug provided the only
solution available without increasing the police capacity
of the state.

The Spring Purification Circle emerged as

the major proponent of suppression.

Its members saw the

opium trade as a symptom of a larger problem of dynastic
decline.

They thought that effective management of the

barbarians in this instance would lead to greater domestic
political rewards for themselves and their cause.
Elliot began informing Lord Palmerston of the Court's
debate on 27 July 1836.

He told the Foreign Minister that

the Peking authorities would choose legalization because
they "cannot do without our opium.

He went on to say

that Peking's decision to regulate the trade, when it came,
would be too late to avoid an international incident.

The

local authorities in Canton, after such a long period of
independence, would not tolerate interference from Peking.
[This] will lead to grave difficulties. A long
course of impunity will beget hardihood, at last
some gross insult will be perpetrated, that the
Chinese authorities will be constrained to
resent; they will be terrified and irritated, and
probably commit some act of cruel violence that
will make any choice but armed interference,
impossible to our own Government.

^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 135.
“"'Elliot to Palmerston, 27 July 1836 (received 15
February 1837), Correspondence, 138.
^®Ibid.
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In Elliot's opinion the legalization of opium, the best
possible short-term solution the British could hope to
achieve, would only increase the possibility of future
violence.

Legalization would, in fact, lead to war between

Great Britain and China by overthrowing the corrupt local
officials and the opium smugglers too quickly.
The opium crisis began to take shape at the end of
183 5 when the Tao-kuang emperor decided against
legalization and for prohibition.^^

In October 1835 Teng

T'ing-chen, Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi
provinces, commenced a crack-down on the illicit trade by
issuing a decree ordering several foreign merchants out of
China.

Most notably, the Chinese authorities expelled

William Jardine (called "old iron-headed rat" by the
Chinese) and Lancelot Dent, two of the most prestigious
British merchants and most notorious opium smugglers in
China, along with six other merchants.^'

Elliot warned

Lord Palmerston of the seriousness of this move and asked
for a man-of-war to proceed to China in order to protect
British interests.

Elliot also stressed the need for

^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 125.
^Inclosure 1, Edict from the Heads of the Provincial
Government, 28 October 1835, in Elliot to Palmerston, 7
February 183 7, Correspondence, 183.
Jardine did not leave China until February 1839, and
Dent remained in China throughout the crisis in March 1839.
They repeatedly received temporary stays of Teng's order.
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regular correspondence between himself and the provincial
authorities.

He believed that if difficulties arose, he

could place himself in his official station between the
opium merchants and the Chinese authorities and avert an
interruption of t r a d e . E l l i o t ' s confidence in his own
ability to influence the decisions of the Chinese
authorities was unrealistic, indeed almost laughable.

They

considered him a mere "foreigner to hold the reins of
foreigners,

not a diplomatic officer who negotiates

between equals.
Even as the local authorities increased the pressure
on the opium trade, Elliot held to his belief that the
legalization of opium was just around the corner.
Moreover, if the Chinese legalized the importation of
opium, they would also legalize the growth of opium in
their own empire.

This change, Elliot claimed, would cut

into the market share of the British.

The British

merchants must gradually begin to shift away from their
dependence upon opium.

According to Elliot, "any abrupt

interruption of this traffic involves a very nearly

^^Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 7 February 1837,
F0228/5/72.
^^Inclosure 2, Extract of a Memorial from the Governor
of Canton to the Emperor of China, in Elliot to Palmerston,
27 January 1837, Correspondence, 152.
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complete interruption of the whole commerce with the
country [China] .
Elliot was right only on this last point.

Like Napier

before him, he was not a very good judge of the intentions
of the Chinese government.
deteriorate.

The situation continued to

The Chinese authorities in Canton decided to

call upon Elliot to stop the prohibited trade.

In two

decrees in August of 183 7 the provincial authorities,
acting on the emperor's orders to suppress the opium trade,
instructed the British Superintendent to send away all of
the receiving ships from the China coast.

The decrees also

warned Elliot that if the smuggling of opium continued, it
would "lead to the entire stoppage of commercial
intercourse.
A month passed, and the receiving ships remained on
the China coast.

The Chinese provincial authorities issued

another decree ordering the dispersal of the ships.
-i*krreoveri— the]r-atrtax*ed-^H:inot-'-s-^:najCtdnoirndiirectd:yi

They--

noted that although Elliot claimed that he resided in
Canton to control the British merchants, he refused to move
against the despicable enterprise.

The Chinese authorities

^^Elliot to Palmerston, 21 February 1837,
Correspondence, 190.
^^Inclosure 1, Abstract of an Edict from the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor of Canton, 17 August 1837, in
Elliot to Palmerston, 18 November 1837 (received 15 May
1838), Correspondence, 234.
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concluded that "he is unfit for the situation as
Superintendent."^^

In the ensuing dialogue between the

imperial officials in Canton, Captain Elliot merely bided
for time, intensifying the crisis.

Elliot told the Chinese

that his commission only covered the legal trade at the
port of Canton.

He claimed to have no official knowledge

of the opium trade, because the ships outside of the port
did not present their papers to him.

Elliot informed

Governor-General Teng that he should relay a formal request
from his Emperor to the King of England asking for
assistance.

This request would enable Elliot to respond to

the allegations and to appeal to his Sovereign for
advice
The Chinese officials recognized Elliot's ploy for
what it was--a hopeless attempt to avoid responsibility.
Governor-General Teng could not understand how Elliot could
make an appeal to ignorance, but he decided to take Elliot
up on his offer.

Teng directed the prefect of the

department of Canton to make a formal declaration of the
Chinese government's intentions.

Elliot notified Teng that

the information had been transmitted to the British

^^Inclosure 1, Abstract of an Edict from the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor, 18 September 1837, in Elliot to
Palmerston, 18 November 1837, Correspondence, 235.
^^Inclosure 2, Elliot to the Governor of Canton, 25
September 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18 November 1837,
Correspondence, 236-7.
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Government.

Elliot claimed that he would act on his

Government's instructions as soon as he received them.^^
Along with the Chinese decrees and his own responses,
Elliot dispatched further alarming information to the
Foreign Office.

While the Chinese waited for Elliot's

response, they had not sat idly by.

Recognizing the role

that the Chinese subjects played in smuggling the opium
ashore, the authorities moved against the natives.
Burning the boats used to carry opium from the receiving
ships, the Chinese officials successfully disrupted the
smuggling operations.

Elliot reported to Lord Palmerston

that this disruption produced a "very hazardous change" in
the opium trade.

"European passage-boats belonging to

British owners, slenderly manned with Lascar seamen," now
smuggled the opium on shore.

Lightly armed, these vessels

operated side by side with the legitimate trade and
increased the possibility of a violent confrontation
between British merchants and the Chinese government.^®

^^Inclosure 3, Governor and Lieutenant Governor to
Elliot, 28 September 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18
November 1837, Correspondence, 237; Inclosure 4, The
Prefect and Commandant of Canton to Elliot, 29 September
1837, in Elliot to Palmerston 18 November 1837,
Correspondence, 237-4 0; Inclosure 5, Elliot to Governor of
Canton, 17 November 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18
November 1837, Correspondence, 240.
^®Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 19 November 1837,
F0228/6/141-43.
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The Chinese thus began a two-pronged assault on the
opium trade--against the foreigners and against the
Chinese.
tolerated.

Elliot believed the situation could not be
He recommended that Palmerston authorize the

dispatch of a Special Commissioner to China to negotiate a
commercial treaty and station several ships in the seas off
the China coast to protect the legitimate trade.
Palmerston failed to address any of Elliot's concerns.

He

had already agreed to send one naval vessel to China in
order to protect British property, but not to extract
commercial benefits.

He commanded the ship's commander and

crew to be very careful not to offend the Chinese.

The

ship was to protect British interests and to control the
rowdy crews of British merchantmen.

Palmerston's

instructions were not what Elliot or the British merchants
had in mind, but the Foreign Secretary deemed them
adequate.
In regard to the question of opium Palmerston clearly
articulated his position.

In the only despatch mentioning

opium and in response to Elliot's proposal to place himself
between the merchants and the Chinese, Palmerston wrote in
no uncertain terms :

^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 19 November 1837,
F028B/6/144-54.
^°Inclosure, Palmerston to the Lords of the Admiralty,
20 September 1837, in Palmei^ston to Elliot, 2 NovemJcer
1837, Correspondence, 193 -4 .
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With respect to the smuggling of opium . . . Her
Majesty's Government cannot interfere for the
purpose of enabling British subjects to violate
the laws of the country to which they trade. Any
loss, therefore, which such persons may suffer in
consequence of more effectual execution of
Chinese laws on this, must be borne by the
parties who have brought that loss on themselves
by their own acts.
Elliot was not in China to protect the opium merchants.
His duty was to the legitimate trade alone.
statement Palmerston refused to venture.

Beyond this

He declined to

give Elliot either the power to suppress the trade or
advice on how to deal with the Chinese government.
Palmerston either did not recognize the opium trade's
connections to British revenue and to international money
markets or he did not deem them as important as historians
have in hindsight.
Palmerston's response forced Elliot to follow a policy
of inaction, while the Chinese tolerance of the illicit
trade reached its limit.

On 8 December 1838 Elliot wrote

to Palmerston "that the trade is at this moment cast into a
state of critical difficulty.

Peking decided that the

time had come for more decisive action against the
importation of opium, and Governor-General Teng inaugurated
a policy of enforcing the existing opium laws against the

^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 15 June 1838,
F0228/8/18-19.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, HM Cutter Louisa, Whampoa, 8
December 1838, F0228/8/351; Received 18 April 1838,
Correspondence, 323.
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foreigners importing opium into China.

This strengthening

of resolve led to the breach of Anglo-Chinese relations.
Four days later, on 12 December, the GovernorGeneral 's attempt to enforce the law produced a direct
confrontation between the foreign com.munity and the
provincial authorities.

The Chinese decided to execute a

native opium dealer in an attempt to demonstrate the
seriousness of the new campaign.

They directed the threat

directly toward the foreigners by ordering the execution to
take place in front of the foreign factories at Canton.
The foreign community considered this a barbarous act and
physically foiled the plans of the Chinese.

Several

European merchants dismantled the execution apparatus
without any opposition from the Chinese "police" assigned
to carry out the death penalty.

After several hours the

crowd, which had gathered to watch the spectacle, increased
in numbers to reach almost 6,000 persons.

Some of the

foreign merchants who had grown weary of the multitude
marched into the Chinese crowd and began swinging sticks.
The Chinese responded by throwing stones at the Europeans,
and the ensuing riot lasted for several hours.
Palmerston's response to Elliot's description of the
12 December incident, although not received until the
latter part of 183 9, should be noted.

Palmerston told

^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 13 December 1838,
F0228/8/355-7.
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Elliot that he did not have enough information to form an
opinion about the matter and wanted to know if any of the
foreigners were British subjects.

More importantly,

Palmerston wished "to know upon what alleged ground of
right these persons considered themselves entitled to
interfere with the arrangements made by the Chinese
officers of justice for carrying into effect, in a Chinese
town, the orders of their superior authorities."^^
Palmerston's response did not concern the actions of the
Chinese, but the actions of the foreigners.

Elliot warned

Palmerston that the situation was degenerating, but
Palmerston failed to take heed.

Apparently, he blamed the

breakdown of Anglo-Chinese relations on the British
merchants rather then the Chinese government; the merchants
would have to bear any loss in trade.
For the moment Elliot had no use for Palmerston's
response, even had the Foreign Secretary encouraged
stronger action against the Chinese.

The Hong merchants,

fearing reprisals from their own government, decided to
terminate all trade until the foreigners did something
about the opium problem.
for him to act.

Elliot judged that it was time

On 17 December 1838 Elliot made his first

public statement regarding the importation of opium.

At a

meeting of the entire foreign community, Elliot announced

^^Palmerston to Elliot, 15 April 183 9, Correspondence,
325.
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Palmerston's policy that British ships engaged in the
illicit traffic would receive no protection from Her
Majesty's Government.

This declaration meant that British

merchants would be held accountable for their actions under
Chinese law--capital punishment for opium smuggling--and
that resisting arrest also would not be tolerated.

He then

went further and ordered all British opium boats out of the
Canton river e s t u a r y . B r i t i s h merchants strongly
objected to this action because they believed that the
Chinese government would conclude that Elliot possessed the
power to order all of the opium trade s t o p p e d . E l l i o t
also decided on his ovm to reopen communications with the
provincial authorities.

He conceded to the Chinese demands

that he use the character "pin" and that he transmit the
petition through the Hong merchants.

To support his

unauthorized move, Elliot used the same arguments that
failed to convince Palmerston earlier.

Now, Elliot also

claimed that the closure of trade necessitated
47

communications.

Inclosure 7, Address by Elliot to a General Meeting
of all Foreign Residents at Canton, 17 December 1838, in
Elliot to Palmerston, 2 January 1839, Correspondence, 3312.

^^John Slade, Narrative of the Late Proceedings and
Events in China (Canton: Canton Press, 1839; Reprint,
Wilmingham, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1972), 5.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 2 January 1839,
F0228/9/9.
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Elliot's action accomplished its immediate goal.

The

Hong reopened trade, but the threat to commercial
activities did not terminate.

As 1839 began, Elliot still

felt that the British merchants' behavior in China
threatened Anglo-Chinese trade relations.

He asked Lord

Palmerston for "defined and adequate powers," something
Palmerston had promised in October of 1836.

Elliot also

made an unusual request.
I humbly hope that Her Majesty's Government
(taking into it's [sic] consideration the novel,
responsible and undefined station I fill and
casting a thought upon the embarrassing
circumstances which have beset me) would be
pleased to determine whether I have a claim to
such an expression of support, as I might be
permitted to publish to the Queen's Subjects in
this Empire."
Such a plea for support does not illustrate a man confident
in his own decisions or his superior's foreign policy.
Once again, Palmerston ignored Elliot's pleas and gave
neither advice, nor powers.

He simply wrote in private to

express the "entire Approbation of Her Majesty's
Government" regarding Elliot's actions in December.
This letter, even though it reached China after the
opium crisis in March, demonstrates that Palmerston
approved of Elliot's decision to take a more active role
against the opium trade.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Private, Canton, 2 January
1839, FO17/30/61.
^
’palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 13 May 1839,
^’palmei
F0228/11/29.
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The time for Palmerston to act had come to an end.
The Emperor decided that the money-hungry barbarians must
know the power of the Celestial Empire and that the
decadent opium trade must end.
the traffic had succeeded.

The campaign to suppress

Trade in the drug had remained

at a standstill for the previous four m o n t h s , b u t the
opium merchants had not left Chinese waters.

To eradicate

the trade altogether, the Emperor appointed a special
commissioner, Lin Tse-hsü.^^
On 10 March 1839 High Commissioner Lin, a headstrong
civil servant and an associate of the Spring Purification
Circle, arrived in Canton.

Eight days later he issued the

infamous edict requiring that all opium be turned over to
him and that the foreign community guarantee the cessation
of the opium trade.

Lin reminded the foreign community of

the generosity of the Emperor in allowing them the
privilege of trading with the Middle Kingdom.

Lately, the

opium trade had tested the limits of that generosity and
would no longer be tolerated.

The High Commissioner gave

the foreign community three days to comply with his
demands.

If it did so, then he would forget the

^°Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 30 January 1839,
F017/30/240.
^Vrthur Waley's The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) is based on
Lin's diary and contains a developed account of the
Commissioner's activities during the crisis.
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barbarians' past abuses and allow legitimate trade to
continue as before .
The foreign community delayed taking action.

To make

the merchants comply with Commissioner Lin's orders, the
Hoppo, the administrator of Canton Customs, quarantined the
whole foreign community.

He surrounded the foreign

factories with troops and refused to allow any one to
leave, or to communicate with those outside of Canton.

The

action taken against the entire foreign community was
thoroughly consistent with what the British knew of Chinese
law and established precedent.

From the British point of

view, the Chinese "doctrine of responsibility made it
necessary that someone must suffer, whether the guilty
person or not, whenever a crime was committed.
Furthermore, Chinese law held to the principle of
collective responsibility--the community must be held
accountable for the actions of its members.
The Hoppo's orders caught the attention of Elliot, who
was in Macao at the time.

The Chief of the British trade

commission decided to force his way into the foreign
factories at Canton and to demand passports for the entire

Inclosure 1, Edict from the Imperial Commissioner
Lin to the Foreigners of all Nations, 18 March 1839, in
Elliot to Palmerston, 22 March 1839, Correspondence, 350-2
^^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 109.
^^Fay, Opium War, 38.
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community.

Before leaving for Canton, Elliot clothed

himself in his dress uniform, the symbol of his authority,
and publicly ordered the British ships in the Gulf of
Canton to hoist "their national colours,

[and] be prepared

to resist every act of aggression on the part of the
Chinese Government.

Immediately upon his arrival in

Canton, Elliot directed the foreign community there to
follow a similar course.

In his despatches to Lord

Palmerston, Elliot wrote as though the world was about to
fall in on the whole foreign community and that only his
actions saved them from starvation and the threat of
violence.
Elliot was wrong.

He even contradicted himself in his

letters to Lord Palmerston.

It was Elliot's decision to

place himself between the opium merchants and the Chinese
government that inflam.ed the situation; the Hoppo, taking
the same steps that forced Lord Napier's departure,
increased the number of troops around the factories and cut
off the barbarian's supplies and servants.

Robert Inglis,

who testified before the Select Committee on Trade with
China in May of 1840, stated that the threat did not arise

Inclosure 10, Public Notice to Her Majesty's
Subjects, 22 March 1839, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March
1839 (received 29 August 1839), Correspondence, 363.
^*Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 30 March 1839
(received 29 August 1839), F017/31/5-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
until after Captain Elliot arrived in C a n t o n . W i l l i a m
Jardine, who resided in China from 182 0 to 183 9, also told
the committee that no threat to British life or property
existed at the time Lin issued the e d i c t . T h e merchant
community never believed that the Chinese would carry out
their threats ; indeed, the merchants felt certain the
Chinese would settle for a partial solution.
What might have happened if Elliot had not arrived is
not clear.

It is clear that Elliot's actions provoked the

Chinese to become more rigid.

The Chinese believed the

foreign community had made arrangements to cooperate, but
the captain's intervention frustrated these plans.*'’
According to the Chinese, Elliot claimed he occupied a post
of authority, but only used that post to protect the opium
s m u g g l e r s E l l i o t ' s earlier appeals to impotence and
ignorance concerning the opium trade failed to carry any
weight.

Lin continued to demand the opium.

On 27 March 1839, fearing the worst, Elliot reversed
course and ceased standing up to the Chinese.

He commanded

Report, 184 0, 8.
^^Report, 1840, 91.
*’siade. Narrative, 42-6.
^’’inclosure 17, The Prefect of Canton to Elliot, 26
March 1839, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March 1839,
Correspondence, 372.
*’waley. Opium War Through Chinese Eyes, 35.
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the British opium merchants in China to hand over their
merchandise to Lin.

At first the merchants resisted

turning over the opium, but they agreed after receiving a
guarantee from Captain Elliot that the British Government
would reimburse them.

The merchants released to Elliot

over £2,000,000 worth of opium.

Since 1836 the British

merchants had found it difficult to sell their commodity in
China.

As a result several thousand chests of opium

remained unsold year after year.

Elliot's offer to pay

gave the merchants what they wanted--a market for their
goods and the official involvement of the British
Government in the d i s p u t e . E l l i o t expected that the
pledge to deliver the opium would be enough to lift the
restrictions, but the Chinese did not trust the barbarians.
The quarantine continued for six weeks.

As a sign of good

faith, however, Lin "sent the foreigners a present of beef,
mutton, and other f o o d . T h e

Imperial Commissioner also

agreed to lift gradually the restriction as the opium came
into his possession.

On 5 May he allowed all of the

foreigners, except sixteen notorious opium merchants, to
leave the factories.

^^Morse, International Relations, 214-30.
^^Cheong, Manderins and Merchants, 134-5.
^^Greenberg, British Trade, 203-4.
^^As quoted in Waley, Opium War Through Chinese Eyes,
39.
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When all of the opium had been delivered on 24 May,
the Chinese released the remaining foreigners.

The

provincial authorities then proceeded to destroy the opium.
They also agreed to reopen trade on the condition that the
foreign community guarantee that the opium trade would
cease.

To guarantee cessation Lin demanded that all

foreigners sign a bond stating that they would not import
opium into China.

Beginning in the autumn of 183 9 anyone

caught breaking the bond would "suffer death at the hands
of the Celestial c o u r t . E l l i o t felt that this demand
was unreasonable. He stated that he had no authority to
bind future merchants without their knowledge and pleaded
with Commissioner Lin to accept a compromise bond.

The

foreign merchants pledged themselves "not to deal in opium,
nor to attempt to introduce it into the Chinese Empire.
The Commissioner refused to compromise.

Elliot even

proposed a five month grace period for merchants coming
from India and a ten month grace period for merchants
coming from England before the new law went into effect
Lin again refused to compromise.
^^Inclosure 1, "Proposed Bond Regarding Opium," in
Elliot to Palmerston, 6 April to 4 May 1839 (received 21
September 1839), F017/31/144-6.
^^Inclosure 7, The Foreign Merchants to the Imperial
Commissioner, Canton, 25 March 183 9, Elliot to Palmerston,
Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839, FO17/31/31/169-70.
*^Inclosure 6, Elliot to Lin, Canton, 10 April 1839,
Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839,
FO17/31/16S-70.
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Believing that the Chinese government needed foreign
trade, Elliot warned Lin that if he continued to demand the
bonds, then "there would be no alternative but for the men
and vessels of his [Elliot's] country to depart.
Elliot never carried out his threat.

He did recommend a

cessation of British trade until the matter was settled.
The merchants complied.

Elliot hoped to gain protection

against what he considered the arbitrary actions of the
Chinese government.
desired effects.

His actions did not produce the

The Chinese refused to grant British

merchants any special protection.

American, German,

Danish, and Spanish traders, who all signed Lin's bond,
moved in to fill the vacuum created by Elliot's refusal to
reopen British trade with China.
It is essential here to consider the reaction in
Britain.
first.

The Opposition, not the Ministry, responded
After reading a newspaper report on 1 August 1839,

Lord Ellenborough (Edward Law), former President of the
Board of Control, introduced the subject into Parliament
with a question to the Prime Minister that same day.

The

most startling aspect of the question was the theme.

One

would assume that Ellenborough would have questioned the

Inclosure 12, Elliot to Lin, Canton, 20 April 1839,
Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839,
F017/31/182.
^°Morse, International Relations, 227-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
action of the Chinese authorities, but he did not.

The

lord questioned the actions of Elliot and the Government
that he represented--the Melbourne Ministry.

The Ministry

had allowed the China trade to be almost totally dependent
upon opium, and with the cession of the opium trade all of
Britain's China trade was threatened, including the
lucrative tea trade.

Ellenborough concluded with a call

for papers relating to the incident, but Melbourne, denying
any official knowledge of the incident, declined any
further comment.
Even without access to the documents elucidating the
conflict in China, the conservatives began their attack on
the Ministry.

They asserted that the incompetency of the

Ministry had lost one of Britain's most prized trading
partners and that the Government had to be held
responsible.

The weakness of the Ministry in Commons

amplified these charges.

^’Appendix B; Lord Ellenborough. Hansard, 3d ser.,
vol. 49 H August 1839), cols. 1052-55.
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CHAPTER 5
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE

In 1834 Lord Grey's Government fell, and Sir Robert
Peel formed a Ministry.

The political right had not

recovered, however, from the devastation of the Great
Reform Act, and Peel led a minority Government.
Accordingly, his term in office was short-lived; he
resigned in five months.

The Whigs quickly regained

control of Commons, allowing Lord Melbourne to forge a new
Ministry.
1841.

His Governemnt ruled Great Britain from 1835 to

During this extended period, the Whigs saw their

majority in the House of Commons slowly decline.

In the

summer months of 183 9, before news from China reached Great
Britain, the Liberal Tories joined the Ultra-Tories in
their attacks on the Whigs.

At the same time parliamentary

Radicals, frustrated by the slow pace of reform, seized
upon the vulnerablity of the Government and pressed their
own agenda.^ This crisis of confidence intensified Lord

'"Resignation of the Ministry," Leeds Mercury, 11 May
1839, p.4; "Position of the Ministry," The Guardian
(Manchester), 27 March 1839; "Position of the Ministry.-State of Public Opinion," The Guardian (Manchester), 30
March 1839 ; Newbould, Whiggery, 231-41.
134
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Ellenborough's charges that Lord Melbourne's Whig Ministry
neglected British interests in the Far East.
While Elliot tried to pacify the Chinese, the conflict
between the Whigs and the conservative Opposition began to
take shape.

On 7 May 183 9 Lord Melbourne resigned his

position as Prime Minister after winning a crucial vote in
Commons by only five votes.

Even though his Ministry won

this contest, the Prime Minister felt that the vote
indicated "with sufficient clearness and distinctness . . .
a want of confidence on the part of a great proportion of
that House of Parliament.

Melbourne believed that for a

ministry to continue in office it must have the support of
both the Monarch and the House of Commons; support from a
mere majority of Members in Commons was not enough.
Writing to Queen Victoria in March, he stated that the
Ministry "must resign" if it should carry the House of
Commons by a "small m a j o r i t y . T h e Prime Minister's
views of the constitution were in line with contemporary
theorist J.J. Park.

In Dogmas of the Constitution (183 2)

Park asserts that "It would be esteemed politically

^Lord Melbourne, "Resignation of the Ministers," House
of Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., 46 (7 May 1839), col. 974;
George K. Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party: A Study
in Party Politics, 1832-1841, 2d ed. , (Hamden, CT: Archon
Books, 1964), 417-23.
^Melbourne to Queen Victoria, South Street, 22 March
1839, "Cabinet Reports by the Prime Minister to the Crown,
1837-1867" (Microfilmed by Harvester Press, 1973), Reel 1.
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dishonourable and improper, if [the government] were to
retain office after the support and adhesion of a majority
in the House of Commons should have been unequivocally
withdrawn from them.

His resignation thus resulted less

from mechanistic, or rational, constitutional principles
than from aristocratic notions of the honor needed to
command respect.
According to his own political principles then,
Melbourne had no choice but to advise Queen Victoria, who
was in the second year of her reign, to invite the
conservatives under the leadership of the Duke of
Wellington to form a ministry.

The Duke declined the

invitation, stating that the Prime Minister should sit in
the House of Commons, the more troublesome of the two
Houses of Parliament, and that Sir Robert Peel was a better
choice.^

Peel accepted the offer reluctantly, because he

did not believe the conservatives sufficiently strong.
almost succeeded in forming a government.

He

In fact all of

the plans had been made, but the Queen refused to accept
Peel's intention to replace some of the Ladies of the
Bedchamber with women from conservative families.

Peel

thought it would be difficult to gain the confidence of the

As Quoted in Angus Hawkins, "'Parliamentary
Government' and Early Victorian Political Parties, c .1830C.1880," English Historical Review 104 (July 1989): 641.
^Robert Peel, "Ministerial Explanations," House of
Commons, 3d ser., 46 (13 May 1839), col. 981.
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young Queen with the wives of leading Whig politicians
acting as Ladies of the Bedchamber.
In rejecting Peel's proposal. Queen Victoria stated
that she liked her companions and that any attempt to
remove them infringed on her prerogative.

She considered

Peel's request as part of a general conservative attack on
the moral integrity of her household.

Giving in to Peel's

demand would have been tantamount to admitting that
conservative allegations of moral misconduct were true
Her rejection denied Peel his wish for "public proof" of
Her Majesty's "entire support and confidence"^ and forced
him to resign his commission.

The Queen willingly turned

back to Melbourne, who reconstructed his Ministry.
The result of the Bedchamber Crisis was that it
appeared as if the Melbourne Ministry's position of
authority rested outside the current constitutional system.
The prerogative of the Queen, not the will of Commons, had
determined who would govern Great Britain.

To their

opponents the hypocrisy of the Whig Ministry was selfevident.

The Charter, a newspaper "established by the

working classes," observed that "An overweening respect for

Richard Spall, "The Bedchamber Crisis and the Hasting
Scandal: Morals, Politics, and the Press at the beginning
of Victoria's Reign," Canadian Journal of History 22
(December 1987): 37; For the details of the story see James
Clark, "The Late Flora Hastings," The Charter (London), 13
October 1839, p.587.
^Peel to Victoria, Copy, 10 May 1839, PP, GC/ME/292/l.
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prerogative was not at one time a Whig doctrine," while the
conservative Quarterly Review wrote that the principles of
"parliamentary government" were the "doctrines, which the
old Whigs affected to monopolise, and which the present
Whigs are equally zealous to repudiate.
In the House of Lords the Earl of Winchilsea (George
William Finch-Hatton) asked Lord Melbourne to state the
principle by which he planned to govern since the
Bedchamber Crisis brought those principles into question.
Melbourne replied that he was not "a very great friend to
declarations of general principles on the part of the
Government.

He would govern as any other Government by

the prudence, wisdom and firmness of Parliament.

Such a

broad statement brought Lord Brougham (Henry Brougham),
former Lord Chancellor under Lord Grey and advocate of
further reform, to his feet.

He "never heard a question,

that was more plain or more easily to be answered, if an
answer was to be given, but he had never yet heard an
answer that answered so l i t t l e . M e l b o u r n e ' s statement

^"Farcical Demonstrations of the Whigs," The Charter
(London), 26 May 1839, p.288; "The Household and the
Ministry," Quarterly Review 64 (June 1839): 270; See also
"Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine for June," The Northern
Star and Leeds General Advertiser (Leeds), 22 June 1839,
p .4 .
^Melbourne, "The Ministry," House of Lords, Hansard,
3d ser., vol. 46 (31 May 1839), col. 1162.
^°Lord Brougham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (31 May
1839), col. 1167.
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of "principles" pleased neither the Opposition nor some on
his own side of Parliament.
The memory of the Bedchamber Crisis had not faded by
the time Lord Ellenborough questioned the Prime Minister in
Parliament on 1 August 183 9 regarding Captain Elliot's
action in Canton.

The crisis would be a source of constant

irritation for the Ministry.

Melbourne's position worsened

as Peel continued to withhold his cooperation.

The

Ministry depended more than ever on the support of the
Radicals to stay in office.

The Radicals realized that

their strength was disproportionately larger than their
small numbers and pushed for further political reform.
Probably the most immediate problem facing the
Melbourne Ministry and Great Britain in 183 9 was Chartism.
The Chartist movement, composed of the disenfranchised, had
six demands in its national petition: universal suffrage,
vote by secret ballot, annual Parliaments, equal electoral
districts, pay for M.P.s, and abolition of property
qualifications for Members.

The Chartists wanted the

process begun by the Great Reform Act continued by
extending formal political participation beyond the middle
classes to the working classes.

Chartist rhetoric

^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 300.
^^"Six Points," Leeds Mercury, 6 October 1838, p.4;
Thomas Atwood, "National Petition--The Chartists," House of
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June 1839), col.
225 .
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chastised the parliamentary reformers for ending black
slavery in the colonies, while supporting the slavery of
freeborn Englishmen.

By maintaining the status quo

Whigs and Radicals betrayed the people and joined the
Tories as political oppressors.

While the

conservatives provided the most vocal opposition to the
Chartist demands, many supporters of the Government shared
their fears.

The conservatives believed that further

revolutionary changes of the constitution would weaken the
stability of Great Britain by giving power to the unwashed
masses; that England would follow the same path that France
had traversed after 1789.''^
The issue of the secret ballot, one of the six
Chartist demands, divided the Melbourne Ministry itself.
The members decided to make the proposition an "open
question."

This decision meant that the Ministry as a

whole did not support the ballot, but individual members of

''^Richard Oastler, "To the People of Yorkshire, "
Northern Star (Leeds), 4 April 1840, p.l.
Beware of the Whigs," The Charter (London), 17
March 1839, p. 113; Feargus O'Connor, "To the Working Men
and Women of Birmingham," Northern Star (Leeds), 20 March
183 9, p.4; Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists (London: Temple
Smith, 1984), 7, 40.
^^"Six Points,"
"Six Points," Leeds
Chartists and Their
(Manchester), 4 May

Leeds Mercury, 6 October 1838, p.4;
Mercury, 13 October 1838, p.4; "The
Proceedings," The Guardian
1839, p.2.

The Chartist and Universal Suffrage," Blackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine, 46 (September 1839), 289-303.
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the Cabinet could.

Conservatives charged that the move

proved the weakness of the Ministry, demonstrated the
disunity of the Cabinet and illustrated the Whigs' support
for further constitutional reform.

Lord Howick, Secretary

of War, countered these charges by stating that he
personally supported making the ballot an open question in
order to defeat it.^^

Howick's candid remark caused an

uproar among the Radicals.

The Ministry had to reiterate

that Howick expressed his personal opinion, not the opinion
of Her Majesty's Government.

The damage had been done.

Chartism represented more than a simple political
threat to the Ministry.

In the Winter of 1838/1839 the

Chartists lost hope in the ability of the Reformed
parliament to satify their demands and rejected appeals by
parliamentary Radicals to petition for redress of
grievances.

The agitation before the Great Reform Act

taught the Chartists that the threat of violence provided a
powerful incentive for political change.

The Ministry

experienced the repercussions of this change in tactics
when the manufacturing city of Birmingham exploded into
open revolt on 15 July.

Following ten days of unrest, the

Chartists completely destroyed two houses, gutted several
others and burned furniture in the streets, while the city

^^Lord Howick, "The Ballot," The House of Commons,
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (18 June 1839), col. 500.
^^Thompson, Chartist, 12, 17.
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magistrates delayed calling on the military or police for
several hours.

The Duke of Wellington stated that the

city appeared as if it had been taken by storm.

When

questioned on the events the next day, Lord Melbourne
stated that he knew no more concerning the matter than what
had been reported in the newspapers.

He accused Wellington

of exaggerating the effects of the riot.
The Duke of Wellington quickly challenged Melbourne's
competence.
I am rather surprised that the noble Viscount
should bring a charge against me of having
indulged in exaggerated statements; but I am
still more surprised that the noble Viscount,
considering the station he holds, should only
have known the state of things in Birmingham by
the public accounts . . . . This is ^ot the way in
which a country should be governed.
The decision of Lord John Russell, Home Secretary and
leader of the Whigs in Commons, to grant the city of
Birmingham a charter contributed to some of the Ministry's
political problems stemming from the Chartist riots.
According to the Municipal Corporation Act of 183 5, the
Ministry could dismantle the old oligarchical city
governments and replace them with elective councils and

Another Serious Riot in Birmingham : Several Houses
Gutted," The Guardian (Manchester), 17 July 1839, p.2;
"Another Chartist Riot: Attempt to Fire Birmingham," Leeds
Mercury, 20 July 183 9, p.4.
^°Duke of Wellington, "Riots at Birmingham," House of
Lords," Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 49 (16 July 1839), cols.
377-8.
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magistrates appointed by the Home Office.

In the selection

of magistrates for Birmingham, Russell had chosen several
members of the Chartist movement.

The conservatives

attributed the delay in calling for police intervention to
the magistrates being sympathetic to the rioters.

The

Opposition wondered how the Ministry expected the working
classes to respect magistrates who had once called for
public agitation.
Such an open threat to property and to social order
was bad enough, but the conservative Opposition also
accused the Ministry of undermining the moral fiber of the
nation and maligning the constitution by threatening the
Church of England through the Irish Tithe Act of 1835 and
educational reforms.

The Tithe Act threatened the

financial integrity of the Church.

The appropriation

clause constituted the most controversial aspect of the
bill.

The clause, ultimately struck from the act, would

have allowed a district to reallocate surplus money to
secular projects if the majority of those living in the
district chose to do so.

The conservatives viewed this

move as one step in a plan of total dismemberment and
confiscation of Church property.

22

^^Lord Wharncliff, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 49 (15 July
1839), col. 381.
^^G.I.T. Machin,
Politics and the Churches in Great
Mac
Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 33-9, 51-4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
The conservatives' concerns about the threat to the
Church gained added strength when Russell, another pupil of
Dugald Stewart,

23

announced on 12 February 183 9 the

Government's proposal for reforming the nation's
educational system.
goals.

The Whig reform program had three main

The first reform would replace the Church's

domination of education with a committee of the Privy
Council, a board appointed by the Prime Minister.

The

second reform would enable the committee to distribute
educational grants to organizations other than the Anglican
National Society and the Dissenters' British and Foreign
Society.

The Ministry wanted to distribute educational

grants according to the needs of the community instead of
merely matching the funds raised by the two educational
societies.

This change, if implemented, would remove the

need for schools to depend solely on "voluntary local
contributions" and eliminate Anglican control of funding.
The final goal would establish a set of Normal Schools
(teacher training colleges) designed to standardize teacher
education.

These schools would also design a nonsectarian

religious curriculum.

The educational reforms would have

^^John Prest, Lord John Russell (Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 12.
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drastically reduced the role of the Church in educating the
nation's youth.
The conservatives again accused the Ministry of
undermining the constitution.

The Church was a part of the

state; to alter it was the same as altering England itself.
Both the Tithe Act and the educational reforms were seen by
the Opposition as a deliberate attempt by the Ministry to
put its own political gain before the good of the state.
There could be no state without the Anglican Church.^'
Vocal opposition of High Churchmen and Wesleyan Methodists
arose throughout the kingdoms to Russell's plans and forced
the Ministry to scale back the proposed c h a n g e . T h e
conservatives objected to the subordination of education to
the Privy Council.

They asserted that this would make

education a tool of party politics.

When it finally

brought the matter up for a vote in June, Melbourne's
Government introduced the measure as a simple money bill.
The bill would authorise the Privy council to allocate
£30,000 as it saw fit.

This parliamentary maneuver allowed

Ian Newbould, "The Whigs, the Church, and Education,
1839," Journal of British Studies 26 (July 1987) : 332-46;
Machin, Politics and the Churches, 64-8; Gash, Reaction and
Reconstruction, 76.
Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 269-83.
National Education," The Guardian (Manchester), 1
June 1839, p.2; "National Education," Leeds Mercury, 25 May
1839.
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the Ministry to avoid a defeat in Lords since only Commons
decided the fate of money bills.
The revised bill still pleased neither the
conservatives nor the Radicals.

Lord Stanley, former

Colonial Secretary under Lord Grey, now sitting in
Opposition, stated the conservative case.

Objecting to the

"unlimited and irresponsible powers" the bill gave to the
the committee of the Privy Council, he blasted the proposal
as "despotic."

To place funds at the discretion of such a

committee, backed by a weak Government, invited tyranny and
partisanship.^^
real reform.

To the Radicals the new plan abandoned

It bowed to Church pressure for the

maintenance of the "present state of ignorance throughout
the c o u n t r y . B e n j a m i n Hawes stated that one need only
examine the rising crime rates and their correlation to
illiteracy figures to understand the necessity for real
educational reform.

He admitted that educational reform

threatened the old Tory constitution.

Education provided

the means to replace "that old consitution by something

^^Lord Stanley, "National Education," House of
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June 1839), col.
232 .
^®Joseph Hume, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (4 June
1839), col. 1383; See also "National Education and Its
Opponents," The Charter (London), 2 June 1839, p.296;
"Education for the People," Norther Star (Leeds), 22 June
1839, p.4.
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much better and more substantial."^^

The house voted on

the proposal after four nights of debate.

The bill passed

by only two votes, not a very strong sign of support.

Such

an anemic showing did not bode well for the future of the
Ministry.
Events in Ireland further reinforced fears of violent
opposition to the established order.

By the late 1830s

Ireland faced severe economic distress.

The Irish blamed

their problems on the Act of Union of 1800 and demanded its
repeal.

Daniel O'Connell, leader of the Irish repeal

movement in Commons, supported the Ministry on many
controversial pieces of legislation.

Conservatives

believed O'Connell's cooperation proved that the Government
sanctioned reversing the Act of Union and encouraging
rebellion.
The Earl of Roden (Robert Jocelyn), a leader of the
Protestant Orange Society, considered the Government's
response to the violence in Ireland woefully inadequate.
He moved that the House of Lords establish a commission to
investigate the administration of the island.

The Earl

attributed the unparalleled state of unrest in Ireland to
an official tolerance of Ribandism, a Catholic conspiracy

^^Benjamin Hawes, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June
1839), col. 289-90.
^°John 0. Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 102; Newbould,
Whiggery and Reform, 283-98.
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designed to threaten Protestant life and property.
Although he claimed that he imputed no blame to Lord
Normanby (Constantine Henry Phipps), Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland (1835-1839), Roden stated that Normanby must accept
responsibility for the "tears of sorrow and streams

of

blood that had marked the career of his vice regal
authority.
Normanby, who left his post as Lord-Lieutenant

of

Ireland in February 183 9 to take onthe job of Colonial
Secretary, defended his administration against what he
considered an act of censure by demonstrating that Ireland
in the past had seen unrest that paralleled, if not
exceeded, the present level of violence.

He went so far

as to claim that the Ireland "was in a state of progressive
improvement."^^

If any unrest did exist, then it arose

from the "harsher" rule of the Tories.

The upper house of

Parliament disagreed with Normanby's assessment.

It voted

to approve the creation of the commission.
Ireland was not the only part of the Empire in a state
of rebellion.
Jamaica.

Violence had swept across Canada and

To put down the rebellions the Ministry

maneuvered through Parliament measures which suspended the

^^Earl of Roden, "Government of Ireland," House of
Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (21 March 1839), col. 956.
Norm
^^Marquess of Normanby,
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (21
March 1839), col. 977.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
Canadian and Jamaican constitutions.^^

Of the two

rebellions the Canadian presented a far greater threat to
the honor of the Ministry.

Palmerston considered it more

vital to the domestic interests of the Ministry than any
other problem overseas.
The Canadian Rebellion resulted from the demands of
French Radicals for control over expenditures and for an
elective upper legislative chamber in Lower Canada.
Tensions between the Radicals and the colonial Governor,
appointed by the Colonial Office, reached their peak in the
summer of 1837.

The colonial administration attempted to

arrest the leader of the radicals, Louis Papineau.

In

Lower Canada French radicals rose up in response to the
tyranny, and an uprising in Upper Canada f o l l o w e d . T h e
Melbourne Ministry responded by suspending the Canadian
constitution and by sending a proponent of radical reform.
Lord Durham (John George Lambton), to Canada.

Durham

viewed himself as a viceroy and acted accordingly.

He

issued a proclamation pardoning all the participants in the

Albert H. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough: A Biography of
Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough, Governor General of India
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 73.
^^Palmerston to Russell, Windsor, 2 0 October 183 9,
Lord John Russell Papers. Public Record Office, Kew.
PRO30/22/134.
^^Ged Martin, The Durham Report and British Policy: A
Critical Essay (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1972), 11.
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rebellion except the leaders.

He ordered these men

transported to Barbados and threatened capital punishment
if they returned.
The Ministry's response to events in Canada
illuminates its priorities.

Upon hearing news of Durham's

proceedings, Parliament abrogated his proclamation.

The

Parliament stated that Durham had no legal authority
outside of Canada and could not order the men to remain on
Barbados.

Feeling betrayed because the Melbourne Ministry

did not support his decision, Durham resigned his
commission.

After returning to England at the end of

183 8, Durham wrote his recommendations for solving the
problems of Canada in what became known as the Durham
Report.

It called for the unification of Upper and Lower

Canada into a single state.

The Melbourne Ministry

professed support for this plan but delayed taking action
until 184 0.^^

Traditionally, historians view the report

and the Melbourne Ministry's decision to implement it as an
enlightened colonial policy and a conscious decision to
improve the conditions in Canada.
disagrees.

Historian Ged Martin

He concludes that domestic political concerns

Morison, "The Mission of the Earl of Durham,"
The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 6, Canada
and Newfoundland, eds. J. Holland Rose, et al, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1930), 290-2.
^^Morison, "Mission of the Earl of Durham," 294-5.
^^Morison, "Mission of the Earl of Durham," 299-307.
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motivated the Ministry: "The immediate concern of the
Melbourne government, then, was not to save Canada but to
save themselves.
Even though the Ministry considered Canada more
important, the Jamaican rebellion also played a key role in
its troubles.

Parliament's vote on the Whig's Jamaican

policy directly precipitated the Bedchamber Crisis.

The

trouble for the Whigs began in 1833 when the Grey Ministry
sponsored legislation in Parliament for the abolition of
slavery in the British West Indies.

The Parliament decided

to compensate former slave owners for their slaves by
allocating £20,000,000 and requiring former slaves to serve
as apprentices "for a period of four years in the case of
domestic servants and six years in that of fieldhands.
Like the Southern planters after the United States
Civil War, the Jamaican elite used the judicial system to
negate the gains of emancipation.

Parliament responded by

passing the Act for the Better Government of Prisons in the
West Indies.

The Jamaican House of Assembly viewed this

act as undue interference in its internal matters by the

^^Martin, Durham Report, 12.
^°Izahak Gross, "Parliament and the Abolition of the
Negro Apprenticeship, 1835-1838," English Historical Review
96 (July 1981): 560.
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Imperial Parliament and "simply refused to function.
The colonial legislature had to approve all money bills;
otherwise the Jamaican Governor, appointed by the Colonial
Office, could not execute the laws of the colony.
The Melbourne Ministry proposed following a course
similar to that pursued in Canada--suspending the
constitution.

During the Parliamentary debate Peel accused

the Ministry of bypassing the existing constitutional
framework, and thus threatening the established order.

The

leader of the conservative Opposition stated that he had
previously agreed to suspend the Canadian constitution, but
now the Ministry was setting a dangerous precedent.

He

viewed the Government's Jamaican policy as a manifestation
of a weak Government and a sign of the future demise of
English liberty if the present Ministry should remain in
p o w e r . T e n Radicals voted with the conservatives,
compelling Melbourne to resign.

'^Vhilip J. McLewin, Power and Economic Change: The
Response to Emancipation in Jamaica and British Guiana
1840-1865 (New York: Garland, 1987), 73.
^^Peel, "Jamaica Government Bill," House of Commons,
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (3 May 1839), cols. 79-5; Philip
McLewin demonstrates the imperial historian's typical
neglect of domestic affairs by stating that "Details of how
the dispute was finally resolved is of less interest here
than the conciliatory attitude the Home Government took
toward Jamaica." Power and Economic Change, 74.
^^"Resignation of Lord Melbourne's Ministry," The
Guardian (Manchester), 11 May 1839, p.2; "Resignation of
Ministers," Northern Star (Leeds), 11 May 1839, p.4; "The
'Shabbies' Adrift at Last," The Charter (London), 12 May
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Financially, according to the conservatives and the
Radicals, the Ministry also proved incapable of managing
the financial affairs of Britain.

The Chancellor of the

Exchequer had presented a deficit budget for the past two
years.

During 1837 the deficit soared to over £2,000,000

and only fell to £400,000 in 183 8

The Government,

however, continued to spend money without increasing
revenues.

Thomas Spring Rice, Chancellor of the Exchequer,

blamed the deficits on extraordinary expenses related to
the Canadian rebellion.

The conservative Henry Goulburn

pointed out that an "early application of our military
resources" could have prevented the large expenditure ; the
Radical Joseph Hume stated that "If the Government had
given Canada a representative government, he was confident
that in two months the expense of their military
establishment there might be s a v e d . E v e n without such
attacks from the conservatives and Radicals, the Ministry's
domestic and foreign policies made the prospects for a
bright fiscal future dim.

1839, p.248.
^^Lucy Brown, The Board of Trade and the Free Trade
Movement, 1830-1842 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 483.
^^Henry Goulburn, "The Budget--Postage Duties," House
of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (5 July 1839), col.
1367; Joseph Hume, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (5 July 1839)
col. 1379.
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Domestically, the conservatives accused the Ministry
of fiscal mismanagement because of its handling of the
Penny Post.

The Penny Post gave the lower classes access

to the postal system by creating a uniform postal rate for
the entire United Kingdom.

The plan called for a decrease

in postal fees in order to increase volume.

Proponents

argued that the increase in volume would compensate for the
decrease in rates and produce a surplus in the long run.
In the short run, however, they expected a deficit until
new customers began to use the s e r v i c e . T h e Ministry
decided to back the proposal in order to appease the
Radicals and to "keep the government a l i v e . T h e postal
bill went into effect on 10 January 184 0, but had not been
put into the budget.
getting better.

The budget deficit had no hope of

The conservatives accused the Ministry of

putting the nation's financial security at risk for
partisan gain.
On these domestic and colonial issues the Melbourne
Ministry refused to accept all of the blame for the
country's problems because Opposition and Radical members
had played a role in helping get the controversial pieces
of legislation through Parliament.

Foreign policy was

^^"Uniform Penny Postage," House of Commons, Hansard,
3d ser., vol. 49 (12 July 1839), cols. 277-308; Howard
Robinson, The British Post Office: A History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1948), 244-302.
^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 3 00.
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another matter.

The Ministry's almost exclusive control

over foreign policy left the Government wide open for
attack.

Additionally, commerce, the central concern of the

industrial and commercial capitalists, greatly depended on
British foreign policy for safe and secure markets.

If

foreign commerce was threatened, then the Ministry could be
held directly responsible and risked losing the support of
the Radicals and their constituencies--the new urbanindustrial centers
Commerce was threatened in three areas.
threat occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.

The first

In 1838 the French

had imposed a naval blockade on M e x i c o , a n act
endangering British investment.

Since Mexican

independence, British merchants had been buying Mexican
government bonds.

The blockade hindered the Mexican

government's ability to pay them off.

This act was a

direct threat to British interests, yet the Ministry chose
to do nothing.

Palmerston had proposed sending a naval

force to Mexico in order "to induce the French to negotiate

^®Greenberg argues in British Trade and the Opening of
China 1800-42 that pressure from the British manufacturing
interest forced the government to take decisive action.
^^Nancy Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, 18211861: A History of Constant Misunderstanding (Chapel Hill;
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 53-88.
^°Robert Lacrete, Great Britain and Mexico in the Age
of Juarez, 1854-1876 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms,
1975), 1-27.
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with the Mexicans before they begin hostilities."^^
Palmerston's inducement included placing a British squadron
between the Mexican castle at San Juan d'Ulua and the
French fleet.

Melbourne refused to approve such a bold

move which risked a European war and ordered Palmerston to
pursue a more conciliatory policy toward France.
French intervention in Mexico caused another point of
contention between the British and the French.

On 27

November 1838 a French man-of-war stopped a British
merchant vessel by shooting across its bow.

The French

commander boarded the British vessel and forcibly removed
the Mexican pilot who was under the protection of the
British flag.^"

The conservatives considered this act an

"Insult to the Flag."

The French later publicly

apologized, claiming they had made a mistake.
did not pacify the Opposition.

The apology

They felt that the Ministry

had failed to protect British commerce by not taking
decisive action.

Lord Palmerston responded by stating that

^^Palmerston to Melbourne, Windsor, 14 September 183 8,
PP, GC/ME/531/1.
^^Iwan Wyn Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and
Cooperation in Spanish America, 1836-1848" (Ph.D. diss.
University of London, 1975), 102.
^^Lt. Croke to Capt. H. Plumridge, Copy, 9 March 183 9,
Enclosed in Minto to Palmerston, Admiralty, 15 March 1839,
PP, GC/Ml/378 enc 1.
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he was "satisfied" with the apology; the Opposition and the
commercial interests were far from satisfied.
The French also closed the port of Buenos Aires to
British trade.

The closure represented an extraordinary

turn of events.

During the three decades following the

separation of the viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata from Spain
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, British trade
grew until it dominated the region.

In return for formal

recognition of independence, Argentina guaranteed British
commercial supremacy by treaty in 1825.

The treaty

acknowledged the rights of the British merchants in
Argentina and insured that the merchants would not be
drafted into the service of Argentina's military.
Britain's privileged position was threatened when the
Government of Argentina drafted French merchants into its
military service.

The Argentines claimed that after a

foreigner resided in their country for three years, he
automatically became an Argentine citizen, susceptible to

Insult to the British Flag," House of Lords,
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 45 (21 February 1839), cols. 700-3;
"Insult to the British Flag, House of Commons, Hansard, 3d
ser., vol. 45 (25 February 1839), cols. 844-6; "Insult to
the Flag," House of Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (8
March 1839), cols. 132-45; Morgan, "Anglo-French
Confrotation and Cooperation in Spanish America," 114.
^^John Cady, Foreign Intervention in the Rio De La
Plata, 1838-50 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1929), 17-18.
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the draft.

As a result of Argentina's actions, France

imposed a naval blockade on Buenos Aires on 28 March 1838.
It hoped to gain the same privileges which had been granted
to Great Britain.
British merchants called for action.

They wanted the

Melbourne Ministry to protect their interests abroad from a
wanton attack by the French on their supremacy in Spanish
America.

Although the blockade had little effect,

at

the time the prospects for continued prosperity appeared
bleak.

In 1839 Sir Woodbine Parish, former British Chargé

d'affaires at Buenos Aires, believed that the French
blockade fell heaviest "upon those neutral parties who have
established an extensive commercial intercourse" with
Argentina.

The "calamitous consequences" of the

hostilities would be "difficult to estimate.
The British Government did nothing.

Palmerston chose

not to take forceful action in the face of considerable

"Memorandum: Quarrel between France and Buenos
Ayres," 2 March 1839,"The Papers of William Lamb, second
Viscount Melbourne," EP Microfilm Limited, 1975. Manuscript
Collection. British Library, London (Hereafter cited as
Lamb Papers). M859/4: Box 81/36; Morgan, "Anglo-French
Confrontation and Cooperation," 126-7.
^^Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and
Cooperation," 98.
^^Henry S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 243.
^’woodbine Parish, Buenos Ayres, and the Provinces of
the Rio de la Plata; Their Present State, Trade, and Debt
(London : John Murray, 1839), 388-9.
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opposition from British commercial interests.

He

recognized France's right to protect its citizens abroad,
even though he questioned the use of military force to gain
commercial privileges.

Once again, British commercial

interests perceived a direct threat; the Ministry failed to
act.
In all of these cases Palmerston and the Melbourne
Ministry consciously chose not to take forceful action.
One must ask why.

The answer lay in the Middle East:

during the 1830s Russian expansion and Mehemet Ali's
rebellion in Egypt threatened the stability of the Ottoman
Empire, more importantly, Britain's life line to India.
Great Britain needed France's help to off-set Russian
aggression and to control Mehemet's rebellion, which had
provided Czar Nicholas I with an opportunity to extend
Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire.*^

The details of

what happened in the Levant not only help to explain
Palmerston's policy in Spanish America but also why he had
so little time for Anglo-Chinese relations.
In 1832 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt (1805-1849),
tried to break away from his Ottoman master, Sultan Mahmud
II (1808-1839).

The Pasha ordered his son, Ibrahim, to

*°Cady, Foreign Intervention, 22-55, 62; "Memorial:
Quarrel between France and Buenos Ayres," 2 March 1839,
Lamb Papers, M859/4 Box 81/36.
^^Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of
the Entente Cordial (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 9.
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attack Syria.

The successes of Ibrahim's army forced the

"Sick Man of Europe" to turn to Russia for help.

The two

eastern powers reached an agreement and signed the Treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi (1833), in which the Czar agreed to
defend the Sultan in exchange for Russian control over the
Turkish straits in times of war.

The Russo-Ottoman

alliance successfully stopped Ibrahim's advance, but it
could not defeat the Egyptian army.
provided a compromise.

The Sultan allowed Ibrahim to

remain governor of Syria.
an annual tribute.

The peace of Kutuhia

In return Ibrahim agreed to pay

Mehemet gained control of Syria through

his son while he recognized the overlordship of the Sultan.
Such an arrangement did not sit well with the British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston.

Russian influence

increased at the Ottoman court, and a rebellious ruler
controlled British access to India
Events in the Levant took a more settled course until
May 1838.

Mehemet Ali once again struck out against

Mahmud; this time the Pasha formally declared his
independence.

Ibrahim responded to his father's

declaration by provoking a fight with the Sultan.
Ibrahim's army repeated its previous victories and closed
the noose around Mahmud's neck.

Palmerston hoped France

^^Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of
Muhammad Ali (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984),
222-31.
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would join with Great Britain to stop Egyptian expansion.
Adolphe Theirs, Louis Philippe's Foreign Minister, rejected
Palmerston's offer.

"Mehemet employed French officers and

technical experts, and France regarded her influence over
Egypt as a valuable counterpoise to British dominance in
the eastern Mediterranean.
When Sultan Mahmud tried to subdue his rebellious
subject in 183 9, the Ottoman emperor failed to restore
order and lost the Turkish fleet in a mutiny.
of Russian intervention seemed real.

The threat

Without French

support Palmerston had to convince the other great powers
to act in concert, rather than unilaterally.

The task of

coordinating such an alliance took the whole year.

Until

the Russians agreed, Palmerston could not insult the
F r e n c h . I f Palmerston took aggressive action in Mexico
or Buenos Aires, then he risked cutting off Britain from
its most prized colony--India.

No Ministry could risk such

an embarrassment.
Compared to events in Mexico and Buenos Aires, the
opium crisis, the third and most recent threat to British
trade, occurred in relative isolation.

The Opposition

considered Commissioner Lin's decision to stop all British

*^Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the
Entente Cordialle, 18; Marsot, Egypt, 238-45.
^^Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the
Entente Cordial, 1-19.
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trade, including tea, as a fait accompli.

The

conservatives used Captain Elliot's handling of the
situation as evidence of the incompetence of the Ministry.
The Government declined to discuss the situation until the
papers relating to China were laid on the table.

The

request for papers began with Ellenborough's question in
August 183 9 and continued during the month of January.
Palmerston delayed producing the papers by claiming that
the sheer magnitude of the correspondence was overwhelming
his staff; the Foreign Secretary did not produce the papers
until March 1840 (Correspondence Relating to China) .
On 23 August 1839 Lord Lyndhurst (John Singleton
Copely), an Ultra-Tory leader in the House of Lords,
decided that before the session of Parliament concluded, he
wanted to review the Government's policies.

He asserted

that the Melbourne Ministry failed in its responsibilities
to the nation because it could not get Parliament to pass
any significant piece of legislation.

The Ministry also

had to take responsibility for the Chartist-inspired unrest
in the Northern parts of the country.
It was they who first roused the people--they
first excited and stimulated them to acts of
tumult and disorder--they first sent forth the
watchword, "Agitate, agitate, agitate!" . . .
Agitation was convenient to raise them to power.
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and they were willing to keep up as much^pf it as
was necessary to maintain them in power.
Lyndhurst's charges summarized six years of conservative
accusations.
Melbourne responded with his usual lackluster
performance.

He charged Lyndhurst with fostering

discontent by questioning the authority of Her Majesty's
Government and with degrading it in the eyes of Parliament
and the public.

As to the Ultra-Tory's charge that the

Government could not legislate, Melbourne stated that
the passing bills and making laws is only a
subsidiary and incidental duty of Parliament; the
principal duty of Parliament is to consider the
estimates for the public service, to retrench
what is superfluous ; to correct what is amiss,
and to assist the Crown with those supplies and
subsidies which it thinks it right and necessary
to afford.
Judging the Ministry on these principles, Melbourne stated
that the Government served the country well.

The people

"were roused, if roused they were, by the imprudent and
obstinate resistance to the redress of grievances which was
given by the noble and learned Lord [Lyndhurst] and those
who acted with him.

^Lyndhurst, "Business of the Session," House of
Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August 1839), col.
515 .
‘^‘^Melbourne, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August
1839), col. 518.
'^^Melbourne, Hansard, 3d ser. , vol. 50 (23 August
1839), col. 527-8.
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Lord Brougham rose again to deliver a blow to
Melbourne's Government from the Ministerial benches.

The

noble lord wished to know how the Prime Minister could
charge that Lyndhurst wanted to push the reputation of the
Government lower when it already reached the lowest depth
of degradation.

The Ministry had reached such a point

because it was "of an obstructive nature rather than a
party of movement.

To this charge Melbourne cried "No,

no," but Brougham continued his assault.

The Tories could

not have hoped for better policies from Lord Melbourne if
he were the viceroy of the Duke of Wellington.

Brougham

claimed that blaming the Reform Act for the country's
problems, as the conservatives did, distorted the truth.
The Act acted as a safety-valve for social pressures, but
the machine needed competent operators in order to function
properly.

At present the "Parliamentary business of the

country was intrusted to the hands of men utterly imbecile
and incapable of doing it.

He concluded that the

Ministry could only solve its problems by sponsoring
legislation that adhered to the principles of reform.
The nature of the House of Lords' debate exemplified
the problems the Melbourne Ministry faced since the

*^®Brougham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August
1839), col. 532.
'
^’Brougham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August
'^^Brougham,
1839), col. 536
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Bedchamber Crisis: "In Reforms they went too far for the
Tories, and not far enough for the Radicals.

. . . They

held the a medium between opposite e x t r e m e s . T h e
crisis of confidence forced the Whigs to consider the
political ramifications of policy decisions before they
acted.

Without the support of the conservatives, the

Radicals, a minority faction, held the balance of power.
The political tempest tested the Ministry's ability to walk
an "impossible tightrope.

In this tense political

atmosphere the Ministry met to decide on a China policy, a
matter of immense interest to the Radicals and their
supporters.

Résignâtion of the Ministry," Leeds Mercury, 11 May
1839, p.4.
71

Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 246.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DECISION TO WAGE WAR

The Opposition's threat to the survival of the Whig
Ministry was serious.

The time for exploring policy

options had ended; the time for action had arrived.

Lord

Melbourne's Government clearly stood poised on the
defensive on a multitude of issues.

It could not afford to

sit idly by as it had in Mexico and Buenos Aires; the
Ministers needed to react to the situation.

Because of

China's isolation from other British interests and the
"outrageous" actions of Commissioner Lin, the opium crisis
presented the best opportunity to act forcibly without
putting other foreign policy concerns at risk.

Most

historical interpretations of the Opium War, by ignoring
the details of the Cabinet's decision to wage war on China,
assume that war was a foregone conclusion.^
proposition is far from the truth.

This

Melbourne's Cabinet

waited several months before deciding upon the proper

Owen, British Opium Policy, 168; Collis, Foreign Mud,
256; Greenberg, British Trade, Ch. 7; Chang, Commissioner
Lin, 194; Chung, China and the Brave New World, 205;
Graham, China Station, x; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 102;
Only Peter Fay {Opium War, 192-5) and Kenneth Bourne
{Palmerston, 587) provide accurate details of the decision.
166
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response; several ministers doubted the wisdom of waging
war; and one had no interest at all in the details of China
question.

The Government's domestic political interests

were central to the decision-making process.
Official despatches concerning the March opium crisis
reached the Foreign Office on 29 August 183 9,^ and the
Cabinet began debating the matter in September.

News of

Elliot's promise to pay for £2,000,000 worth of opium could
not have come at a more inopportune time.

During the

summer of 183 9, Palmerston had learned that his
reorganization of the trade commission three years earlier
was legally questionable and that certain "parties at
Canton" intended to challenge Elliot's authority.

In 1836

the Foreign Secretary had appointed Elliot to the post of
Chief of the Commission rather than to the post of Chief
Superintendent of Trade, as required by act of
Parliament
No direct evidence of Palmerston's immediate reaction
to the March opium crisis exists, but John Cam Hobhouse,
Palmerston's "most consistent" ally in the Cabinet,^ did
make his feelings known.

Hobhouse, President of the Board

^Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March, 1839, Correspondence,
355 .
^"Memorandum," 8 July 1839, Foreign Office, Supplement
to General Correspondence, Public Record Office, Kew,
F097/96.
^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 40.
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of Control, quickly recognized the political implications
of the opium question.

Early in September he wrote to Lord

Auckland, Governor General of India, explaining
Ellenborough's intent to hold the Ministry responsible for
the detrimental effect of the opium crisis on India.

As

for a future course of action, Hobhouse was at a loss.

He

did not believe the British had the resources to send an
army from India to China.^
At the time of the opium crisis Auckland confronted a
major threat to Indian security on the territory's
northwestern frontier.

Four men struggled for power in

Central Asia : Runjeet Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, Punjab
(1799-1839); Dost Mohommed, Emir of Afghanistan (1826-1839,
1842-63); Shah Shuja (or Shja-ul-Mulk), King of Afghanistan
(r.1803-1809, r. 1839-1842); and Muhammad, Shah of Persia
(1834-1848).

This struggle put the overland trade route

between Europe and India in jeopardy.

Czar Nicholas I's

attempts to extend Russian influence into Central Asia
further complicated the situation.

He instructed his

representatives in the region to use the local disputes to
Russia's advantage.

As early as 1828 the Duke of

Wellington, then Prime Minister, realized the threat and
instructed British officials in India to find a way to
extend British influence beyond the Indus River.

From the

^John Cam Hobhouse to Lord Auckland, India Board, 3
September 1839, Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/182.
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British perspective the Czar's efforts succeeded in the
summer of 183 7 when the Shah of Persia invaded Afghanistan
with the help of Russian military and political advisors.*
Palmerston and Hobhouse collaborated to solve the
Central Asian problem.

Palmerston worked through the

British minister in Tehran, Sir John McNeil, while Hobhouse
advised Lord Auckland.

Both McNeil and Auckland had the

trust of their superiors.

They conducted the British

empire's distant affairs with a considerable degree of
freedom yet still could not set policies without the
approval of the Cabinet in London.^
As the Persian advance reached Herat, Afghanistan,
British concerns intensified.

The Czar had offered Dost

Mohommed protection from the Persians.

The British also

heard rumors that the Czar had plans to march on Khiva and
Bokhara.

In May 1839 Palmerston told McNeil to issue an

ultimatum to the Shah; if the Persians did not stop the
invasion, then Britain would break off relations and take
steps to protect its possessions.

Auckland also took steps

to thwart Russian and Persian influence in Afghanistan.

He

arranged a triple alliance with Runjeet Singh and Shah

*J.A. Norris, The First Afghan War, 1838-1842
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 37, 118,
^Norris, First Afghan War, 87.
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Shuja in order to overthrow Dost Mohommed and to place Shah
Shuja back on the throne in Kabul.^
The Persian failure to take Herat brought the invasion
to a halt and forced the Russian Foreign Minister in London
to denounce the actions of his emperor's representatives in
Central Asia.

These events had little effect on British

policy in the region.

Neither Palmerston

nor Hobhouse

believed that British India could be protected until
Afghanistan was secure.

They convinced the Cabinet to

sanction the joint venture Auckland had arranged.

For his

part Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto on 1 October 1838;
it publicly turned the quarrel into one among local rulers,
rather than a European contest.

He left out any references

to the Russians in order to keep peace in Europe.^
The British-led expedition to restore Shah Shuja to
the Afghan throne began in the spring of 1839 (just as
troubles began in China).
Central Asia.

Auckland had his hands full in

No British or Company army had ever

proceeded past the Indus.

The petty chieftains who

controlled the territory did not welcome the huge army and
refused to supply it with provisions.

As British supplies

ran low, the troops reached the point of mutiny.

British

generals avoided a disaster by taking the city of Kandaher

^Norris, First Afghan War, 160-9.
^Norris, First Afghan War, 215-21.
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along with its rich agricultural regions.

After the

success at Kandaher, the expedition quickly moved into
Afghanistan.

On 23 July it seized the fortress of Ghazni

after a one night siege and then took Kabul without a fight
on 7 August.

Dost Mohommed fled for his life.

News of

this easy success reached London at the end of October
1839.’
’°
The threat to British India demanded Palmerston's and
Hobhouse's full attention.

Defeat in Central Asia would

mean giving more political ammunition to the conservatives.
In January 183 9 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, whose
founder, William Blackwood, was an "uncompromising
T o r y , a t t a c k e d Lord Auckland as "lamentably deficient
in the powers which should enable him to grapple with so
momentous a c r i s i s . T o place Shah Shuja, an unpopular
ruler, on the throne of Afghanistan required constant
supervision and skilled leadership.

If the British failed

in their chosen mission, then they would create a more
serious crisis.

Dost Mohommed would march back into Kabul

under the protection of the Russian Czar.

^°Norris, First Afghan War, 264-7, 289-99.
^Maurice Milne, "The 'Veiled Editor' Unveiled,
William Blackwood and His Magazine," Publishing History 16
(1984): 101.
^^"Persia, Afghanistan and India," Blackwood's 45
(January 1839): 105.
Persia, Afghanistan, and India," 101.
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Even after Auckland's initial success became known to
the British public, Blackwood's continued its assault on
the Melbourne Ministry's India policy.

By crossing the

easily defensible Indus river, a "natural frontier," the
Ministry had opened the only invasion route into India,
leaving the valuable territory unprotected.

A contributor

to the magazine wrote "So low had the reputation of the
British name sunk in the East, that even the Chinese, the
most unwarlike and least precipitate of the Asiatic
empires, had ventured to offer a single injury to the
British name, and insult to the British name.

Russia

surely knew of India's vulnerability and would take
advantage of the situation.
Hobhouse sympathized with Lord Auckland's position; to
divert men, ships and supplies from India to China at the
beginning of September would certainly have jeopardized the
Afghan expedition.

As the month progressed, Hobhouse's

opinion began to change and the Cabinet's new China policy
emerged.

The Cabinet was "embarrassed by the conduct of

the Chinese," and Hobhouse came to believe that some show
of force would be necessary.

The force, however, should

The Afghanistan Expedition," Blackwood's, 47
(February 1840): 247.
^^Hobhouse to Auckland, India Board, 16 September
1839, Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/184.
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be to relieve Elliot and to restore British honor, not to
protect the opium trade.
On 22 September 183 9 Hobhouse wrote to Auckland,
"Doubtless, you must give up the cultivation of the poppy,
and substitute an unprofitable export duty for your present
m o n o p o l y . H i s letter was not mere idle chatter between
politicians.

In January 1840 Hobhouse formed definite

plans to cut the links between the Indian Government and
its opium monopoly.

He pressed his policy on the Chairs of

the East India Company over their objections.

The

Ministry could not afford to tolerate the Company's opium
monopoly any longer.

Some of the Whig's most strident

supporters denounced the Government's participation in the
drug trade as immoral.

The Leeds Mercury, a newspaper that

defended the Whigs against the attacks of both the Radicals
and the conservatives, lashed out at the East India Company
and the British merchants in Canton for pushing the toxin
upon the Chinese population : "There is no slavery on earth
to name with the bondage into which Opium casts its
victims.

^%obhouse to Auckland, India Board, 22 September
1839, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/l89.
''^Hobhouse to Chairs of the East India Company, Draft,
India House, May 1840, 010, M s s .Eur.213/50.
’^"British Opium Trade with China," Leeds Mercury, 7
September 183 9, p.3.
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While Hobhouse dealt with the East India Company
representatives and with Lord Auckland, Palmerston faced
the British commercial community.

Its members demanded to

know if the Government would honor Elliot's promise to pay
for the opium.

They insisted on vigorous measures.

One of

several groups to whom Palmerston granted a personal
audience was Jardine, Matheson & Co.

The company had a

considerable interest in the formation of the Government's
new China policy.

After Elliot's pledge to pay for the

opium, the company's agents handed over to Elliot in one
day 7,341 chests of opium--almost one half of the total
amount surrendered to Lin.’’ At the meeting with the
Foreign Secretary, Jardine himself and the company's agent,
John Abel Smith, M.P., explained their views, which
differed little from the rest of the British merchants and
industrialists interested in the China trade.
Palmerston assured them that the Government would respond
appropriately.
reassured.

A number of merchants were not so easily

They threatened to make their case public.

Smith tried to discourage such talk because of his
conversation with Palmerston and because the M.P. felt that

Jardine, Matheson to Elliot, 27 May 1839 (In a
bundle marked "original opium claims"). Foreign Office,
Embassy and Consular Archives : China, Superintendent of
Trade, Records, Public Record Office, Kew. F0677/5/214-6.
^°Palmerston to Melbourne, note, 26 August 1839, Lamb
Papers, M859/6 Box 12/15.
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an open debate would hurt the Ministry.

The episode

increased the political pressure on Melbourne's Government.
After Palmerston's conversations with the commercial
and industrial communities that had vital interests in
China, he laid out the Ministry's options to Melbourne in a
matter-of-fact letter.

He guided the Prime Minster from

the least popular to the most acceptable policy.

The

Government could reject responsibility for Elliot's
actions, but then what would become of the merchants?
Alternatively, the Government could accept responsibility,
but then would it ask Parliament for the money needed to
pay for the opium or demand it from the Chinese?

Once the

Government made the demand for compensation, would it also
seek to put the China trade on a more secure footing by
demanding a treaty?

Palmerston also suggested that the

most effective means of carrying out such a policy would be
to blockade the Chinese coastal trade in grain and salt.
He painted a rosy scenario : "No very large naval force
would be required for these p u r p o s e s . I n this note to
Melbourne, Palmerston laid out his strategy for making the
best out of Capt. Elliot's unauthorized action, thus
averting another clash with the Radicals.

^^Smith to Palmerston, Belgrave Square, 18 September
1839, F017/35/68-9.
^^Palmerston to Melbourne, note, 23 September 183 9,
Lamb Papers, M859/6 Box 12/13.
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During the Parliamentary recess the Ministry also had
to deal with several other issues besides the opium crisis.
One of the more immediate domestic problems was the
reorganization of the Cabinet in the face of Radical and
conservative threats.

Hoping that personnel changes would

aid the passage of legislation, Melbourne allowed Russell
and Lord Normanby to exchange their positions in the Home
and Colonial Offices.

Howick, son of Lord Grey, responded

to the shift by resigning his position as Secretary of
State for War.

He thought Normanby's transfer to the Home

Office represented a shift toward the Radicals.

Howick's

loss created the perception that conservative Whigs wanted
to distance themselves from Melbourne's ailing Ministry.
Melbourne called upon the extremely popular Thomas Macaulay
to solidify the Cabinet's support in Commons.

Recently

elected as a representative for Manchester, his popularity
rested on the controversial question of the ballot.

In the

past summer's debate on the issue Macaulay had stated his
belief that Parliament should institute this mechanism for
Parliamentary elections.

His elevation to the War Office

signaled a growing dependence on Radical s u p p o r t . H i s
appointment did nothing to stop conservative accusations
that the aristocratic Ministry was really a "Radical" wolf
in sheep's clothing.

^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 248-52.
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In the area of foreign policy, events in the Levant
held center stage and pushed the China question to the
side.

The Melbourne Government had to decide on a strategy

for dealing with Mehemet Ali's rebellion.

Palmerston told

Melbourne that "the Turkish Question is one of more
extensive Interest & Importance to England than any other
Question . . . and no administration would be able to stand
the Blame . . .

if by neglect or indifference" it allowed

France and Russia to extend their influence unchecked.
Palmerston received an unexpected break in September.
Baron Brunnow, Russian envoy to London, informed the
British Foreign Secretary of Czar Nicholas's proposal to
issue a joint declaration with Britain, Austria, Prussia
and France.

The declaration would state that the great

powers saw the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as
essential to the European balance.

Mehemet All and his

heirs could keep Egypt, but not Syria.

The great powers

would meet any further expansion with vigorous measures.
The Cabinet then met at Windsor Castle on 3 0 September
to consider the Czar's proposal.

Palmerston told the

Cabinet that in return for a favorable British response,
the Czar would allow the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to

^^Palmerston to Melbourne, 5 December 183 9, PP,
GC/ME/329.
^^Hobhouse, 15 September 183 9, Diary,
Add.Mss.56561/139; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston,
647-652 .
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expire: the Russian threat to the Turkish straits would
come to an end.

Melbourne thought Mehemet All should be

allowed to keep Syria, but Palmerston, Hobhouse and Russell
protested.

A strong Mehemet All would continue to threaten

the stability of the Ottoman Empire and British trade
routes.

The Cabinet met late into the evening and finally

reached a tentative decision.

It agreed to the Czar's

proposal in principle but wanted further discussions
concerning its implementation.^*
After the previous day's grueling session, the Cabinet
reconvened on 1 October 183 9 to decide on a China
p o l i c y . P a l m e r s t o n described recent events in China and
explained his plans for disrupting the grain and salt
trade.

He believed that a "small squadron of one line of

battle ship, two frigates & some small armed vessels with
two or three steamers might blockade the whole coast of
China from the river of Pekin [sic] down to the Canton
c o a s t . H o b h o u s e expressed concern that such an
expedition would fail.

He reminded the Cabinet of

Staunton's objections to the use of force three years
earlier.

Staunton had argued that an expedition to extract

^*Hobhouse, 3 0 September 183 9, Diary,
Add.Mss.56551/140; Bourne, Palmerston, 581-3.
^^Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.6561/144-6 ;
Fay, Opium War, 192-95; Bourne, Palmerston, 589-90.
^^Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/144.
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commercial privileges would insult the British flag and
alienate the Chinese government and people.

The

President of the Board of Control also read a letter from
Lord Auckland stating that he had no forces available for
hostilities with China.

Melbourne then voiced his doubts

about the success of Palmerston's proposed expedition.
The rest of the discussion centered on two issues--the
Chinese government's use of force and Elliot's promise to
pay for the opium.

The circumstances of Elliot's

capitulation to Lin's demands posed a dilemma for the
Ministry.

The Government felt obligated to compensate the

British merchants for their loss of property, the euphemism
used to refer to the opium, but the question of the source
of funds remained unresolved.

Melbourne instantly opposed

using public funds to pay for the drug.

The Chancellor of

the Exchequer did not have the money, and the House of
Commons would not consent to appropriate the necessary
resources.

Henry Labouchere, President of the Board of

Trade, suggested that the East India Company pay.
Palmerston and Thomas Macaulay, who argued "with his usual
volubility and eagerness," thought the Chinese should pay.
The Cabinet members finally agreed; they decided that the

taunt on, Remarks on the British Relations with
China, 28.
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Chinese themselves should come up with the m o n e y . T h i s
decision meant war.
It would have been difficult for the Cabinet to rebut
Macaulay's enthusiastic argument.

Melbourne had brought

the representative from Manchester into the Cabinet in
order to bolster the popularity of the Government.
Rejecting his reasoning would have diminished Macaulay's
influence among other Radical M.P.s, defeating the purpose
of bringing him into the Cabinet.

Radical M.P.s were the

most vocal proponents of a more aggressive policy towards
C h i n a . T h e i r constituencies in Manchester, Liverpool
and Glasgow believed that an unprotected China trade
remained limited; a protected China trade would provide the
largest market in the world.

Some British manufacturers

and merchants eagerly anticipated an opportunity to sell
their goods in China after the war.
By the end of the 1 October meeting the Cabinet had
decided to send a squadron to China and agreed that

^°Hobhouse, 1 October 183 9, Diary, Add.Mss.55561/145;
Fay, Opium War, 193.
^^Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism:
Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and
Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), 152-4.
"Trade with China," Manchester Guardian, 9 October
1839, p.2; "The Dispute with China," Manchester Guardian,
16 October 1839, p.2; "Differences with China," Manchester
Guardian, 30 November 1839, p.2; "Relations with China,"
Manchester Guardian, 23 November 183 9, p. 2; Greenberg,
British Trade, 193-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181
Palmerston should draw up instructions for the campaign.
Before the meeting broke up, Hobhouse leaned over and told
Macaulay
his two first Cabinets had done some work--i.e.
resolved upon a war with the master of Syria &
Egypt backed by France--and also on a war with
the master of one third of the human race. He
laughed & said he had no doubt about our Chinese
policy buh was not so certain as to our
Egyptian.
Hobhouse's original diary entry differs slightly from
the account he wrote in his memoirs, Recollections of a
Long Life.

He replaced the vague phrase,

"his two first

Cabinets had done some work," with a more specific
statement, "that charges made against us of idleness could
hardly be sustained; for at the first Cabinet which he
[Macaulay] had attended we had resolved upon war . . ..
The change suggests that, at least upon reflection,
Hobhouse considered the charges of idleness made by the
conservatives a significant factor in the Ministry's
decision to go wage war.
Two members of the Cabinet--Melbourne and Chancellor
of the Exchequer Francis Baring--remained unsure of the

Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56551/1455; I would like to thank J. Conway, Superintendent,
Students' Room [Manuscript Collection, British Library],
for verifying the accuracy of this quotation.
^^Lord Broughton (John Cam Hobhouse), Recollections of
a Long Life. With Additional extracts from his private
dairies. Edited, by his Daughter Lady Dorchester. Vol. 5.
1834-1840 (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1911), 229.
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decision after the meeting broke up.

Melbourne still was

unconvinced that a small force could do the job and wanted
to defer to the "judgement of Lord A u c k l a n d . B a r i n g ,
although his family's firm--Baring Brothers & Co.--provided
the financial backing for most of the opium t r a d e , h a d
little sympathy for the commercial interests involved in
the opium c r i s i s . H e did not believe that the
Government should take responsibility for Elliot's pledge,
but he did think the matter would be a "bother in the H of
C.
Lord Holland, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
was indifferent to and ignorant of the whole affair.

He

usually led the opposition within the Cabinet to
Palmerston's foreign policy, especially in regard to
France.

All Holland knew about affairs in China was that

Lord Minto's cousin needed relief.

Having missed the

Cabinet meeting, he was willing to leave the decision in
the hands of his c o l l e a g u e s H o l l a n d was more worried

^^Hobhouse, October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/148.
^^Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants, 226.
^^Francis Baring to Melbourne, 24 October 183 9, Lamb
Papers, M859/6/ Box l/38d.
^^Francis Baring to Palmerston, 1839, PP, GC/BA/264.
^^Lord Holland. Political Journal. Holland House
Papers. Manuscript Collection. British Library, London.
Add.Mss. 51872/1159.
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about a rupture with France over Palmerston's proposed
Egyptian policy, than events in China.
Palmerston took his time forming the instructions for
his subordinates in China and India.

He did not inform

Elliot of the decision for war until 18 October^^ and
waited until early November to send preliminary
instructions to Lord Auckland to make preparations for
hostilities.

Palmerston's slow reaction would bring

criticism from the Opposition, but the commercial interests
involved agreed with the delay.

They had no reason to

believe that the 183 9/1840 trading season would not open as
usual, and they did not want the conflict to begin until
the season was over in March, hoping the violence would end
in S e p t e m b e r . S u c h considerations suggest neither a
knee jerk reaction nor a policy planned well in advance.
When Hobhouse informed the Chairs of the East India
Company of the Cabinet's decision to wage war, they "did
not give any positive o p i n i o n . T h i s apprehensive
reaction is hardly what one would expect from a group
dependent upon opium for survival.

Hobhouse did raise

their spirits when he told them that the British
Government, not the Company, would pay for the expedition.
''^Palmerston to Elliot, Private, 18 October 1839, PP,
GC/EL/27/1.
''^Palmerston to Hobhouse, Foreign Office, Letter
Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/225.
^^Hobhouse, 4 November 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/155,
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The decision to go to war with China represented a
drastic change in Palmerston's Far Eastern policy.

Since

the creation of the office of Chief Superintendent of
Trade, Palmerston had instructed the Crown's
representatives to avoid war and to protect the status quo.
The Foreign Secretary now claimed to seek redress for the
Chinese quarantine's insult to the British merchants and to
protect future trading privileges in China.

Palmerston

explained his reasons for his about-face in a letter to the
Emperor of China dated 2 0 February 184 0.

He claimed that

he was not questioning the Emperor's right to prohibit
opium nor the right to enforce that prohibition.

He did

challenge, however, the methods used by the Emperor's
officials.

The Foreign Secretary accused the Chinese of

uneven enforcement of a law that had long remained a "dead
letter" by suddenly threatening "innocent" foreigners with
violence.

Palmerston ignored the fact that China had begun

the crackdown three full years earlier and had begun by
punishing its own subjects.

Furthermore, every foreign

merchant house in Canton, with the exception of one
American firm, brought opium to C h i n a . T h e letter
defends Elliot's actions, claiming that Elliot had "to
rescue" the merchants from a "barbarous fate," a statement
which was far from the truth.

Finally, the letter ended

‘'^Report, 1840, 34.
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with a list of demands that included payment for property-opium--lost during the March 1839 crisis and protection of
future trading rights.

If the Emperor of China refused

these demands, the expeditionary force had the authority to
exact them by f o r c e . P a l m e r s t o n clearly intended to use
this military show of force to gain commercial privileges,
the same type of endeavor which he had questioned just one
year earlier in regard to France's blockade of Buenos
Aires.
The domestic political crisis helped to alter his
policy.

During the previous three years Palmerston had

made it clear to Elliot that he was in no way to offend the
C h i n e s e . N o w the situation had changed.

Merchants

banged on the Foreign and Treasury Office doors demanding
compensation for the lost opium, while opposition to the
opium trade mounted from across the political spectrum.^*
After the Ministry made its decision not to pay for the

^'^Morse, International Relations, 521-26.
^^Gerald Graham, China Station, 49, 73.
Foreign and Domestic Intelligence : The East,"
Northern Star (Leeds), 17 August 1839; "The Opium Trade v.
British Manufacturers," Leeds Mercury, 26 October 183 9,
p .4 ; "China," Leeds Mercury, 2 November 1839, p.4; "Foreign
and Colonial Affairs : China," The Charter (London), 3
November 1839, p.642; "Opium Script," Northern Star
(Leeds), 16 November 1839, p.4;"The Opium
Smugglers,"
Leeds Mercury, 16 November 1839, p.4; "The China Question,"
Leeds Mercury, 16 November 1839, p.7; "The Opium Trade,"
Leeds Mercury, 23 November 183 9, p.7.
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opium, both the Foreign and Treasury Offices answered the
merchants' demands with the same response.
H.M. Govt, have no funds at their disposal out of
which any compensation could be made to the
owners of the opium which was surrendered to
Capt. Elliot, in conformity with his public
notice dated Canton March 27, 183 9. . . . [T]he
sanction of Parliament would be necessary before
any such claims against H.M. Govt., founded upon
Capt. Elliot's notice, could be recognized and
paid . . . .
[F]urther, it is not the intention
of H.M. Govt, to submit^^to Parliament for the
payment of such claims.
The Melbourne Ministry refused to take responsibility for
Elliot's pledge, because the "Chief of the Commission" had
no authority to make such a pledge.

The dispersal of funds

required an act of Parliament, but to get money from it
seemed impossible.

Facing a defiant House of Commons, and

needing all the support the Ministry could get, it finally
decided to act in heat of domestic criticism.
In regard to foreign policy the Parliamentary recess
gave the Ministry a little breathing room.

In a letter to

Lord Palmerston, Lord Minto, First Lord of the Admiralty,
wrote
The great success of Auckland will drive the
Tories to despair, and Brougham will [be] ready
to kill himself in earnest. I think they have
now no foreign allies to rest their hopes upon
except Commissioner Lin & the Emperor of China--

initialed "P" to Magniac, Smith & Co., Draft,
Foreign Office, 19 November 1839, F017/35/131-2 ; see also
Treasury to Opium claimants. Copy, Treasury Chamber, 11
November 1839, FO17/36/107-8.
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who may serve them for the opening of
Parliament.
Palmerston’s vilification of Commissioner Lin would help to
blunt the conservative charges of incompetence.

The

Foreign Secretary felt confident enough to tell Russell not
to worry if Minto exceeded his voted estimate at the
Admiralty.

"Parliament would not object to make good the

deficiency, considering that the Slave Trade, Buenos Ayres,
China and the Levant all require naval Exertions.
Domestic politics was another matter.

The Chartist

violence continued to flare up around the country.
Gentlemen's Magazine described how local magistrates
resorted to force in order to put down armed protests.

In

raids on the houses of leading Chartists, police seized
muskets with bayonets and bullets, along with papers and
correspondence.

"Thousands" of Chartists demonstrated in

Stockport, Manchester and Bolton.
The most serious uprising in the winter of 183 9
occurred in the seaport town of Newport, Wales, on 3-4
November.

The Morning Chronicle, a daily newspaper with

Whig sympathies, reported that 10,000 armed men with guns.

^^Minto to Palmerston, private, 2 November 1839, PP,
GC/MI/412.
^^Palmerston to Russell, Windsor, 17 October 183 9,
Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/1316.
^°"Domestic Occurrences," Gentlemen's Magazine 12
(September 1839): 301-1; "Domestic Occurrences,"
Gentlemen's Magazine, 13 (February 1840): 198-9.
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muskets, pikes and swords descended upon the town.
attack left at least twenty dead and fifty wounded.

The
The

paper considered the destruction as "penance" for the years
of "despicable domination" before the Reform A c t T h e
early newspaper reports have stood the test of time.

John

Frost, a former Newport corporation magistrate, led 7,000
men, armed with pikes, pistols, guns and heavy bludgeons,
from the mining and manufacturing regions of South Wales to
the seaport town.

The throng hoped to rescue several of

their colleagues held by local officials.

A severe rain

storm delayed the group's advance and allowed the officials
to prepare for an assault.

When the Chartists reached the

Westgate Hotel, the makeshift prison, they violently
demanded the release of the prisoners.

After a scuffle at

the front door, members of the 45th Regiment, hidden inside
the hotel, fired into the crowd.

After a 25 minute battle,

the military managed to disperse the Chartists.

The battle

left at least twenty persons dead and fifty wounded.

"The Chartist Riots at Newport," Morning Chronicle,
6 November 1839, 3; "London: Thursday, Nov. 7, 1839,"
Morning Chronicle, 1 November 1839, 2; "London: Friday,
Nov. 8, 1839," Morning Chronicle, 8 November 1839, 2.
Chartist Insurrection in Monmouthshire," Leeds
Mercury, 9 November 183 9, p.4; "The Insurrection and Its
Causes," The Northern Star (Leeds), 9 November 1839, p.4;
"Alarming Intelligence," Northern Star (Leeds), 9 November
1839, p.8; "The Welsh Insurrection," The Charter (London),
10 November 1839, p.664; "The Riots in Wales," The Charter
(London), 10 November 1839, p.657-9; "The Riots in Wales,"
The Charter (London), 17 November 1839, p.677; David Jones,
The Last Rising: The Newport Insurrection of 1839 (Oxford:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189
Once again, an official who the Melbourne Ministry had
appointed to ensure public order threatened life and
property.

At least in Birmingham, the Ministry's

appointees had acted on the side of the Government. This
time, the Ministry choice for magistrate--John Frost-actually led the rebellion.

Melbourne thought that more

unexpected uprisings might occur.

He considered the

situation a "little awkward after having taken merit for
our mode of dealing with C h a r t i s m . T h e rebellion
further weakened the popularity of Melbourne and the Whigs.
At a dinner held for the Lord Mayor of London, the guests
drowned with hisses Lord Melbourne's toast.

He had tried

to express his determination to suppress domestic unrest
with force, but the noise obliged the Prime Minister, along
with Normanby, Palmerston and Baring, back to their
54

seats.

The Ministry tried to strengthen its position during
the Parliamentary recess, but the ground continued to erode
from beneath its feet.

For every crisis the Government

addressed, two more emerged.

To carry successfully the

Clarendon Press, 1985), 114-43, 144-54.
^^Melbourne to Russell, Windsor Castle, 6 November
1839, Lord Melbourne's Papers, ed. Lloyd Sanders (London:
Longmans, Green, 1889), 407-8.
5^"The Lord Mayor's Dinner, and the Unpopular
Ministers," Norther Star, 16 November 1839; "The Lord
Mayor's Day," Norther Star, 16 November 1839, p.4.
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China policy across the "impossible tightrope," the
Ministry refused to respond to specific questions about the
use of force.

During the preparation of the Queen's speech

at the opening of Parliament in January, the Cabinet
decided to say simply that the Government had done its
duty.

To say more might have pushed conservative Whigs

toward the Opposition, but to say less might have upset the
Radicals.

^^Hobhouse, 11 January 1849, Diary, Add.Mss.56562/32.
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CHAPTER 7
"THE OPIUM AND THE CHINA QUESTION"*

With the beginning of the 184 0 session of Parliament
the conservatives' assault on the Ministry started anew.
In a vote of no confidence at the end of January they
brought together in one debate all of their accusations
against the Whigs.

The disruption of trade in China

provided added fuel for their attack.

The private decision

did not end the public debate about Government acceptance
of responsibility for Elliot's actions.
the debate began in earnest.

On the contrary,

Pamphleteers and journalists

wrote polemics on both sides of the issues, while
politicians weighed the consequences of defending the
Crown's officer in China against the repercussions of
leaving the opium merchants to their fate.
from this debate is a community divided.

What emerges
No mandate for

war existed.
The conservatives believed the vulnerability of the
Government called for a direct challenge.

In December 1839

they decided that the challenge should come at the

The title is taken from an article in Blackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine 47 (June 1840) : 717.
191
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beginning of the new session in January.

On 28 January

1840, Sir John Yard Buller, a distinguished country
gentleman, rose from the conservative benches and
introduced a motion of no-confidence in the House of
Commons.

He began by declaring that "distress and

dissatisfaction" existed "throughout England."

This state

of unrest did not arise from extenuating circumstances,
which could not be controlled.

The unrest arose from the

policies of Her Majesty's Ministers.

The Ministry adopted

a "system of agitation which had [been] nurtured and
fostered for the sake of carrying their ov/n measures,
pressing them upon the country, and exciting the masses of
people for their own purposes.

To argue his case,

Buller focused on the domestic situation, and proceeded to
call the attention of the House to the Chartist riots,
"hostility" to the Church of England, abuses of patronage,
attempts to repeal the corn laws, and Whig support for the
socialist Robert Owen.^
Mr. Alderman Thompson, representative of the Shipping
Interests in Commons, then rose to second the motion of noconfidence.

He was sure the House of Commons would make

the right decision and stated his reasons for withholding

’sir John Yard Buller, "Confidence in the Ministry,"
House of Comimons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January
1840), col. 650.
^John Yard Buller, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28
January 1840), cols. 650ff.
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confidence from the Ministry.

Considering the Chartist

unrest and the budget deficits, Thompson "found that there
was cause of alarm and apprehension for the constitution of
the country and the honour and prosperity of the nation.
After expanding on Buller's themes, Thompson focused on the
Ministry's colonial and foreign policy.

He called the

attention of the House to the French blockade of Mexico,
the exclusion of British trade from Buenos Aires, the
situation in China, and the Canadian and Jamaican
rebellions.
Sir George Grey, Judge Advocate-General, rose first to
defend the Ministry.

He set the tone for the debate to

follow by simply stating that the Opposition's motion gave
him nothing to "grapple with.

Grey felt that the motion

was motivated by politics rather than policy.

He asserted

that the empire was not in a state of general unrest as
claimed by the Opposition.

He called upon the members of

Commons to vote on principle.

Grey asked if the House

would rather have a Government committed to "progressive

^Alderman Thompson, "Confidence in the Ministry,"
House of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January
1840), col. 656.
^George Grey, "Confidence in the Ministry, House of
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January 1840), col.
666 .
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movement," or one committed to the suppression of "all
future progress.
Once again, the conservatives blamed the Whigs'
progressive principles of constant reform as the cause of
the instability of the realm.

More specifically, the

conservatives blamed the Whigs' continuous attempts at
extending the Reform Act of 1832 to the workers as the
cause of the considerable unrest.

The Whigs, on the other

hand, denied that a general state of unrest existed and
said that the unrest that did exist was prompted by the
reactionary principles of the conservatives, who wanted to
overturn the Great Reform Ac t .
power.

The Whigs held the reins of

They were vulnerable to the charges that the

Government was failing to respond to the extensive unrest,
which was quite real.
All of the problems which Great Britain faced did not
go unnoticed on the Ministry's side of Commons.

Lord

Howick, a former member of the Melbourne Ministry, probably
delivered the most damaging speech in the no-confidence
debate.

Lord Howick, on the second night of the debate,

rose admitting that the Ministry lacked the full confidence
of the House of Commons and the country.
cheers arose from the Opposition benches.

As he spoke,
Their cheers

diminished, however, as Lord Howick stated that he would

^Grey, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January 1840),
col. 688.
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vote against the motion because he had even less confidence
in the Opposition.*
After four long nights of debate the motion of noconfidence failed.
majority.

The Ministry had only a twenty-one vote

Hobhouse wrote in his diary that the Ministry

"had a majority of 300 to 287--much more than I had
expected a day or two before.
have 14."^

Russell told me we should

The Radicals decided to vote with the Ministry

on this particular occasion, but their continued support
remained unreliable.

The Ministry entered the debate over

Elliot's pledge to pay for the opium in a slightly better
position than it had at the close of the last session of
Parliament.

When the House of Commons finally took up the

issue in April, however, the Ministry found itself back in
its previous precarious state.*
The arguments for and against supporting Captain
Elliot's pledge to pay for £2,000,000 worth of opium were
wide-ranging.

The argument used most often in support of

Government responsibility rested on a simple fact--Elliot
had acted in his official capacity.

The Government must

champion their representative's decision and bear the loss
of the £2,000,000.

By failing to pay for the opium, the

*Lord Howick, "House of Commons, January 30, 1840,"
Times, 31 January 1840, p.4.
^Hobhouse, 31 January 1840, Diary, A d d .Mss.56562/53-4.
*Newbould, Whiggery, 256.
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Government was avoiding its responsibility.^

Supporters

of Government action also justified their position by
highlighting official complicity in the opium trade.

When

Parliament abolished the East India Company's trade
monopoly in the Far East, the Government allowed the
government of India to keep its monopoly for the production
and sale of o p i u m . T h i s lack of action sanctioned the
India Company's collection of £2,000,000 in revenue from
the exportation of the drug to China.^

Complementing the

above arguments was the belief that the British Government
needed to avenge the insults to an officer of the Crown and
the British community in Canton.

The outrageous

behavior of the Chinese, which compounded the cruelty
perpetrated against the "unavenged martyr," Lord Napier,
demanded immediate action.

^Samuel Warren, The Opium Question {London: James
Ridgway, 1840), 17-18. Volume 1139. Wellington Pamphlets.
Deposited in Southampton University Library (Hereafter
cited as WP).
’°H. Hamilton Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just
One? (London: James Ridgway, 1840), 7. Volume 1139. W P .
^Alexander Graham, The Right, Obligation, & Interest
of the Government of Great Britain to require Redress from
the Government of China, For the Late Forced Surrender of
British Owned Opium at Canton (London: Whittaker, 1840), 1.
Volume 1138. WP.
^^Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question: with a few
Suggestions Regarding British Claims on China (London:
Smith Elder, 1840). Volume 1139. WP; "The Disputs With
China, The Guardian (Manchester), 16 October 1839, p. 2.
^^Warren, The Opium Question, 25-6.
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Other writers saw the opium traders as the source of
the unsettled state of affairs in China rather than as the
victims of Chinese despotism.

The British merchants in

Canton had returned Chinese hospitality with acts of
aggression.

The Chinese government had attempted to put

down the opium trade since 1836, but the British merchants
failed to heed the warnings.
the drug.

They kept illegally importing

Opponents to accepting responsibility for

Elliot's pledge also argued on moral grounds.
an anonymous author the issues were clear.

According to

The opium

trade, and the war to protect it, was a "National Sin.
George Thompson, a "celebrated anti-slavery advocate,"
spoke to an overflowing crowd in Leed's Music Hall for two
hours on the horrors of the opium trade.

While the pagan

rulers of China and the Ottoman Empire suppressed the
immoral trade the Christian rulers of Great Britain

Captain T.H. Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, or
Another View of the Opium Question: Being a Reply to a
Pamphlet by Samuel Warren (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1840), 85.
Volume 1139. WP; "War with China," The Charter (London), 19
January 1840, p.8; "The Opium Trade.--War with China,"
Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1840, p.4.
Voice for China: An Answer to the Question, Is the
War with China Just? To My Countrymen, the Government, and
My Church. By One of Her Ministers, 2d (London: Nisbet,
1840). passim. Volume 1139. WP; "The Opium Trade," Leeds
Mercury, 8 February 1840, p.7.
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encouraged it.

No true Christian could support a war that

protected such an atrocity.
Surprisingly, economic reasoning motivated some
authors to contest the Ministry's policies.

For example,

William Storrs Fry claimed that money spent by the Chinese
on opium deprived British manufactures of a market.

As the

opium trade increased, British exports to China
d e c r e a s e d . H e also cited a petition by the Mayor of
Leeds and 3127 inhabitants of that town.

The petitioners

asserted that the opium trade was the cause of British
trade problems in China and was harmful to the
manufacturing and mercantile classes in Britain.

Fry

concluded that the evidence necessitated an immediate end
to the opium trade .
Chartist newspapers added their voices to the outcry
against the Ministry's China policy.

The movement objected

to war in g e n e r a l . T h e pending hostilities with China
provided more proof of the abuse of political power for
sectarian interests.

The Chartists argued that corrupt

"The Opium Question," Northern Star (Leeds), 22
February 1840, p. 1; "The Opium Trade : Public Meeting at
Leeds," Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1840, p. 8.
’^Fry,

Factsand Evidence, 45-9.

^®Fry,

Factsand Evidence, 54.

^^Fry,

Factsand Evidence, 5.

^°Northern Star (Leeds), 12 October 1839, p. 4.
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politicians, merchants and stock jobbers would reap the
benefits of the war, while the laborers would bear the
weight in t a x e s . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform furnished the
only solution to the p r o b l e m . T h e nation could then
pursue its true interest--"peaceful and unrestricted
commerce, each nation taking from the other the produce
raised with greater f a c i l i t y . T h e Chartist papers also
decried the loss of national honor caused by the opium
crisis.

For the Queen to keep the dignity of her crown,

her Ministers should hang the opium merchants,

"as hanging

commissions are Whig f a n c i e s . I n s u l t i n g the
aristocratic honor of the Ministry, the Northern Star
stated that the behavior of "Opium Elliot" and the Reformed
Ministry proved them to be merely the tools of
"Shopkeepers," sacrificing the national honor for the unChristian pursuit of mammon.
Both proponents and opponents of the Government's
China policy used international law to support their

"War with China," The Charter (London), 19 January
1840, p. 8.
"The Opium War," Northern Star,

(4 April 1840), p.

4.
"War with China," The Charter (London) , 12 January
1840, p. 888.
^“^"The Queen's Speech," The Charter (London), 26
January 1839, p.9.
"The 'Shopkeepers:' Their 'Profit' and Our 'Loss,'
Northern Star (Leeds), 18 January 1840, p. 4.
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daims.

Proponents stated that the Chinese government

behaved in defiance of "all international laws recognized
by civilized nations for the protection of life and
property.

It had no right to demand opium which the

authorities themselves could not capture.

The receiving

ships anchored at Lintin remained outside the reach of the
Chinese.

Since Elliot turned over the opium housed at

Lintin only after the Chinese held the foreign community as
prisoners, the seizure was i l l e g a l . O p p o n e n t s stressed
that according to international law an individual must obey
the laws of the state in which he resides.
forbad the importation of opium.

The Chinese

British merchants in

China had no choice but to comply with that state's wishes.
The Government of Britain should not take responsibility
for the illegal behavior of English subjects in China.
Both sets of arguments based on international law were,
however, of questionable validity.

International law

depended upon the "general consent" among independent
n a t i o n s . C h i n a never consented to any set of common
principles until after the war ended with its defeat.

^^Lindsay, Is The War with China a Just One?, 7.
^^Graham, The Right, Obligation, & Interest of the
Government of Great Britain, 2, 10-11.
^^Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, 64.
^^Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: With a
Sketch of the History of the Science (Philadelphia: Carey,
Lea & Blanchard, 1836), 46.
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The authors of the above articles and pamphlets based
their arguments on newspaper reports, private
correspondence or personal knowledge of events in China.
At the end of January and throughout the month of February
the Opposition turned up the pressure on the Ministry by
demanding all official papers relating to C h i n a . T h e
Ministry's plans to use force had been a secret decision.
It left the country in the dark about the expeditionary
force.

The debate remained focused on the general issues

involved until Palmerston produced the Foreign Office
despatches.
In March murmurs of discontent began to be heard, as
news of Lord Auckland's military preparations in India
leaked out.

The Opposition demanded to know the details,

but the Government remained silent.

Its silence, however,

left the Opposition free to speculate and accuse the
Ministry of hiding details from the British public.

In an

editorial on 2 March, The Times wrote
It is in keeping with the whole genius and
history of the MELBOURNE Cabinet, that they
should first, from fear, look on while France was
the oppressor of La Plata, and then plead their
own connivance at that series of crimes as a
defence of their consistency in the preparation
of similar outrages upon China."

^Collis, Foreign Mud, 258.
Times (London), 2 March 1840, p.4
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The lack of official details gave the Opposition more time
to put the Ministry's policy into context.
On 5 March Palmerston finally broke the Government's
cloak of secrecy by producing the Correspondence Relating
to China.

This large Blue book did not quickly satisfy the

Opposition, because it did not provide an immediate
narrative of events.

The document contained 458 pages of

despatches with no table of contents or index.

It

presented the despatches in turgid, chronological order.
Any Member of Parliament seeking clarification of events
had to be enthusiastic and have a lot of free time to
complete a thorough analysis of events in China.
Furthermore, The Times continued to accuse the Ministry of
hiding information, because the manuscript did not include
the Foreign Office's orders to Elliot since the crisis
occurred.
The Times got the story right.
his tracks well.

Palmerston had covered

Charles Webster, author of the most

respected book on Palmerston's foreign policy, claimed
that, when the Foreign Secretary personally edited the Blue
books, he "meant to enlighten rather than mislead the
p u b l i c . S u c h a statement cannot be substantiated.
Palmerston deleted almost all references to the conflict

^^Times (London), 14 March 1840, p.4.
^^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 62.
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between Robinson and Elliot, Elliot's refusal to perform
his duty and Elliot's renegade foreign policy.
Even with the deletions Palmerston provided the public
with the source for debate, and the blue book quickly sold
o u t A

new set of pamphlets and review articles, which

focused on the details of Elliot's actions and his
instructions, appeared as commentary for the mountain of
despatches.

The anonymous authors of two such pamphlets

examined the same evidence and came to opposing
conclusions.
In Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China
the author states that because of the "lack of timely
protection" by the British Government, the China trade
might be lost fc r e v e r . The Government had left Elliot
alone to follow his own policies, and he had involved
himself needlessly with the Chinese authorities.

This

involvement clouded his decisions because he overestimated
his own ability to negotiate with the C h i n e s e N o t h i n g
could better illustrate Elliot's lack of foresight and

Digest of the Despatches on China (Including Those
Received on the 27th March): A Connecting Narrative and
Comments (London; James Ridgway, 1840), 1.
Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China,
Since the Opening of the Trade in 1834; with an Analysis of
the Government Despatches From the Assumption of Office by
Capt. Elliot, on the 14th December, 1836, to the 22d of
March, 1839 (London: Smith, Elder, 1840), 4.
^^Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China,
76 .
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overconfidence than his leaving Macao for Canton during the
heat of the opium crisis.

He went with the intention of

demanding release of the foreign community, but he had to
surrender £2,000,000 worth of opium.
On went his uniform coat, and up went the
national flag. The one was taken off by himself,
but we do not hear who hauled down the other.
It
was probably trampled under the feet of the
Chinese coolies, in whose peeping he was placed
immediately after landing.
Leaving such a man as Elliot without instructions required
the Government to take responsibility for his actions.
The author was, however, willing to forgive the
Government's past transgressions because it had decided to
use force.

He believed that the use of force would protect

the China trade from the Chinese government and demonstrate
to it that the time for conciliatory policy had come to an
end.

The opponents of force should recognize this fact and

hail the new policy of the Government.^®
To fight, or not to fight was the question in the
spring of 1840.

Pamphlet author did not believe the final

decision had been made.

They still hoped they could

influence Parliament's decision.

Hence, the author of A

Digest of the Despatches on China had a simple and
straight-forward message.

He found fault neither with the

Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China,
75 .
®®J?eview of the Management of our Affairs in China,
210 .
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Government nor Elliot.

The Government had no authority to

put down the opium trade, and Elliot performed his duty by
protecting British merchants.

The anonymous writer

acknowledged the moral evil of opium, but he believed that
"moral evils are to be met by moral cures."
Commissioner Lin's material pursuit of the illicit traffic
demanded a forceful response.
The parliamentary debate heated up on 12 March 184 0
after the two main metropolitan newspapers. The Times and
The Morning Chronicle, announced a British declaration of
war on China.

The Times ran the following sensational

headline: "EXPRESS FROM INDIA: DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
CHINA. "

The Opposition demanded an explanation from the

Government, which continued its evasive strategy.
stated that he knew of no declaration of war.

Russell

The

Government had instructed Lord Auckland to make "active
preparations."
war.

Those preparations fueled the rumors of

Peel, "supposing the declaration should prove to be

true," insisted on knowing who would pay for the war.
Palmerston responded by denying that the nation was at war,
but said the Government of India would share the fiscal
burden.

Peel was not satisfied.

He asked Palmerston if

the House should expect a message from Her Majesty stating

Digest of the Despatches on China, 209.
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that hostilities were imminent.

In an arrogant response,

Palmerston stated that no message was forthcoming.
The next day The Morning Chronicle reversed its
previous position.

It now maintained that The Times had

"magnified" the orders for preparations into a declaration
of war.

In all probability "not only will there be no

declaration of war against China, but no war at all.
The Times, however, continued to blast the Ministry on a
variety of issues relating to the expeditionary force.
newspaper could see no reason for the undeclared war.

The
It

would accomplish nothing and leave other British interests
"ruinously exposed," because the Empire's defenses were
already stretched too thinly.

Furthermore, the Government

refused to present its intentions to Parliament.

Should

not Parliament voice its opinion before the Government
committed the nation to v/ar?

Lord Palmerston followed a

course "of doing nothing and saying nothing, at the same
time when both declarations and actions had become a
paramount duty.
The Ministry finally caved in to the pressure.

On 29

March, six months after the Foreign Office received
Elliot's despatches and one year after the crisis began.

"War with China," House of Commons, Hansard, 3d
ser., vol. 53 (13 March 1840), cols. 1155-57.
‘''^Morning Chronicle (London), 13 March 1840, 2.
Times (London), 14 March 1840, p.5.
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Lord John Russell divulged the Government's objectives: 1)
"to obtain reparations for the insults and injuries offered
to her Majesty's superintendent, and Her Majesty's subjects
by the Chinese government ;"
merchants trading with China

2) "to obtain for the
an indemnification for the

loss of their property;" 3) "to obtain security that the
persons and property of those trading with China, should in
future be protected from insult or i n j u r y . T h e
Ministry responded too late.

This feeble attempt to avoid

a conservative challenge missed its mark.

The

conservatives were not concerned about war aims, but about
war origins.

They realized the political value of the

Government's mishandling of the affair and were determined
to make the best of it.
After reviewing the massive Correspondence Relating to
China, the conservatives knew the blue book contained few
materials relating to the Palmerston's China policy.

Sir

James Graham even confessed to Hobhouse that Elliot made a
better superintendent than anticipated,

"but he [Graham]

nonetheless gave notice of a motion on China.

The

conservatives still believed that they would have a

^Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 52
(19 March 1840), col. 1223.
^^Hobhouse, 19 March 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5562/95.
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majority.

The Ministry did not know what to e x p e c t . O n

7 April 1840 Graham moved that the House withdraw its
confidence in the Ministry for its incompetent handling of
Anglo-Chinese relations.

He based his motion on the crisis

that had developed in China and the government's failure to
take action in response to it.

Dismissing the opium

question, Graham maintained that "it is the crime of the
QUEEN'S Ministers in having entailed a needless and unjust
war upon this country, through the difficult and helpless
condition in which they left their own diplomatic
agent.The

illicit opium trade only made Elliot's

impotence that much more deplorable.
Even after Palmerston's careful editing, Graham was
able to use the Correspondence Relating to China v;ith great
skill to substantiate this accusation.

He called the

attention of the House to the dismissal of Sir George Best
Robinson.

Graham wanted to know why Palmerston dismissed a

man who followed a policy which produced two and a half
years of peace.

Graham answered his own question by

stating that Robinson's policy clashed with the progressive
philosophy of the present Ministry: Robinson had wanted to
leave well enough alone.

Immediately after the personnel

^^Hobhouse to Auckland, India House, 4 April 1840,
Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/326.
^*Sir James Graham, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840:
China," Times (London), 8 April, 1840, p.4.
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change, "Violence, discord--he might almost say agitation-visted that peaceful region.

Graham also cited

Elliot's attempts to warn Palmerston about the dangers of
the opium trade and Palmerston's failure to give Elliot the
necessary powers needed to control the trade.

Palmerston's

vague instructions had left Elliot unprepared to handle any
problems which might arise.

Graham concluded that

Palmerston's inaction--not the actions of the Chinese
government--destroyed British trade relations with
China.
Writing in his diary later that night, Hobhouse
assessed these accusations.

He believed that Elliot did

possess the necessary powers to fulfill his duties. "As to
instructions perhaps Palmerston's letters were not
sufficiently full & d e f i n i t e . I f Palmerston's
staunchest supporter could come to such a conclusion, then
the conservatives truly had a chance of winning over those
members who were undecided.
The Ministry was not, however, willing to concede
defeat easily.

Secretary of State for War, Thomas

Macaulay, rose to challenge Graham's motion.

As he began

^^Sir James Graham, "War with China," Hansard, 3d
ser., vol. 53 (7 April 1840), cols. 684.
^^Graham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 53 (7 April 1840),
cols. 691-4.
^^Hobhouse, 7 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5662/103.
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to speak, one could imagine drums beating, a chorus
shouting "God Save the Queen," and the Union Jack flapping
in the wind.

Macaulay treated the present no-confidence

motion with the same contempt that Sir George Grey had
expressed toward the no-confidence motion in January.

He

started with the basic principle that the "flag should be
the protection of an Englishman, however r e m o t e , a n d
went on to defend Palmerston's instructions to Elliot.

The

instructions were sufficient, he insisted, considering the
vast distance between England and China; the Government of
India functioned quite well without detailed instructions.
Macaulay asserted that no amount of power would have been
sufficient for Elliot to stop the trafficking in opium.
The trade was a profitable endeavor and those involved
would stop at nothing to make a profit.

Macaulay also

complained about the nature of the motion; it dealt with
past policy.

He asked if the Opposition could find any

fault with the Ministry's present policy.

Finally, the

Secretary turned to the action taken by the Chinese.

The

Chinese, by imprisoning the whole foreign community, had
insulted the dignity of Great Britain, and that insult
demanded retribution.

As Macaulay sat down, the House

erupted into "Loud and continued cheering.

^°Thomas Macaulay, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840:
China," Times (London), 8 April, 1840, p.5.
^^Macaulay, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.5.
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Macaulay's argument did not sway the conservatives.
Sir William Follet rose to respond to Macaulay.

Follet

stated that an appeal to national sentiment missed the
point.

The charge against the Government was that it left

the Superintendents in China without powers and advice
despite their repeated calls for both.

Did Palmerston

answer any of Captain Elliot's pleas for powers or advice?
Follet answered his own question with a resounding "No!"
An agent of the crown must have one or the other.

The

Government of India survived v.’ithout advice because it had
sufficient power.
luxury.

The superintendents did not have this

The Government must be held responsible for the

consequences.
Mr. Sidney Herbert also directly challenged the
Secretary of State for War.

Herbert "did not complain of

Her Majesty's Government for sending out an arm.ament, but
he did complain of this--that their previous conduct had
rendered such a proceeding necessary.
heard throughout the house.

"Hear, hear" was

The Opposition had to attack

the past policies of the Ministry, because "on the
Opposition side of the House they had no knowledge of the

^^Sir William Follet, "House of Commons, April 7:
China." Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.5.
^^Sidney Herbert, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840:
China," Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
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future policy of the present advisors of the Crown.
Once again, expressions of approval were heard from the
benches.

If the nation did go to war, however, then the

Government would be "expending 6,000,0001. to recover
2,000,0001.; that we were sending good money after bad, and
that we were contending with an enemy whose cause for
quarrel was better than ours.
The young and promising William Gladstone forcefully
challenged the Government's policy on the second day of the
debate.

Gladstone disputed Macaulay's appeal to national

sentiment.

He acknowledged the "animating effects"

produced by the sight of the flag, but rhetorically asked
why it had such effects.

He then answered himself:

It is because it has always been associated with
the cause of justice, with opposition to
oppression, with respect for national rights,
with honourable commercial enterprize; but now,
under the auspices of the noble lord, that flag
is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband
traffic.
Cheers came from the Opposition benches as Gladstone
began with a bang, but he was not finished yet.

He also

disputed the Secretary's assertion that the Government
lacked the ability to control the opium trade.

He did so

^^Herbert, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
^^Herbert, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
^“^William Gladstone, "House of Commons, April 8, 1840:
China--Adjourned Debate," Times (London), 9 April 1840,
p .5 .
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by pointing to the fact that the East India Company, under
the jurisdiction of the Government, controlled the supply
of opium.

If the Government had wanted to address the

problem created by the opium trade, then the Government
should have cut off the supply.

The Ministry chose to put

Britain's commercial position at risk by failing to respond
to Elliot's repeated w a r n i n g s . G l a d s t o n e also insisted
that Palmerston had neglected his duty by failing to inform
the House of the increasing danger.

Palmerston had behaved

like an "Egyptian task master, commanding his officer ' to
make bricks out of straw.'

Gladstone concluded by

stating that the insult to the flag had not been delivered
by the Chinese, but by the Melbourne Ministry's tacit
approval of the illegal opium trade.
Gladstone's valiant condemnation of British
participation in the opium trade is much praised by
historians.

At the time, however, he went too far when he

defended the Chinese actions.

Responding to reports that

the Chinese had poisoned the water wells in order to drive
Captain Elliot and the opium merchants away, Gladstone
stated "of course they poisoned the w e l l s . T h e
Ministerial benches "raised a yell of abhorrence . . .

^^Gladstone, Times (London), 9 April 1840, p.5.
^®Gladstone, Times (London), 9 April 1840, p.5.
^^Gladstone, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 53 (8 April 1840),
col. 817.
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[while]

. . . Peel & Stanley hung their h e a d s . S u c h

naive statements hurt rather than helped opponents to the
Ministry's China policy.
On the third night of the debate the Ministry fought
back with vigor.

John Hobhouse stated that the

Opposition's motion was a mere attempt at party politics
and contained no substantial charges.

He asked whether or

not it was British policy to punish subjects who smuggled
goods into Spain; should it be different in China?

Let the

Chinese stop the smugglers. As to the superintendent's
want of powers, the President of the Board of Control
responded with contempt.

"It does not appear, he thought,

that Captain Elliot imagined there was any deficiency in
his powers.

Hobhouse had chosen to ignore both the

evidence presented by the Opposition and the despatches
supplied by the Foreign Secretary.
Sir Robert Peel returned to the conservative case,
concluding it with some simple observations.

He pointed

out that the arguments of Macaulay and Hobhouse made it
clear that the Ministry had set the nation on a course for
war.

The war would not be cost-free.

The Ministry must

consider the responses of other countries, especially the

*°Hobhouse, 8 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5562/104 .
^^Sir John Hobhouse, "House of Commons, 9 April, 1840;
China--Adjourned Debate," Times (London), 10 April 1840,
p.4.
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United States.

Would the Americans sit by as a war raged,

destroying their trade?

Peel's simplicity did not serve

the conservative cause.

Hobhouse thought that the speech

was not "one of his [Peel's] best."*^
After the leader of the Opposition's brief speech,
Palmerston rose in defence of his policy.

He felt that he

had little to fear; he held the "trump card.

His

strong, "swift" action intended to defend the British flag
in China was meant to secure British trade.

Palmerston

clearly attempted to use national sentiment to his
advantage.

The noble Lord spoke with an air of arrogance

as he brushed aside the accusations of the Opposition.
If the resolution of the right hon. baronet who
had opened the debate were not so pointedly
directed at the department which he [Palmerston]
had the honour to fulfill he should not--and he
wished to say it without meaning the slightest
offence--think it necessary to address himself to
a motion so feebly conceived and so feebly
enforced as the one under discussion, more
especially after the able manner in which the
friends around him had refused the arguments of
those on the opposite side.
Cheers arose from the ministerial benches, while laughter
flowed from the Opposition benches.

As Palmerston spoke,

he gave little of substance to defend his position.

^^Hobhouse, 9 April 1840, Diary, Ad d .Ms s .5662/185.
^Collis, Foreign Mud, 262.
'^^Lord Palmerston, "House of Commons, April 9, 1840:
China--Adjourned Debated," Times (London), 10 April 1840,

p .5.
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In rebuttal to Graham's charges, Palmerston defended
his orders to Elliot as appropriate and Elliot's actions as
honorable.
done.

He asked the Opposition what could have been

If he had followed Gladstone's advice and moved

against the opium trade, "the house would not have treated
their [the Ministry's] proposal with serious levity [sic],
but would absolutely laughed them out of c o u r t . H e
claimed that he should be praised for doing nothing,
because it was the only option.

Palmerston concluded by

declaring that he acted in accordance with the
international consensus.

The expeditionary force sent to

insure British national honor would not bring retribution
from the Americans or the French.
Graham tried to answer Palmerston's charges, but the
members of the House had grown weary of debate.
tired and wanted to go home.
Graham sat down.

They were

The M.P.s shouted until

The House divided after Palmerston's

"glorious" speech, and once again the Ministry succeeded in
holding on to its position.
however, had dropped.

Their margin of victory,

The motion failed by only nine

^^Palrnerston, Times (London), 10 April 1840, p.5.
^^Palmerston, Times (London), 10 April, 1840, p .5;
Palmerston had little to fear from the American government.
It even refused its citizens request to join the British
expedition in extracting commercial concessions from the
Chinese. William J. Donahue, "The Caleb Cushing Mission,"
Modern Asian Studies 16 (1982): 194.
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v o t e s . H o b h o u s e commented that the Ministry's
"casualties were numerous . . . [and] . . .

we were

fortunate in being able to keep our party together on this
occasion."*^

The Opposition had presented a strong case

against the Government.

Palmerston's only defence was his

claim that the Ministry was defending British honor against
the barbarous actions of the Chinese.

Apparently, this

jingoistic rhetoric successfully, though narrowly,
persuaded the British nation to wage war on China.

In the

process the Melbourne Ministry began the process of opening
China to Western trade.
The Ministry's defeat of the 7 April 184 0 vote of NoConfidence was, in any case, a pyrrhic victory.

After

losing a series of by-elections in the early part of 1841,
the Ministry faced another serious threat from the
Opposition.

This time, however, the Opposition had the

upper hand.

Lord Stanley, a leading member on the

Opposition side of the House, brought forth the Irish
Registration Bill.

Stanley wanted to restrict Irish

suffrage, but the Ministry tried to counter with a more
liberal bill.

When it came time to debate the issue. Lord

Howick argued against the Ministry.

Howick, by far the

"House of Commons, April 9, 1840 : China--Adjourned
Debate," Times (London), 10 April 1840, p.6; Collis,
Foreign Mud, 274.
^^Hobhouse, 9 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5662/106.
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most prominent defector, was not the only one.

The

Ministry lost by ten votes.*’
The Ministry chose to remain in office and fought
ahead, making the budget the issue upon which it would
stand or fall.

The Ministers hoped to gain support by

turning to Free-Trade issues.

Melbourne's Government

argued that the country's financial difficulties would be
solved by lowering tariffs on such items as corn and sugar.
The reduction of duties on corn was highly controversial.
The Ministry gambled that the conservatives would not
challenge it on this issue.

The Cabinet made the right

assessment on corn, but failed to see the attack on the
reduction of the sugar tariff.

The Opposition assaulted

the Government's budget on the single issue of sugar.

This

focus allowed the conservatives the luxury of not taking a
stand on the Corn Laws.

The Opposition argued that by

reducing the sugar duty the Ministry threatened the newly
freed black population of Jamaica.

Jamaican free labor

would be forced to compete with cheaper slave labor.

When

the votes were counted, the conservative margin of victory
had increased to thirty-six.
The Ministry reluctantly decided to dissolve
Parliament, but before doing so it wanted to force the

*’clark. Peel and the Conservative Party, 463-473.
^°Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, 478-479.
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conservatives to take a stand on the Corn Laws.

After the

Ministry announced their intention to make a motion to
reduce the Corn Laws, the Opposition quickly decided to
make a general motion of no confidence on 27 May 1841, thus
avoiding a direct challenge on policy issues.

The

conservative Opposition pointed to the Ministry's two
previous losses as proof of the lack of confidence in the
Ministry.
easily.

The Government, however, would not fall so
The Whigs tried in vain to make Peel, the leader

of the Opposition, take a stand, but he refused to do so.
He merely stated that his views were already well known.
The issue before the House was not Peel's ability to
govern, but the Melbourne Ministry's ability.

The majority

of the House agreed with Peel and the Ministry lost by one
vote.

Melbourne and his colleagues had failed to address

the more serious issues of the day.

Palmerston's rationale

for war against the Chinese had faded into the background.
After seven long years in Opposition, the Conservatives led
by Sir Robert Peel formed a ministry.
Accordingly, the Melbourne Ministry was out of office
when one of the most significant events of the nineteenth
century took place--the Treaty of Nanking, 29 August 1842.
The treaty ended hostilities between Great Britain and
China and signaled the opening of China to the West.

Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, 480-86.
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Palmerston did play a significant role in designing its
content.

After being accused of giving vague instructions

and leaving an officer of the crown without powers,
Palmerston took no chances.

The Foreign Secretary sent

clear and precise demands to Elliot and gave him
plenipotentiary powers.

Elliot decided to settle for less

than Palmerston had demanded.

Palmerston removed Elliot,

stating "Throughout the whole course of your proceedings
you seem to have considered that my instructions were waste
paper, which you might treat with entire disregard, and
that you were at full liberty to deal with the interest of
your country according to your fancy.
Palmerston then sent out Sir Henry Pottinger to
replace Elliot and to carry out his instructions.
Pottinger served Britain well.

After a series of military

victories, Pottinger extracted all of Palmerston's demands
from the Chinese.

The British made the Chinese surrender

$21,000,000 to pay for both the seized opium and the
expense of the war.

Furthermore, the Chinese opened five

ports--Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai--not
only to British trade, but also to British residents and
consuls.

The British also demanded and got the elimination

of the Co-hong and the establishment of regular duties.

^^Palmerston to Elliot, 21 April 1841 as quoted in
Fay, Opium War, 3 09.
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Finally, the Chinese ceded the island of Hongkong to the
British, and the island came under British jurisdiction.^
As stated above, the Melbourne Ministry fell before
Pottinger signed this remarkable treaty.

Palmerston's

clear and concise instructions came too late to be of any
good to the Ministry.

The immediate concerns at home

overshadowed the foreign war abroad.

Any political leader

contemplating a "splendid little war"^'^ should remember
the events surrounding the Opium War.

War euphoria will

soon recede, and the domestic tide will swell unless
domestic needs are satisfied.

^Fay, Opium War, 362.
"11 has been a splendid little war; begun with the
highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence
and spirit, favored by that fortune which loves the brave."
John Hay, U.S. Ambassador to England, writing to Colonel
Theodore Roosevelt at the close of the Spanish-American
War; As quoted in Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 3.
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CONCLUSIONS:
HISTORIANS AND THE OPIUM WAR

War is never inevitable.

Political leaders make

conscious choices of when to fight and when to compromise.
They do not, however, always base their decisions on clear,
rational policies.

More often than not, they fail to look

past short-term goals.

The immediate circumstances often

overshadow larger historical forces such as economics or
cultural differences.

Historians, on the other hand,

prefer to examine the long-term trends in their studies of
the origins of war and often look for the sources of
violent outbursts in inappropriate places, favoring
historical forces over immediate conditions.

To understand

fully the motivation for war, historians must consider the
immediate circumstances surrounding those making the
decision to wage war, as well as the prevailing views
within society.
Historians have used a variety of arguments to assert
that the first Opium War was an inevitable consequence of
Anglo-Chinese commercial contact.

Earl Pritchard, for

example, claimed that the British and the Chinese "thought

222
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and acted in a way almost directly opposed to one
another.

Unlike Britain's experience in Europe, China

developed in relative isolation and refused to accept the
British government's or merchants' demands to be treated as
equals.

After Lord Macartney (1791-1792) failed to

establish a permanent British embassy in Peking, "the
gauntlet was clearly thrown down for the future.

As

British merchants expanded their economic connections with
the Chinese, the lack of any diplomatic relations, which
might have peacefully settled conflicts between the two
countries, made an armed contest unavoidable.^
Other historians, such as Michael Greenberg, have
found the source of the inevitable tensions between the
British and the Chinese in Britain's expanding modern
economy.

Greenberg contended that the country traders

joined with British manufacturers to provide the primary
impetus behind the campaign first, to eliminate the East
India Company's China trade monopoly and second, to tear
down Chinese restrictions on foreign trade--the Canton
System.

The removal of the East India Company's monopoly

unleashed these dynamic agents of change.

Working in

^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 110; see also Chang,
Commissioner Lin, ix, 9-13.
^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 389.
^Owen, British Opium Policy, 168; Costin, Great
Britain and China, 20; Chang, Commissioner Lin, 2; Graham,
China Station, x.
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tandem, these merchants and manufacturers easily convinced
the British government to act violently on their behalf in
the first Opium War, shattering China’s stagnant world
4

view.

Historians have also used the British-run government
in India's opium monopoly as evidence to argue for the
inevitability of the Opium War.

Tan Chung and J.Y. Wong

found the desire to expand the China trade in India rather
than Britain or Canton.

The East India Company needed the

expansion of the China trade--opium exports--in order to
finance the Government of India.

When Commissioner Lin

cracked down on the opium trade, a response by the British
Government was inevitable, because the Indian government
could not survive without the money derived from the sale
of opium. 5
£

•

These economic and cultural factors certainly played a
role in the British Cabinet's decision to wage war and can
not be ignored.

British economic dependency on the opium

trade and the deep-seated cultural differences about the
role of the merchant in society played important roles in
the outbreak of hostilities in 1839 and 1840; the economic

^Greenberg, British Trade, 215; see also Chang,
Coimissioner Lin, 13-14.
^Tan Chung, "The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle
(1771-1840)," The Indian Economic and Social History Review
11 (December 1974); 411-31; J.Y. Wong, "Monopoly in India
and Equal Opportunities in China, 1830-33," South Asia 5
(1982): 81-95 ; see also Chang, Coimissioner Lin, 215.
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variables and the cultural differences unquestionably laid
the foundation for conflict.

This does not mean that war

was inevitable, or even likely before March 183 9.

These

historical realities only defined the "limits of the
possible"--the border that separate "the possible from the
impossible."*

Previous historians of the Opium War have

interpreted these borders within the context of an emerging
modern, industrial state in which the middle class
manipulated the political debate.

If one redefines the

limits of the possible and places the war within the
context of a aristocratic society, then the likelihood of
the Melbourne Ministry fighting a commercial war
d e c r e a s e s T h e March opium crisis should not have been a
life or death issue for the Government.

Those who pushed

for the war--Radicals in Parliament, and northern merchants
and manufacturers out of doors--were political and social
minorities.*

Interpretations that rest on economic and

cultural explanations fail to explain fully the motivation
behind the first Anglo-Chinese war by ignoring how these

*Fernand
18th Century,
Limits of the
Harper & Row,

Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15thvol. 1, The Structures of Everyday Life: The
Possible, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York:
1979), 27.

^Jeremy Black, "British Foreign Policy in the
Eighteenth Century : A Survey," Journal of British Studies
26 (January 1987); 44-45.
*Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 40-42.
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minorities convinced the British Cabinet to expand
violently British merchants' trading privileges in China.
Their failure is the result of an assumption made
explicit by Morris Collis.

In Foreign Mud (1947) Collis

argued that the British Government and merchants sought an
excuse for military intervention in China.

The British

wanted to compel the Chinese government to sign a "modern
commercial treaty," as well as to allow an expansion of
trade.^

The Chinese government's behavior prior to the

arrival of Commissioner Lin had not warranted the use of
force, but "Lin had played straight into his [Palmerston's]
hands."

The High Commissioner's "naive" actions provided a

"godsend" that the Foreign Secretary used to justify his
change in tactics.
This assumption has led historians to neglect the
manuscript sources relevant to the discussion of the Opium
War.

Historians of the war's origins have focused almost

exclusively on Foreign Office letters, while they have
completely overlooked Melbourne's, Palmerston's and
Hobhouse's private papers.

Historical interpretations of

the Cabinet's decision to fight a war half-way around the

’collis. Foreign Mud, 8; See also Costin, Great
Britain and China, 20; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 102;
Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 215.
^°Collis, Foreign Mud, 256-7.
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globe suffered as a result.

For example, Chang Hsin-pao

wrote that
Within the frame work of the British
constitution, Parliament has very little voice in
foreign-pelicy decisions. The decision to wage
war against China in 183 9 was made by Palmerston
alone, under the influence of Smith, Jardine,
Elliot and a few others.
Tan Chung made a similar erroneous assertion : "the British
government could bypass Parliament in making decisions of
far-reaching consequences."

Such statements conform

neither to the British constitution nor to the evidence
found in Hobhouse's diary.

Palmerston had no authority to

start a war without consulting the Cabinet, and Parliament
did have a voice in the decision, especially when the
Ministry lacked the confidence of the country.

If a

majority of the M.P.s disagreed with any Cabinet decision,
then they could remove both the Foreign Secretary and the
Cabinet.
Peter Fay is the only previous historian who came
close to finding a political motivation for the Opium War,

” chang. Commissioner Lin, 194.
^^Chung, China and the Brave New World, 205.
^^Melbourne to Queen Victoria, South Street, 22 March
183 9, "Cabinet Reports by the Prime Minister to the Crown,
1837-1867" (Microfilmed by Harvester Press, 1973), Reel 1;
Angus Hawkins, "'Parliamentary Government’ and Early
Victorian Political Parties, c .1830-c.1880," English
Historical Review 104 (July 1989): 641; On the relationship
between domestic and foreign policy see Black, "British
Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century," 38.
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but he quickly moved away.

In one paragraph, he presented

some of the most significant factors surrounding the
Melbourne Ministry's decision to wage war--the Bedchamber
Crisis, the budget deficit, and the Chartists riots--but he
minimized their importance in the larger scheme of AngloChinese trade relations--the opium trade.

The Cabinet had

to find the money to pay for the opium because "the lobby,
the memorials, the piercing sounds of distress from
Calcutta and Bombay all combined to persuade the Cabinet
that they must.

Citing Hobhouse's memoirs.

Recollections, Fay explained that since neither the British
nor the Indian governments could pay for the opium, the
Cabinet decided to force the Chinese to pay.

He then

promptly disregarded his own analysis and accepted
Palmerston's explanation of the war.

The British sent the

force to China to extract a mere £2,0 00,000 from the
Chinese, because of the immeasurable insult wrought by the
Chinese.

Palmerston wanted to make sure that no such

threat to British trade would happened again.
The British press's reaction to the Opium War has also
received little attention from historians.

In the only

article dealing with the subject Shijie Guan argued that
the Chartist newspapers' attitudes toward the war "can

’^Fay, Opium War, 193.
^^Fay, Opium War, 194.
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throw light on the nature of the Chartist movement, its
class consciousness and feelings of international
solidarity for the oppressed."'*

Viewed in isolation, the

articles Guan cited seem to support his thesis, but when
put into context, they suggest another possible
interpretation.

No single economic "class" monopolized the

opposition to the war in China or the disreputable and
unchristain opium trade.

Newspapers with little

ideological common ground such as The Times, The Leeds
Mercury, The Northern Star and The Charter all joined in
denouncing the vain attempt to collect money for greedy
opium smugglers by violently assaulting China's sovereignty
and people.

The uniqueness of the Chartists' opposition

stems from their belief that the English political system,
which excluded a large portion of the people, allowed a
privileged few to command the resources of the state.
Evidence from the Chartist newspapers thus supports Patrick
Joyce's argument that class consciousness was less
significant in shaping social identities in early
industrial England than populism:

populism’ points to a

set of discourses and identities which were extra-economic
in character, and inclusive and universalising in their

'*Shijie Guan, "Chartism and the First Opium War,"
History Workshop Journal 24 (1987): 18
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social remit in contrast to the exclusive categories of
class.
The neglect of the Cabinet's actual decision to wage
war and the opposition to the conflict has led British
imperial historians astray.

Both Robinson and Gallagher,

and Cain and Hopkins cited Palmerston's desire to force
British manufactured goods on China as evidence for their
own theories of "free trade imperialism" and "gentlemanly
capitalism."’® Neither of these claims can be
substantiated because they rest on the assumption that the
use of force was a necessary component of Palmerston's
foreign policy.

Studies of Palmerston's policy in this

period have shown that the Foreign Secretary's belligerent
behavior in China marked a departure from his peaceful
execution of foreign policy in the Levant, South America,
and Mexico.

Even when merchants and manufactures placed

considerable pressure on the Government, he refused to
solve overseas commercial problems with the use of
f o r c e . B e f o r e the conservative Opposition made a

’Voyce, Visions of the People, 11.
’^Gallagher and Robinson, "Imperialism of Free Trade,"
10; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 82, 100.
’^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol. 2, 6214, 785; Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 250-2; W.M. Mathew,
"The Imperialism of Free Trade : Peru, 1820-70," Economic
History Review 21 (December 1968) : 567; Morgan, "AngloFrench Confrontation and Cooperation in Spanish America,"
97-99; Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some
Reservations," 297.
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political issue of Palmerston's China policy, he also
followed a peaceful course in the Far East.

Once the

debate entered Parliament he acted more like a shrewd
politician reacting to an immediate political crisis than a
high-minded statesman following a clear imperialist policy.
Cain's and Hopkins' focus on the metropolis does,
however, provide a more appropriate context for studying
the motivation that drove imperialism than Gallagher's and
Robinson's concentration on the p e r i p h e r y . T h e Napier
episode makes this point quite clear.

Lord Napier's

behavior had brought Britain and China to the brink of war,
but the Foreign Office refused to be dragged into a fight
that went against British policy.

Only Her Majesty's

Government had the authority to commit troops.

Palmerston

himself told Elliot that representatives of the Crown
stationed abroad had no authority to make important
decisions.

Authority rested in London, not Canton.

While Cain's and Hopkins' argument parallels in some
respects the one presented here, there are important
differences.

Between 1837 and 1842, the height of an

economic depression and the Chartist crisis, they found an
increase in imperialist activities directed by Lord
Palmerston and claimed that he sought to avert a "social

Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism^ 12; Robinson,
"Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," 147-8;
On the periphery thesis see also Fieldhouse, Economics and
Empire, 8; Graham, China Station, x.
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breakdown" in Britain by finding "overseas solutions to
domestic p r o b l e m s . T h e y asserted that he wanted
increased access to foreign markets in order to counter the
Chartist unrest caused by the sharp rise in
unemployment.^^

Neither Palmerston nor his colleagues in

the British Cabinet adhered to such a grand scheme ;
considering the vocal opposition Chartist newspapers
expressed to overseas wars in general, and the Opium War in
particular, there is no compelling reason why the Whigs
should have had such an expectation.

Moveover, Palmerston

and the Chartists shared the belief that economic vitality
depended more upon developing home rather than external
m a r k e t s . T h e political crisis in Parliament, not the
desire to prevent a social breakdown, forced Palmerston to
go against his beliefs and to side with the northern
industrialists and merchants in violently opening China's
market.

Cain's and Hopkins' theory of gentlemanly

capitalism thus fails to explain Palmerston's "burst of
bellicosity" in 1839.
The overwhelming concentration on British imperialism
has also hurt the interpretation of the Opium War by

Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 100; idem,
"Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas,"
523; idem, "The Political Economy of British Expansion
Overseas," 480.
^^Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 40.
^Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 219-21.
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neglecting the Chinese side of the story.

As Martin Lynn

has cautioned, the historian's focus on imperialism has
exaggerated the importance of the Western presence
overseas.

Focusing on Africa as his primary example, Lynn

states, "The Europeans were simply one factor in a complex
mix of forces which an African ruler had to account of;
they were neither the only nor the most deadly threat to
the independence of his s t a t e . D i s t a n c e ,

fiscal

policy, the ineffectiveness of the navy inland, the size of
Africa and the desire of indigenous populations to
manipulate the foreign presence for their own benefits
restricted the ability of British merchants and Foreign
Office agents to control events in Africa.

Many of the

above qualifications of European imperial power in Lynn's
discussion of Africa also apply to China.

In Discovering

History in China, Paul Cohen points out that studying
China's history from a paradigm based on the significance
of the Western impact is misleading.

Even considering all

the trouble the Westerners caused in the treaty ports, the
Chinese government faced the far greater problem of
internal unrest.

Westerners provided Chinese officials.

^'^Martin Lynn, "The 'Imperialism of Free Trade ' and
the Case of West Africa, c .1830-c.1870," The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 (October 1986) : 31.
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and later historians, with easy scapegoats for the
unraveling of Chinese society.
The most recent work on the Anglo-Chinese conflict
examines the subject from Chinese perspective, and its
conclusions complement the arguments presented in this
dissertation.

In The Inner Opium War (1992), James

Polachek shifted the focus from Canton to Peking.

Polachek

explicated the political wrangling over the opium question
within the Emperor's Court.

He tied the decision to

suppress the detestable trade to an attempt by the Spring
Purification Circle to seize power.

His argument dismissed

theories about traditional Chinese isolationism and
aversion to western trade, looking instead at the immediate
political circumstances around the d e c i s i o n . B o t h
Polachek's book and my argument question the validity of
viewing the first Opium War as clash of two cultures, and
both doubt the primacy of economic motivations in causing
the conflict.

Minority factions in Peking and London used

the political crises in their respective governments to
their own advantage.
Umberto Eco's novel, Foucault's Pendulum, helps to
explain the recurring deficiencies in the secondary sources

^^Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China:
American Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York;
Columbia University Press, 1984), 9-55, 97-147.
^'^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 134-5.
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that focus on the Opium War.

While telling the story of

various occult theorists and publishers, Ecco enlightens
his reader with numerous excursions into areas such as
causality and historiography.

Two such excursions are

relevant to the discussion at hand.
causality is simply: A causes B.

First, for many people

Eco explains, however,

"The belief that time is a linear, directed sequence
running from A to B is a modern illusion.

In fact it can

also go from B to A, the effect producing the cause.
Historians, by connecting events and ideas together, create
the past as much as the past creates the future.

In the

historical literature on the Opium War, this reverse
sequencing seems to have taken place.

Since the effect of

the Opium War was to open China, the cause must have been
the desire to see China opened.

Historians readily

accepted justifications, or ex post facto explanations for
the war, without questioning their validity.

Second, when

trying to "prove" a thesis, occult writers and historians
alike effortlessly cite the work of experts to support
their theses.

As the field grows older, and more experts

produce more works, "They confirm one another, therefore
they 're true ."

^^Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, trans. William
Weaver (New York: Ballatine Books, 1988), 173.
28,-

Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, 231.
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From the very beginning of the debate over the Opium
War the political polemics discussed the war's origins in
terms of economic or cultural conflict in the Far East.*
In late 183 9 and 1840 writers had no access to the secret
documents between the Foreign Office and Captain Elliot.
Anyone wishing to write on this subject had to rely on
Palmerston's heavily edited Blue Book and on the public
statements of Cabinet ministers in order to divine their
motivations for waging war half way around the world.

The

story told by twentieth-century historians differs little
from the scory told in the 1840s.

Recent historians have

used both the early narratives and the Blue Book as primary
sources when in fact they are secondary sources.

"They

confirm one another, therefore they're true."
Shifting the focus from events in Canton to conditions
in London challenges long-held assumptions about the
reasons for the first Opium War.

During the 183 0s Lord

Palmerston and the Melbourne Ministry received repeated
warnings from their agents at Canton that the situation
there was deteriorating.

The Ministry either chose to

ignore these warnings or decided that their priorities lay
elsewhere.

Only when news of Elliot's actions in March

183 9 reached Great Britain, and the Opposition held the
Government accountable, did the Whigs decide to take

See Bibliography "Primary Sources: Printed" and
Chapter 7 above.
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action.

The Chartist riots, the three years of deficit

budgets, Irish unrest, colonial rebellions in Canada and
Jamaica, the first Afghan War and French threats to
commerce in Mexico and Buenos Aires all weighed heavily on
the minds of Cabinet members when they made policy
decisions.

As the crisis developed in China over opium,

the Melbourne Ministry faced mounting pressure from the
conservative Opposition and from Radicals sitting in the
Ministerial benches.

The Opposition accused the Ministry

of encouraging unrest at home and of failing to protect
British interests abroad; they charged that the Ministry
lacked the ability to govern.
It is in the context of these immediate charges by the
Opposition that the Ministry's decision to go to war must
be viewed.

Captain Elliot clearly had no authority to

pledge payment for £2,000,000 worth of opium.

If

Palmerston had dismissed the Chief of the Commission, then
the Foreign Secretary would have had to admit that his
policy failed to achieve peaceful access to China's market;
if the Cabinet decided to honor Elliot's pledge, it would
have had to get the approval of Parliament.

The domestic

political crisis thus intensified the commercial crisis in
the Far East and created the opportunity for the Radicals,
whose constituents eagerly awaited the "opening" of China,
to sway a cautious aristocratic government.
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The Ministry had few options.

It had to change

British policy by sending an expeditionary force to China
in order to counter another conservative charge that Her
Majesty's Government neglected the nation's commercial
interests.

Before the opium and Ministerial crises

Palmerston stated his policy clearly to Captain Elliot: the
Government would not take an active role in opening China
to foreign trade.

Free trade meant free trade.

The

Ministry would not replace one form of government
intervention--the East India Company--with another-military force.
own.

Merchants had to open markets on their

Palmerston was not looking for an excuse to attack

the Chinese in an effort to expand trade and could have
continued the policy of quiescence had there been no crisis
of confidence in the Melbourne Ministry.

The Radicals took

advantage of the Ministry's weakness, pressing for war to
enlarge Britain's commercial relationship with China.

The

convergence of the economic crisis in China and the
political crisis in London pressured the British Cabinet to
reverse course.

The Whigs finally sent the naval and

military force that merchants and manufacturers had been
demanding since the failure of the Napier mission.

The

force went to the Far East with the intent of demanding
Chinese redress for the "Insult to the British Flag," and
of guaranteeing future trading rights.

The use of force

was not the result of long-range planning.

Rather, the
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Opium War was an unintended consequence of Palmerston's
failed foreign policy.
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APPENDIX A
Viscount Powerscourt, "House of Commons Debate: January
30, 1840," Times
(London), 31 January 1840, p. 3.
"We have in the first place," continued the noble lord,
"a Chartist conspiracy branching all over England and
Scotland; we have, in the second, a Riband conspiracy with
a secret organization and of an extensive nature, proved to
exist in most parts of Ireland (cheers form the Opposition
benches), and we have a system of perpetual agitation kept
alive in that country, which, like the effects of
unwholesome excitement on the human frame, must terminate
in exhaustion and decay.
(Cheers continued.) We have
numerous colonies--some of them only discontented,--and
what must our condition be when more discontent is
considered comparative happiness! (hear, hear)--others in a
state of subdued revolt--and others again the seat of a
late military triumph, which those who are best acquainted
with the country say will prove only a short-lived one.
(Cheers from the Opposition benches.)
Those colonies
composed of petty states, partially independent of each
other, were only waiting for a small disturbance to fall to
pieces as so many beads would do when the string is cut
which confines them together. (A laugh.) We have a war in
India imminent, and a status quo liable to be disturbed by
the introduction of the sword of Russia or the bayonet of
France into the scales of diplomacy. We have a state of
great financial difficulty before us at home (cheers from
the Opposition benches), and to crown all this, we have a
Government--it is difficult to deny it--which cannot pass a
single measure through Parliament except by sufferance
(cheers from the Opposition benches)--a Government not
distinguished by the possession of a single talent, not
illuminated by a single ray of genius (laughter and cries
of "Oh!" from the Ministerial benches), and not even
supported by the common attributes straightforward dogged
and plodding mediocrity. (Cheers form the Opposition
benches.) The only aptitude of its members is for dexterous
maneuvering. (Cheers from the Opposition.)
They have not
the power to stem the torrent with manly fortitude, for all
they aim at is to keep their heads above it, and to float
listlessly along its tide. (Cheers from the Opposition
benches.) Their last resource is in the favor of the
Crown, whose illustrious wearer is so unacquainted with the
state of affairs as to be incapable of knowing the danger
256
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State of affairs as to be incapable of knowing the danger
of her position, and is kept so purposely in the dark by
those who surround her as to be incapable of seeing what
ought to be her [calm] and magnanimous course. (Hear,
hear.) With all these dangers staring me in the face, I
have no hesitation in saying that, whatever their fate may
be now, in spite of their accommodating system of open
questions and contradictory evasions, which render
impossible even for their best friends to conjecture what
the next day may bring forth, their doom is sealed.
(Cheers from the opposition.)
They have weighed in the
balance and have found wanting. The voice of the country
is now pushing them from their stools (roars of laughter
from the Ministerial benches), and will soon set in their
places men whose principles are in accordance with those of
the constitution, and whose talents are proportioned to the
emergency of the times." (Great cheering from the
Opposition benches.)
Viscount Powerscourt
Vote of No-confidence Debate
January 30, 184 0
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APPENDIX B
Lord Ellenborough. Question to the Prime Minster, 1
August, 1839. Hansard Parliamentary Debates. 3d ser., vol.
49, (1839), cols. 1052-55.
China-Opium Trade] Lord Ellenborough wished to put a
question to the noble Viscount opposite, but, as he
intended to make some remarks on the subject to which it
referred, he should conclude with a motion. He wanted to
draw the attention of her Majesty's Government to the
information lately received from China. The case, as he
understood it, was this : The Chinese government determined
at length to put an end altogether the illicit trade in
opium, and dispatched a commissioner with full powers of
that purpose to Canton. On the arrival of the
commissioner, he intimated to the British merchants that,
with regard to the past, the Chinese government would not
insist on prosecuting any one of anything he might have
done against the law. But they desired for the future that
the trade in opium should cease. They required further
immediate delivery to the Chinese government all opium then
in the possession of British merchants on the waters of
China. They enforced this demand by forming a cordon round
the British factories, and preventing the introduction of
provisions. The British superintendent then went to
Canton, and placed himself in the same circumstance of
peril with the British merchants, his arrival had not the
effect of
making any alteration in their condition. On the
contrary, the blockade was yet more strictly enforced,
and ultimately Captain Elliot, the superintendent, felt
himself obliged, or imagined he was obliged, to request
that the British merchants should deliver to him all the
opium in their possession, for the purpose of being
delivered by him to the Chinese government, he
undertaking, on the part of the British Government, that
all those merchants should be by the British Government
identified. The quantity of opium so delivered, or agreed
to be delivered, amounted to 20,000 chests. He (Lord
Ellenborough) understood that the value was estimated--the
estimate being by no means sufficient--at more than two
millions sterling. Now, it would be a subject undoubtedly
for serious consideration with her Majesty's Government,
when they were acquainted with all the circumstances of the
258
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when they were acquainted with all the circumstances of the
case, how far it might be incumbent on them to sanction the
proceedings of Captain Elliot. Until that gentleman's case
was fully before the public, it would be improper to form
an opinion upon it. But he (Lord Ellenborough) must lay
this down as a general principle, that any person, in civil
situation, who is called upon to perform civil duties in
the public service, is under as solemn an obligation to
disregard every feeling for his own personal safety as any
man in the military service. That which would not be
justified in one holding a [civil] situation, when he
undertook to act for [the] public but in what a position
were we now practically placed by what had occurred?
Whatever might be the conduct of her Majesty's Government,
or whatever might be the success of any negotiation or
intervention with a view of obtaining compensation for
these losses from the Chinese government, he thought it was
impossible not to come to this conclusion, that the trade
in opium practically at an end. Now the revenue of India
derived considerably more than a million sterling a year
from the monopoly of that trade--he believed that the
amount was 1,200,0001 a year and he apprehended, that from
800,0001 to 900,0001 was delivered from the export of opium
to the Chinese territories. The export of opium to China
formed fully more than one-half of the whole export that
export was the equivalent which this country gave to the
Chinese empire for tea. Consider in what position the
revenue of England would be placed by any great change in
the tea trade.
If a smaller quantity of tea should be
imported, the revenue must suffer but incase of the
cessation of the opium trade,the same quantity of tea must
be had at a great additional expense, and, therefore tea
would become much dearer. With respect to the opium trade,
however, it would be difficult for any man to say one word
against the grounds the Chinese government insist on its
discontinuance. That government declared that it was
contrary to its duty to permit this trade, which had been
carried on to such an extent, and v/hich was destroying the
morals and health of the people. He (Lord Ellenborough)
really did not know what answer could be given by the
British Government to the allegations of the somewhat long
but sensible and able statement of the Chinese
commissioners on that subject. These circumstances, and
considering the great importance of anything affecting our
financial condition, at a time when Parliament was
considering the propriety of taking off a tax which would
for some time diminish the revenues, he desired to ask the
noble Viscount [whether] he could lay on the table of the
House any dispatch which he might have received from the
superintendent, giving an account of those transactions.
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In order to make his observation regular, he would beg to
move for the production of any new dispatch.
Viscount Melbourne said, that no dispatch had been
received.
The facts might be as the noble Lord stated, but
her Majesty's Government had received no account of them
whatever. Therefore he should not make any observations on
the subject until the Government was in position of full
information.
Lord Ellenborough had taken the account from the
newspaper, but there could be no reasonable doubt of its
accuracy.
Subject dropped.
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